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ABSTRACT 
 
HABERMAS AND THE FEMINIST ENGAGEMENT WITH COMMUNICATIVE 
ETHICS: SOLIDARITY AND UTOPIAN INTERESTS AS A CORRECTIVE TO 
NORMATIVE POLITICAL PROBLEMATICS 
 
By 
Taine Duncan 
August 2010 
 
Dissertation supervised by Dr. James Swindal. 
 My dissertation subjects Habermas to a critique inspired by ethical and political 
feminist philosophy.  Whereas Habermas believes particularized political interests are 
foundational for communicative ethics, neo-Marxist feminists argue that he makes naïve 
assumptions about the separation of public from private interests.  Habermas, on one 
hand, sees communication as politically oriented dialectics that culminates in rational 
consensus and normative guidelines. Seyla Benhabib, on the other hand, claim that 
Habermas‟ notion of consensus is obtained through false dialectical syntheses.  In her 
view, Habermas cannot preserve the utopian goals cherished by diverse and marginalized 
members of society.  Benhabib thus attempts to reconcile contemporary Critical Theory 
with the utopian nature of a neo-Kantian inspired ethics.  My first three chapters argue 
that this feminist notion of utopianism is a helpful corrective to Critical Theory. 
 v 
 My next chapter moves to Habermas‟ most recent explorations of the nature of 
rational human beings themselves.  Despite his interests in the individuating effects of the 
lifeworld, he gives an increasingly formalistic account of human nature—one that is all 
but solidified in the prenatal stage of life and thus determines potential political action in 
the public sphere. From a feminist standpoint, I argue that his strictures limit what 
normative ethics should actually engender, a notion of autonomy that contributes to 
emancipation and political participation.   
 My final two chapters argue more positively that a relational ethics contributes to 
an expansive understanding of human nature and intersubjective possibility.  I explain 
how conceptions of diversity and relationality can supply a rich formulation of solidarity 
as the model for political action.  I use Amy Allen, Drucilla Cornell and Judith Butler to 
reimagine an Arendtian inspired notion of solidarity, suggesting that the utopian spirit of 
normative ethics can be only fairly achieved through a fluid process of working together 
for shared interests.  By synthesizing the feminist hopes for utopian ideals with the 
concept of solidarity emergent from a relational ethics, I attempt to salvage Habermasian 
concerns for a feminist project of cosmopolitanism and the foundation of an 
emancipatory ethical society. 
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Introduction 
 A Future for Feminist Critical Theory 
 
There was no strain between them and that cannot be explained.  Better not.  For either 
to try to.  Not everything between two people can be laid before The Table for resolution.  
That’s it.1—Nadine Gordimer. 
 
 Nadine Gordimer‟s The Pickup (2001) tells a thoroughly contemporary 
transnational and intercultural love story.  Gordimer weaves an elegant tale of the 
meeting and relationship of Julie and Abdu (Ibrahim), spanning continents, traditions, 
and a process of maturation and growth.  This story illuminates the complexity of 
intersubjective relationships, exposing the fundamental sharing of vulnerability at the 
heart of any human relationship.  Simultaneously, their relationship highlights the 
irreconcilable differences that make every individual unique.  Thematically, the novel 
also works through issues of gender, class, race, religion, and nationality.  These complex 
and interwoven themes help to illuminate the core philosophical problems I deal with in 
this dissertation.  In my research and writing, I hold that philosophy works best as an 
ever-developing and ever-changing dialogue with itself. In both Critical Theory and 
feminism, this methodology of self-critical examination and evolution is not merely a 
method, but integral to their respective philosophical systems. In what follows, I attempt 
a critical examination of the dialogue between Habermas and feminist philosophers, but 
                                                 
1
 Gordimer, Nadine. The Pickup. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001. p. 229. 
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also among various feminist perspectives, ranging from Amy Allen and Bonnie Honig, to 
Judith Butler and Carole Pateman.  However, keeping in mind the requisite development 
of critical reflection, I also offer an original analysis of substantive normativity, to which 
Habermas‟ argument in The Future of Human Nature seems to lead. This analysis 
culminates in a re-evaluation of autonomy in contemporary ethics. I contend that 
autonomy is relevant to the feminist concerns of participation, universalization, and 
innovation, which are all threatened by overly normatively conceived interests. 
The general question that I am interested in answering is how to reconcile autonomy and 
power in human freedom.  More specifically, I address the intersection between the 
theories of Habermas‟ communicative ethics and various feminist analyses of problems 
emerging from such a normative ethics, in order to account for a positive notion of 
autonomy founded in relational ethics.  In my first chapter, I engage the neo-Marxist 
feminist critique of Habermasian normativity as reifying the distinction between public 
and private interests.  In my next two chapters, I claim that Habermas‟ definition of 
normativity depends on an overly optimistic account of rational consensus.  Here, I am 
most interested in uncovering the possibility for a utopian dimension in Habermasian 
ethics.  In chapters 4 and 5, I synthesize these feminist critiques to lay out my original 
ethical position:  a notion of human nature as embedded inextricably in relational ethics, 
dependent on solidarity and the utopian imaginary.  In chapter 6, I address the 
relationship of the current movement in feminist philosophy to adopt and adapt Arendtian 
theory, and I demonstrate the link Arendt affords between Habermas and feminist theory 
on the basis of her conception of solidarity.  Finally, I conclude by showing how revised 
notions of human nature, autonomy, and ethics can restore Habermas‟ own project, as 
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well as address the most important feminist concerns regarding normativity and rationally 
based autonomy. 
 Let me outline my argument in a bit more detail.  I begin chapter 1 by exploring 
the relation between Habermas‟ depiction of particularized political interests as 
foundational for communicative ethics and the neo-Marxist feminist critique of his naïve 
assumptions about the separation of public from private interests.  I am interested here in 
critiques ranging from the relatively established radical critique of contractualism 
espoused by Carole Pateman and Catherine MacKinnon, to the more nuanced views of 
someone like Bonnie Honig, who is sympathetic to Habermas‟ interest in preserving a 
clearly defined notion of rationally motivated society.  I use these critiques as grounding 
for my analysis of Habermas‟ overly Hegelian conception of a communicative and 
politically oriented positive dialectics that culminates in rational consensus and normative 
guidelines.  Critical theoretical feminists like Seyla Benhabib believe that Habermas—to 
his detriment—abandons the utopian goals of a Kantian inspired ethical system, in favor 
of false dialectical syntheses.  Benhabib especially attempts to reconcile contemporary 
Critical Theory with the utopian nature of a neo-Kantian inspired ethics—salvaging 
Critical Theory for a feminist, cosmopolitan, and global society.  Once I have made the 
argument that this feminist notion of utopianism could be a helpful corrective, I move to 
Habermas‟ most recent explorations of the nature of rational human beings themselves, in 
his books The Future of Human Nature and Between Naturalism and Religion. Here 
Habermas argues that human nature is circumscribed by the individual‟s ability to 
employ reason.  Habermas continues to argue for an increasingly formalistic account of 
human nature—one that is all but solidified in the prenatal stage of biological life, and 
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determinate of potential political action in the public sphere.  It is at this stage that I 
introduce my original feminist analysis of Habermas‟ increasingly substantive 
normativity.  I argue that his strictures limit what normative ethics should actually 
engender; namely, a notion of autonomy that contributes to emancipation and political 
participation.  I contend that Habermas‟ recent preoccupation with biological constraints 
and reason undermines his own interests in the intersubjective nature of lived experience 
and the ongoing process of subject formation.  Instead, I argue that a relational ethics, 
grounded first in the intersubjective, rather than the biological, formal, or abstract-
rational, contributes to an expansive understanding of human nature.  I then explain that 
this concept of human diversity and relationality, can ground a rich conception of 
solidarity as the model for political action.  Using feminist Critical Theorists like Amy 
Allen and Drucilla Cornell, I explore the possibility that the utopian spirit of normative 
consensus is fairly achieved only through a fluid process of working together for shared 
interests.  By synthesizing the feminist hopes for utopian ideals with the concepts of 
solidarity that emerge from relational ethics, I then explore the possibility for salvaging 
Habermasian concerns for cosmopolitanism and an emancipatory ethical society by 
providing an inclusionary and proactive feminist grounding. 
 
Introduction: Why Habermas and the Feminist Engagement with Communicative Ethics? 
In the current academic atmosphere of theories concerning global politics, 
terrorism and economic hegemony, an understanding of political discourse seems not 
only important, but integral, to any attempt at understanding contemporary philosophy. 
Issues of language, politics, freedom and human interaction which have been central to 
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German philosophical thought throughout the history of philosophy are yet the subjects 
with which contemporary philosophers are most concerned. Meanwhile, contemporary 
philosophy is often faulted for being compartmentalized, with each theory or school 
acting as though completely isolated from every other theory. When theories intersect, 
generally they fail to fully engage one another, generating little or no productive 
dialogue. Out of this contemporary climate and philosophical heritage, scholars such as 
Habermas, Benhabib, Butler and Cornell reach beyond isolation and 
compartmentalization to productively engage in critically challenging dialogue. Similarly 
interested in intersubjective experience, political representation and the construction of 
“society,” political feminism and Critical Theory have recognized their shared 
background in Marxist and Socialist interests and created theories which lend themselves 
to continuous debate.  
On the side of Critical Theory, there is perhaps no more influential figure than 
Habermas. Habermas‟ interest in theories of democracy, American pragmatism, and his 
roots in The Frankfurt School of Critical Theory afford him a unique perspective on 
ethics, politics, and the future of philosophic debate. His magnum opus The Theory of 
Communicative Action, explains a system of discourse involving two equal interlocutors 
whose discussion, situated in a normative sphere, produces the possibility for social and 
political action. Several feminists contribute the other side of the dialogue, including, but 
far from being limited to, Carole Pateman, Catherine MacKinnon, Seyla Benhabib, 
Bonnie Honig, Nancy Fraser, Amy Allen, Judith Butler and Drucilla Cornell. These 
feminist political scholars are interested in the problematics of equal socio-political 
dialogue, especially in a world where the distinction between public and private spheres 
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still takes precedence.  The research presented here allows me to address several 
philosophically important questions: How and why are these feminist critiques 
interrelated? What might the shared interest in Habermas/Critical Theory indicate about 
current trends in political feminism? Does the feminist confrontation with Habermas 
offer a unique insight into a synthesis of various feminist ideals, issues and concerns? 
By constructing a theoretical dialogue wherein these various feminist positions 
can simultaneously engage one another, as well as Habermasian Critical Theory, I argue 
that I can best relate to the core problems concerning discourse, autonomy and 
intersubjectivity today.  A cursory evaluation of the constructed Pateman-Benhabib 
engagement indicates that the relationship of Habermasian communicative action to 
political feminism is complex and potentially productive. Through my project, I seek to 
uncover the complexities of this relationship.  On a first order level, I offer a 
philosophical exposition of Habermas‟ theory of communicative ethics and action as it 
relates to political feminism.  On a deeper level, through my analysis of the pervading 
critiques of Habermas and normativity, I provide crucial linkages connecting the 
disparate feminist theories to one another.   As I explored the relationship between the 
various feminist positions, I discovered the possibility for an innovative and integrative 
approach to a Critical Theoretical feminist ethics.    
 
Chapter 1: Feminism as Meta-Critical:  The Redemption of the Other Major Antinomy in 
Critical Theory 
Whereas, traditional Critical Theory attempts to restore the primacy of the 
antinomy between subject and object with society as mediation, political feminism, 
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particularly that represented by Carole Pateman, attempts to restore the missing 
antinomy—a critical approach to society itself via a recognition of the tension between 
public and private. Feminists often recognize an internal problem of Marxist theory as 
reinforcing the separation of public and private. However, this problematization usually 
falls short of requiring a critical reinstatement of the antinomy between public and private 
as potentially productive for the feminist critical position. Reinvigorating the project of a 
critical approach to the private sphere, Pateman and MacKinnon have addressed the 
specific concerns of the separation of a feminine/private dimension of society.  As 
Pateman writes in The Sexual Contract: “The civil individual and the public realm appear 
universal only in relation to and in opposition to the private sphere, the natural foundation 
of civil life.”2  Applying this notion of the importance of the private realm to a critique of 
Habermas‟ system of communicative action, several tensions between Habermas‟ theory 
and feminist concerns emerge. Pateman, MacKinnon and others contrast Habermas‟ 
notion of egalitarianism, universalization, and an emphasis on public discourse as 
exclusionary of marginalized, individual and private concerns. However, this feminist 
perspective may be limited as well; by developing a Critical Theory of the private as 
foundational for the public, Pateman, in particular, risks a false reconcilement of the 
antinomy in favor of the private sphere.  Preserving the productive nature of this 
antinomy, while ensuring that private interests do not collapse under the weight of the 
generalized public sphere, requires a synthetic approach to Habermas‟ democratic realism 
and feminist considerations of difference.  In chapter 1, I make the argument that such a 
                                                 
2
 Pateman, Carole. The Sexual Contract. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989. pp. 113-114. 
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synthetic approach is an integral part of productive feminist critique in contemporary 
Critical Theory. 
 
Chapter 2: Raising the Stakes: Normativity and the Problem of Feminist Belonging 
Exploring autonomy and intersubjectivity through feminist lenses requires an 
analysis of power, representation, and an exploration of political legitimation.   For 
Habermas, these concepts are constrained theoretically by his narrow definition of 
normativity as both the foundation for social relations, and the means through which 
ethical society is ensured.  In this chapter, I argue that Habermas‟ definition of 
normativity is uniquely influential for feminist theories of autonomy, as both a challenge 
to, and an inspiration for, feminist notions of difference, individuation, and participation.  
The tension between feminist theories and a Habermasian notion of normativity further 
exposes an internal tension within feminist Critical Theory: How can an emancipatory 
theory simultaneously respect difference, while ensuring justification for social 
participation?  This dilemma develops explicitly in the influential feminist work Feminist 
Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange (1995), with contributions from Seyla Benhabib, 
Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell, and Nancy Fraser.  Ostensibly a debate between feminist 
theorists on the usefulness of postmodern philosophy to feminist ethics and political 
philosophy, this exchange is indicative of this central dilemma in establishing a feminist 
Critical Theory.  In order to develop this position, I articulate the progression of 
Habermas‟ conception of normativity.  Then, I relate this concept of normativity to both 
the postmodern positions espoused by Butler and Cornell, as well as the more 
conservative theoretical positions articulated by Benhabib and Fraser.  I uncover how 
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even the most stringent postmodern position Butler puts forward is still dependent on a 
notion of discursivity with normative understanding at its core.  Simultaneously, the most 
sympathetic and Habermasian argument maintained by Benhabib exposes the difficulty 
normative theory faces with particularity and difference.  I end this chapter by analyzing 
case studies, embodying the Critical Theoretical emphasis on relating theory and practice.  
With both women‟s health care, and transnational feminist concerns for Afghani 
emancipation, normative theories provide valuable means for evaluation and justification, 
while at the same time tending towards anonymous universalization and disguising 
particularized needs and problems.  The theoretical alternative begins to emerge as a 
relationally grounded ethics, neither abstracted in an absolute postmodern sense, nor 
leveled by overly rationalist normative Critical Theory.   
 
Chapter 3: Seeking Utopia: A Feminist Critical Analysis of Habermas’ Consensus 
Orientation 
In another vein of feminist discourse and debate, Seyla Benhabib and Bonnie 
Honig approach the limitations of Critical Theory from a utopian perspective. Benhabib 
studied under Habermas at the University of Frankfurt, and much of her work is 
influenced by the time she spent there. Benhabib‟s work is uniquely important to my own 
understanding of the debate between communicative action theory and American 
feminists, because contrary to many feminist philosophers, Benhabib espouses a modified 
version of Habermas‟ theory. For Benhabib, a system of Habermasian communicative 
action resolves conflicts, answers moral and political questions, and balances self-interest 
(private) with mutual understanding (public), albeit in a limited way given his emphasis 
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on normativity.  Benhabib believes Habermas recognizes and addresses the dichotomy 
between public and private, but that his application and extension of political discourse is 
limited by its consensus orientation.  In this chapter, I emphasize these unique critical, 
neo-Kantian perspectives by analyzing the tension between this consensus orientation and 
utopian ethics in Habermas‟ discourse theory.  According to Benhabib, and others, 
Habermas—to his detriment—abandons the utopian goals of a Kantian inspired 
philosophical ethics.  Benhabib and Honig attempt to reconcile contemporary Critical 
Theory with the utopian nature of a neo-Kantian inspired cosmopolitan ethics—salvaging 
Critical Theory for feminist and global social considerations.  
In her essay “The Utopian Dimension in Communicative Ethics”(1991), Benhabib 
offers a critique using Habermasian ideas against Habermas himself.   Her critique rests 
on the grounds that Habermas over-determines the normatizing power of communicative 
action in fulfilling truth ideals to the detriment of the utopian and emancipatory 
transfiguring powers of critique.  Explicit in her claims is a neo-Kantian and feminist 
formulation of utopian universalization and emancipation as the primary outcomes of 
critical philosophy.   However, implicit in her claims lies a potentially illuminating 
reconstruction of Habermasian communicative ethics as a philosophy of spirit rather than 
critique.  In this chapter, I uncover Habermas‟ Hegelian tendencies in Moral 
Consciousness and Communicative Action (1990).  Then, by examining Benhabib‟s 
critique of fulfillment-oriented philosophy, I argue that Habermas‟ description of 
normativity is not only linked more to his Hegelian heritage of philosophies of spirit than 
to his critical allegiance with Kantianism, but that it also abandons the central critical 
theoretical goal of emancipation.  It is precisely emancipation and transfiguration that 
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allow for a feminist Critical Theory to emerge, and by recreating the philosophical 
historical lineage of Habermas‟ thought, I reconfigure a contemporary Critical Theory 
that synthesizes Habermasian concepts with the ethical, political, and practical theoretical 
aspects of feminist critique.  I end this chapter with an analysis of practical and 
theoretical issues illuminated by a case example of immigration legislation, culminating 
in a developed feminist utopian position using Honig‟s, Benhabib‟s, and Pateman‟s 
theories of cosmopolitanism. 
 
Chapter 4: The Future of Human Nature:  A Critical Analysis of Habermas and the 
Ethics of Expanding Human Nature 
In this chapter, I contend that Habermas‟ concerns with normativity and 
autonomy become too restrictive when it comes to controversial issues such as pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis.  In this case, his strictures limit normatively guaranteed 
autonomy by constricting parental decision-making and confining the free choice of the 
individual within biological and genetic constraints.  Using critical theorists Amy Allen, 
Cristina Lafont, and Nikolas Kompridis, in conjunction with care ethicists such as 
Virginia Held, I propose that in order to evaluate the ethics of medical enhancement, the 
definition of "human nature" must be expanded to recognize the cultural, psychological, 
and self-constitutive forces that contribute to the creation of personhood. 
In The Future of Human Nature (2003), Habermas‟ argument hinges on the 
notion of biological nature—he proposes that genetic interference is ultimately 
irreversible and final in the constitution of a person.  However, Habermas' strict 
definition of human nature and its future possibilities restricts the potential for 
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reevaluating the very notion of human nature, and subjectivation. A feminist revision of 
the notion of existential personhood simultaneously respects the decision-making ability 
of the individual, while recognizing the expanded notions of human nature and parental 
responsibility.  In this chapter, I begin with a careful analysis of Habermas' core 
argument in The Future of Human Nature, providing an examination of challenges to his 
project, notably from Lafont on the role of parental responsibility and Kompridis on 
normativity.  Once the core argument is established, I provide an analysis of an 
alternative ethical foundation through a modification of relational care ethics.  In this 
way, I challenge the fundamental assumption that genetic enhancement limits autonomy 
by proposing that a responsible medical ethics including genetic enhancement may 
instead expand existential freedom.  This deeper understanding of the relation between 
bodies, social recognition and our self-identity is of important concern to a feminist 
project of Critical Theory.  Genetic intervention may have a determinative influence on 
physiology, but Habermas‟ account also indicates his belief that it is determinative of 
subjective identity.  This position undermines his own acceptance of communicative 
action as self-empowering, and ultimately intersubjective.   
 
Chapter 5: Mourning and Vulnerability: What Butler and Cornell Offer to Habermas’ 
Theories of Human Nature 
Central to Habermas‟ conception of autonomous subjects is not only the genetic 
formation of the biological self, but also the psychological development of the 
ethical/moral adult.  These themes were most important for Habermas‟ reflections on 
Lawrence Kohlberg and psychology, but returning to these ideas is additionally useful for 
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feminist correctives to the overly normative and biological-formal accounts Habermas 
has more recently espoused.  In this chapter, I continue the exploration of human nature I 
began in chapter 4, focusing predominately on Habermas‟ arguments in Between 
Naturalism and Religion (2008).  Here Habermas contends that subjectivation is 
motivated by the recognition that comes from rational consensus.  This overly rationalist 
version of Habermas‟ theory of autonomy seems to occlude the dynamic and complex 
psychological characteristics of Habermas‟ earlier conceptions of subjectivity.  Here, I 
use Cornell and Butler to reintroduce a psychological component of subjectivity.  Unlike 
the overly rationalist conception of subjectivation, the subject Cornell and Butler propose 
is primarily dynamic and future oriented.  It is continually in a process of subjectivation, 
one which relies on both intersubjective recognition, and on personal imagination.  With 
this fuller conception of intersubjectivity and imagination, I contend that participation in 
the public sphere becomes not only possible, but additionally meaningfully oriented 
towards a utopian future of greater emancipation. 
 As an alternative to recognition through rational-consensus, Butler proposes a 
Levinasian conception of recognition through vulnerability and mourning.  The Other is 
an embodied subject, and like oneself, that body and that psychology is vulnerable to 
harm.  This fundamental vulnerability connects all subjects, across national, cultural and 
gender divides, ensuring that subjects are recognized even when we cannot make rational 
sense of them.  By combining this conception of vulnerability to Cornell‟s conception of 
imagination and forgiveness, which allow us to conceptualize new and illimitable 
emancipatory ideals, subjectivation and intersubjectivity are redefined.  Highlighting the 
potentials for emancipation, and future possibility, I argue that these theories allow for 
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the development of a new concept of autonomous participation.  Through recognition and 
imagination, the desire for change becomes real.  With this desire, I argue, comes a 
motivation for solidarity.  I then articulate how a concept of solidarity functions as an 
alternative to public participation through rationally motivated normative consensus, 
working to combine the impulse to relational ethics I found emergent in feminist critiques 
of rationality, with a utopian conception of subjectivation and autonomy.  
 
Chapter 6: Arendtian Solidarity: What Hannah Arendt Offers to a Feminist Critique of 
the Public Sphere 
For the development of a utopic and relational ethics of solidarity, I trace the 
formulation of solidarity to another historical line of development from German political 
philosophy.  Highlighting the ways in which Hannah Arendt has been reimagined for an 
explicitly feminist project of contemporary Critical Theory, in this chapter I work to 
define Arendtian solidarity in contradistinction to Habermasian normativity.  In order to 
do so, I first identify the affinities Habermas‟ and Arendt‟s theories have with one 
another; not only are they both indebted to a thoroughly German conception of the public 
sphere, wherein the weight of the history of the Holocaust features prominently 
(explicitly and implicitly), but they are also both theorists that emphasize the material and 
practical in relationship to theory.  This affinity ties them to one another, as well as to the 
feminist theoretical positions which, I argue, will reinvigorate Critical Theory for 21
st
 
Century thought.    
This construction is not only viable as an abstraction of theoretical affinities; 
contemporary feminist philosophers have reclaimed Arendtian theory explicitly.  Amy 
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Allen, as well as Honig and Benhabib, find Arendt a kindred theorist.  Additionally, 
Arendt‟s careful articulation of a theory of solidarity combines sensitivity to a utopic 
future with a pragmatic groundedness in material reality.  Arendt   I contend that this 
synthesis can be interpreted to function as the important linkage between the feminist 
theories of difference and postmodernism with the feminist theories of universalism and 
pragmatism. 
In order for a neo-Arendtian conception of solidarity to accomplish this weighty 
task, however, the characteristics and applications of solidarity must be carefully laid out.  
In chapter 6, I provide the philosophical history of Arendtian solidarity, and working 
from this groundwork, I articulate a particular formulation of a relationship of solidarity.  
By highlighting the pluralistic possibilities of solidarity, I argue that a contentious 
relationship of intergendered, international, or intercultural solidarity may serve to both 
ensure autonomous difference and universal emancipatory possibility. 
Keeping in mind the notion of concerted activity as a specific application of 
political power, solidarity fits well into the sort of transfiguration Benhabib calls for in a 
system of utopian Communicative ethics.  If transfiguration is the “new and imaginative 
constellation of the values and meanings of the present,”3 is solidarity not also a 
transfigurative power?  Solidarity, as a political activity, is directly opposed to the notion 
of unchallenged fulfillment of norms.  Additionally, to remain true to Arendtian theory, 
constellations of political agents working in the interests of solidarity must remain fluid 
constellations.  Solidarity retains its full power by opening itself to as-yet-unseen 
                                                 
3
 Benhabib, Seyla. “The Utopian Dimension in Communicative Ethics.” Critical Theory: The Essential 
Readings.  Ed. by David Ingram and Julia Simon-Ingram.   St. Paul, Minnesota: Paragon House, 1991.  p. 
389. 
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interests and as-yet-unheard voices in the political arena.  Following Honig, if Arendtian 
politics maintains a Derridean duality, than a refreshed concept of Arendtian solidarity 
would also provide the “double-gesture”—solidarity works towards the protection of 
generalizable interests; however, as a form of ongoing political action, rather than ideal 
fulfillment, solidarity is also open to the influence of individual political actors. 
 
A Future for Feminist Critical Theory: “Not everything between two people can be laid 
before The Table for resolution.” 
In The Pickup, Gordimer gives a fictionalized account of a complex and fluid 
intergendered love relationship.  The Pickup illustrates the necessity for change, even 
when the intersubjective relationship is only between two people.  Although the changes 
are precipitated by the development of psychological needs rather than overtly political 
needs, Gordimer draws a parallel between the psychical and the political that I contend is 
central to understanding autonomy and intersubjectivity.  At the beginning of the novel, 
Julie and Abdu are motivated to begin a sexual relationship in order to fulfill reciprocal 
needs for belonging and family.  Julie feels distant from her own South African family 
and feels explicitly expelled by her wealthy, White, and patriarchal father.  In order to 
construct a familial bond outside the confines of her privileged categories of race and 
class, Julie seeks companionship from Abdu.  As an illegal immigrant day laborer, Abdu 
seems to need the same sort of sense of belonging.  In a foreign place, under an assumed 
name, and with no permanent address, Abdu is cut off from social and family relations of 
belonging.  So Abdu and Julie work together to fill these needs for one another.  This 
relationship works only because Abdu and Julie recognize a mutual vulnerability and a 
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reciprocal need in one another.  Equally importantly, they do not allow this recognition to 
fool them into absolute understanding of one another, or to allow the relationship to 
consume them.  Instead, Julie and Abdu misunderstand one another at times, have hidden 
motivations for some of their actions, and strive to keep an autonomous individual 
existence.  Julie keeps a group of friends that she knows Abdu does not particularly 
understand or approve of, while Abdu maintains certain Muslim cultural practices, for 
example, by not drinking alcohol.  However, once the desire for familial belonging has 
been met, at least in a qualified sense, both Julie and Abdu develop other needs and seek 
to have them fulfilled by the other. 
By the end of the novel, Julie and Abdu are married and living in Abdu‟s—now 
Ibrahim‟s—home country.  There, Ibrahim is reunited with his immediate family, and 
rekindles traditional familial bonds, particularly with his mother.  Meanwhile, Julie forms 
her own bonds with his family and her newly adopted community.  The need for 
belonging slowly develops and changes into a desire for individual fulfillment.  Ibrahim 
desires a challenging and more fulfilling job, and wishes to emigrate again.  Julie desires 
to invest in an oasis in the desert, so she can cultivate her own crops, wishing to stay in 
Ibrahim‟s homeland.  After various misunderstandings, disagreements, and fights, 
Ibrahim and Julie tacitly agree to let Ibrahim immigrate to the U.S., while Julie remains.  
The novel ends ambiguously, leaving the reader unsure if Ibrahim and Julie will reunite 
in either the U.S. or the desert, or even if either of them would wish to reunite.  To my 
mind, this is the perfect ending for illustrating the necessity for truly intersubjective 
relationships to remain fluid.  Now that Julie and Ibrahim are attaining individual 
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fulfillment, the potentials for their relationship remain open to accommodating future 
needs and the corresponding changes that will be required of their relationship. 
 Meaningful life is both grounded in a historically contingent present and oriented 
towards a transfiguring future.  In feminist Critical Theory, this combination is of utmost 
concern, resulting in debate, dialogue, and contention.  However, in the lived human 
relationships we find reflected in good literature, this apparent antagonism is a central 
component to understanding the meaning of lived experience.  Gordimer‟s Julie 
ruminates:  
No, no…that‟s not what I‟m trying to…Water‟s—water is change; and the desert doesn‟t.  So 
when you see the two together, the water field of rice growing, and it‟s in the desert—there‟s a 
span of life right there—like ours—and there‟s an existence beyond any span.  You know?4 
 
Although Ibrahim misinterprets Julie as attempting to argue for God‟s existence, I believe 
that Gordimer‟s point, through Julie, is that human existence must encompass past, 
present, and future.  Life must be grounded, like the desert, and open to transfiguration, 
like an oasis of water.  And the real magic occurs where both elements occur together.  
This essential revelation mirrors the feminist philosophical attempt to reconcile that-
which-is with the yet-to-come.  This supports Cornell‟s point that human imagination is 
central to Critical Theory, that openness to future possibility is necessary for 
emancipation.  But this also supports Benhabib‟s more Habermasian claim that 
emancipation rests on human rights, which must emerge in a specific historical-political 
time and place. 
 Not only must the feminist theorist be mindful of the relationship of present and 
future to contingency and change, but for Critical Theory reemerge consistent with 
feminist theories of solidarity and utopic concerns, then particularization and 
                                                 
4
 Gordimer, Pickup, p. 214. 
 xxvii 
universalization must be similarly accounted for.  Butler makes this possible through her 
theory of recognition in mutual vulnerability.  Gordimer also expresses the feeling of this 
destabilizing intersubjectivity.  She describes the psychological reflection on physical 
intimacy: 
The capacity returned to him, for this foreigner makes him whole.  That night he made love to her 
with the reciprocal tenderness—call it whatever old name you like—that he had guarded against—
with a few lapses—couldn‟t afford its commitment, in this situation, must be able to take whatever 
the next foothold might offer.  That night they made love, the kind of love-making that is another 
country, a country of its own, not yours or mine.
5
  
 
For me, this passage expresses that, not only is recognition a result of seeing the 
vulnerability of the Other, but that it is equally the result of sharing in that vulnerability—
making a shared space from that vulnerability.  Here the metaphor of a country of its own 
highlights how important this recognition is, not only for feminist considerations of 
intergendered
6
 relations, but also how important recognition is in the face of an 
increasingly cosmopolitan and transnational society.   
 Despite this optimism for the potential for feminist philosophy to account for 
theoretical tensions in Critical Theory, feminist philosophy must be wary of settling for 
an absolute or final Theory-as-such.  Feminist Critical Theory must be oriented toward 
critique, evaluation, and reinterpretation to retain its essential critical and emancipatory 
potential.  In general, philosophy works best as an ever-developing and ever-changing 
dialogue with itself.  In both Critical Theory and feminism, this methodology of self-
critical examination and evolution is not merely structural, but integral to their respective 
philosophical systems. To this end, I hope to provide a critical examination of the 
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dialogue, not only between Habermas and feminist philosophers, but also among various 
feminist perspectives. Employing the critical methodology, I will offer a historically 
relevant explanation of the contemporary Critical Theory and feminist engagement; 
however, keeping in mind the requisite development of critical methodology, I will also 
offer my own original analysis of substantive normativity and the possible reevaluation of 
autonomy in a contemporary ethics—a notion of autonomy which is relevant to the 
feminist concerns of participation, universalization, and innovation, otherwise threatened 
by overly normatively construed interests.  In this way, this dissertation offers something 
new to the discourses of Critical Theory and feminist theory, and to applications of both 
in the field of ethics. 
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Chapter 1 
 Feminism as Meta-Critical: 
The Redemption of the Other Major Antinomy in Critical Theory 
 
Working from a Marxist feminist perspective, Carole Pateman has written 
extensively on critical appraisals of contract theory and the situation of private life in the 
contemporary political state.   The intersection between the theories of Habermas‟ 
communicative action and Pateman‟s analysis of contract theory is particularly 
interesting from both sides of the Critical Theory and political feminism dialogue.  
Following one vein of a constructed theoretical intersection, in this chapter I seek to 
provide the framework for Habermas‟ treatment of society as a constitutive component of 
his theory of communicative action, compare that to Pateman‟s problematization of the 
public/private distinction and, finally, to evaluate this comparison within feminist 
scholarship both supportive of and critical to Habermas‟ usefulness for feminist analysis 
of the antinomy between public and private.   
 
Habermas’ Indebtedness to Adorno 
To understand fully the framework within which Habermas develops his notion of 
society in communicative action, it is necessary to provide a brief exegesis of Adorno‟s 
theory of negative dialectics.  In his theory of negative dialectics, Theodor Adorno 
2 
 
reinforces the productive possibilities of philosophical critique based on the recognition 
of irresolvable antinomies.  Rather than proposing a theory of dialectics based on 
“reconcilement”—as Adorno accuses the Idealists of doing—Adorno rejects a totalizing 
trajectory of philosophy in favor of a critical analysis of the tension between subject and 
object.
7
   Proper employment of the negative dialectic involves the understanding that 
neither reconciliation nor absolute separation is fully appropriate to Critical Theory:  
The separation of subject and object is both real and illusory.  True, because in the cognitive realm 
it serves to express the real separation, the dichotomy of the human condition, a coercive 
development.  False, because the resulting separation must not be hypostasized, not magically 
transformed into an invariant.
8
 
 
In his humbled approach to philosophy, Adorno claims he “redeems” theory by 
introducing a critical approach.  Although Adorno recognizes that the antinomy cannot be 
resolved, he contends it can be restructured and reformulated.  This restructuring and 
recognition of the tension necessary for irresolvable antinomies is “one of the strongest 
motives of nonidealist [negative] dialectics.”9    
If one were to take Adorno‟s system of negative dialectics most seriously, then 
critical philosophy must be performed on his own work in order to redeem the theory of 
negative dialectics itself.  Taking up this task, Habermas critically engages the system of 
negative dialectics.  Analyzing the efficacy of this system, Habermas is most concerned 
with the prospects of a critical understanding of society.  Initially, Habermas agrees with 
the negative dialectical emphasis on the mediating capacity of society; however, 
Habermas identifies problems with Adorno‟s treatment of mediation as incomplete:  
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This dialectic makes us aware of the untruth of both positions, and this raises the question of their 
mediation.  The thesis developed in Dialectic of Enlightenment does not direct our thought to the 
path that is nearest at hand, a path which leads through the inner logics of the different complexes 
of rationality and through processes of societal rationalization divided up according to universal 
aspects of validity, and which suggests a unity of rationality beneath the husk of an everyday 
practice that has been simultaneously rationalized and reified.
10
 
  
Habermas indicates that although Adorno and Horkheimer do not themselves follow the 
trajectory “nearest at hand,” a path utilizing “societal rationalization” would be more 
direct and productive for negative dialectics.  In his critique of Adorno, Habermas claims 
that Adorno‟s notion of society and its operations is incomplete—it does not maintain 
enough interest in the role of communication as a productive element of society.
11
 
According to Habermas, Adorno manages simultaneously to downplay the productive 
role of communication, while falsely elevating the role of reified consciousness in place 
of true intersubjectivity in society:   
After this, if you will, „idealist‟ retranslation of the concept of reification into the context of the 
philosophy as consciousness, Horkheimer and Adorno give such an abstract interpretation of the 
structures of reified consciousness that it covers not only the theoretical form of identifying 
thought but even the confrontation of goal-oriented acting subjects with external nature…With 
this they take back in part the abstraction they made at first, namely the detachment of thought 
from the context of reproduction.  Instrumental reason is set out in concepts of subject-object 
relations.  The interpersonal relation between subject and subject, which is decisive for the model 
of exchange, has no constitutive significance for instrumental reason.
12
  
 
In Habermas‟ estimation, the concept of societal subjects is necessarily split in Adorno‟s 
theory; just as subject is differentiated from object, so too is society differentiated from 
nature.
13
  Habermas claims that his own notions of communicative action would provide 
the proper mediation between societal subject and the natural world—allowing for both 
natural materialism and intersubjective discourse.   In other words, for Habermas 
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communicative action is the proper goal of intersubjective communication in society:  
“This model has ushered in a communications-theoretic turn that goes beyond the 
linguistic turn of the philosophy of the subject.  What interests me in the present context 
is not the philosophical significance of this turn, but the caesura that the end of the 
philosophy of the subject means for the theory of society.”14  By replacing a theory of 
absolute subjectivity with a theory based on intersubjectivity, Habermas proposes a 
system he claims to be free of marginalization, relativism and misunderstanding.  Further, 
this understanding of intersubjectivity creates the grounds for what Habermas deems the 
lifeworld.  For Habermas, the lifeworld represents the environment and outcome of 
intersubjective experience.  Recognizing the importance of both the environmental 
foreground against which cultural practices and interactions are established, as well as the 
cultural environment that develops from such interactions, Habermas suggests the 
concept of a lifeworld to represent this complex interaction between subjects, their 
environment, and one another.  
 
Universalization in the Public Sphere 
Intersubjectivity for Habermas includes both the notion of actual intersubjectivity, 
as well as the discursive possibilities of intrapsychic communication.  In making a call 
for a critical understanding of both the intersubjective and intrapsychic, Habermas seems 
to indicate his own interest in both private and social interests.
15
  In fact, Habermas 
explicates a desire to analyze critically the reciprocal relationships between private and 
public interests in Between Facts and Norms when he writes:  “We will see that the social 
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changes leading to an awareness of the paradigm shift make it necessary to conceive the 
relation between private and political autonomy no longer as an opposition but as a nexus 
of reciprocal connections.”16  According to Habermas, private law is traditionally 
conceived of incorporating a “certain set of rights and institutions”; these rights originally 
included personal rights, freedom to enter into contracts, and property rights.
17
  He goes 
on to say, however, that private law has changed to correspond with socio-ethical 
interests—indicative of reciprocity between the private and public.  He recognizes the 
conceptual importance of making a formal distinction between the public and private, 
but, using the changes in the reciprocity of private law and public interest as examples, 
Habermas argues that the relationship between the public and private is more complicated 
than an actual separation.
18
  In other words, although the public and private are 
increasingly collapsed as a result of the development of reciprocity in contemporary 
society, Habermas understands that the public and private can neither be entirely 
synthesized, nor completely distinguished.   
In his attempt to provide evidence for reconciliation in a system of intersubjective 
communication, Habermas returns again to the notions of universal accessibility and 
compulsion-free society:   
The structures of reason to which Adorno merely alludes first become accessible to analysis when 
the ideas of reconciliation and freedom are deciphered as codes for a form of intersubjectivity, 
however utopian it may be, that makes possible a mutual and constraint-free understanding among 
individuals in their dealings with one another, as well as the identity of individuals who come to a 
compulsion-free understanding with themselves—sociation without repression.19 
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The idealistic concept of “sociation without repression” seems incompatible with the 
contemporary understanding of power relationships; however, Habermas does not 
altogether abandon the notion of actualizing compulsion-free understanding.  Instead, 
Habermas places the onus of responsibility on free citizens to determine the functional 
relationship between the private and the public.
20
  In actual, material existence agreement 
and universalization must be determined in specific, particular instances.  As Habermas 
explains: “It must therefore be decided from case to case whether and in which respects 
factual (or material) equality is required for the legal equality of citizens who are both 
privately and publicly autonomous.”21  Based on his theory that universalization can be 
determined for each particular instance of communicative action, Habermas believes that 
any problems with the reciprocity of public and private stem from forced normalizations, 
and could be avoided through careful expression of agreed-upon boundaries.  Habermas 
clarifies this concept of normativity:    
This nexus of reciprocal references provides an intuitive standard by which one can judge whether 
a regulation promotes or reduces autonomy.  According to this standard, enfranchised citizens 
must, in exercising their public autonomy, draw the boundaries of private autonomy in such a way 
that it sufficiently qualifies private persons for their role of citizen.  This is because 
communication in a public sphere that recruits private persons from civil society depends on the 
spontaneous inputs from a lifeworld whose core private domains are intact.  At the same time, the 
normative intuition that private and public autonomy presuppose each other informs public dispute 
over the criteria for securing the equal autonomy of private persons, that is, criteria that specify 
what material preconditions of legal equality are required at a given time.
22
 
   
For Habermas, therefore, what constitutes the public and private realms is determined by 
communicatively-participating citizens. Through discourse, citizens determine the 
historically constituted criteria for the equal autonomy of private individuals.  In this 
theory, then, not only are the public and private realms determined by communication, 
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but also the autonomous capacity of participants is communicatively dictated.  With his 
recurrent emphasis on the role of universal participation ensuring universal agreement 
and equality, Habermas indicates that the validity of norms is determined by the universal 
appeal of practical discourse:  “According to discourse ethics, a norm may claim validity 
only if all who might be affected by it reach (or would reach), as participants in a 
practical discourse, agreement that this norm is valid.”23   
In addition to the notion of universalization, Habermas claims that reflexivity is 
also necessary to achieve the goal of consensus, indicating a positive relationship with 
dialectic reasoning: “By entering into a process of moral argumentation, the participants 
continue their communicative action in a reflexive attitude, with the aim of restoring a 
consensus that has been disrupted.”24  Habermas admits that his notion of reflexivity, 
however, can only occur within a publicly constituted discourse: “Only these public 
presuppositions are comparable to the transcendental preconditions on which the Kantian 
analysis was focused.  Only of them can one say that they are inescapable 
presuppositions of irreplaceable discourses and in that sense universal.”25  Despite his 
recognition of public and private elements of society, and his emphasis on the necessity 
for a critical appraisal of society, Habermas continually reiterates the importance of 
universalization via public discourse—a leveling that arguably eliminates the importance 
of the private.  Not only is the public element of society granted a greater importance in a 
Habermasian system of communicative action, but the effective system is also necessarily 
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controlled by institutional forces in public society.  Even when not actively participating 
in communication, an individual is subject to the ethical foundations and ramifications of 
public communicatively-oriented society.  Habermas makes the further claim that 
individual choice is merely an abstraction from a socially constituted lifeworld:  “As long 
as he is alive at all, a Robinson Crusoe existence through which the skeptic could 
demonstrate mutely and impressively that he has dropped out of communicative action is 
inconceivable, even as a thought experience.”26   
Anticipating feminist criticisms of discursively constituted autonomy, Habermas 
carefully lays the groundwork for a discussion of political feminism within the 
framework of communicative action.  Habermas concisely describes the feminist view in 
terms of the legal debate in defining private and public spheres.  Habermas claims that 
this feminist perspective is part of a movement he calls the “women‟s struggle for 
equality.”27  For Habermas, feminist concerns are all related to notions of public equality.  
According to his reading of feminist theory, women must speak in the public realm to 
ensure proper treatment of the private notions of gender identity and difference.  The 
onus of responsibility is again placed on active participants; feminist equality is ensured 
by women‟s public participation.   
Despite Habermas‟ careful consideration of intersubjectivity, the lifeworld, and 
social interests in his theory of communicative action, many feminists view Habermas‟ 
treatment of society as a leveling force, rather than the appropriate grounds for a critical 
appraisal of the dichotomy between public and private.  In her book The Sexual Contract, 
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Carole Pateman provides a compelling argument for the necessity of reinstating a 
productively motivated understanding of this missing critical antinomy in social theory.  
 
Pateman and the Foundation of the Private 
Like Habermas, Carole Pateman recognizes the distinction in legal and social 
society between public and private.  However, unlike Habermas, Pateman believes this 
dichotomy to be much more philosophically relevant to emancipation than 
universalization; in fact, Pateman believes that political society inherently neglects 
aspects of private society because of the incorrect assumption that private society is 
irrelevant to the public sphere.
28
  Pateman recognizes that the missing critical appraisal of 
the private is necessary for understanding the actual state of affairs in political discourse.  
Marie Fleming notes the importance of Pateman‟s analysis, claiming that,  “In an 
impressive analysis she demonstrates that, notwithstanding the objections made by some 
feminists—Okin, for example—the coexistence of public equality and private inequality 
is not a contradiction of the modern „fraternal‟ patriarchy, but part of a „coherent social 
structure‟.”29  For Pateman, and many other feminists, a critical analysis of the private 
sphere is not merely theoretically relevant, but relevant for consideration of actual social 
inequality.  As in Adorno‟s recognition of the dual relationship between subject and 
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object, Pateman recognizes the reciprocal relationship two sides of the social antinomy 
have with one another:   
The two spheres of civil society are at once separate and inseparable.  The public realm cannot be 
fully understood in the absence of the private sphere, and similarly, the meaning of the original 
contract is misinterpreted without both, mutually dependent, halves of the story.
30
  
  
This reciprocal relationship, according to Pateman, extends beyond merely providing two 
sides of a basic concept of society.  The reciprocal interaction of public and private is 
exactly that point on which political society has been founded.  On the surface, Pateman‟s 
description of mutually dependent halves of the social sphere seems analogous to 
Habermas‟ characterization.  However, Pateman goes on to argue that traditional 
characterizations—including those quite similar to Habermas—tend to oversimplify the 
private sphere in order to account for private interests within the public sphere.  Instead, 
Pateman suggests that the private sphere is complex and although dependent upon, not 
collapsible into, public society.    
Understanding this reciprocal relationship as the foundation for society, Pateman 
recognizes that the exclusion of women from the public realm rests on the simultaneous 
relationship and distinction that exists between public and private, a complex relationship 
which is not only critically ignored, but often misrepresented to the detriment of the 
private realm: 
The private sphere is „forgotten‟ so that the „private‟ shifts to the civil world and the class division 
between private and public.  The division is then made within the „civil‟ realm itself, between the 
private, capitalist economy or private enterprise and the public or political state, and the familiar 
debates ensue.
31
 
 
For Pateman, the legal debate over private interests in a public society camouflages the 
actual distinction between public and private.  „Private interests‟ in the legal realm are 
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merely capitalist interests within the narrow spectrum of private businesses, opposed to 
the „public interests‟ of larger corporations or politics.  The actually existent private 
realm of society, however, is much more closely connected to the notions of “nature,” 
“woman,” and the “individual”: 
Women are incorporated into a sphere that both is and is not in civil society.  The private sphere is 
part of civil society, but is separated from the „civil‟ sphere.  The antinomy private/public is 
another expression of natural/civil and women/men.  The private, womanly sphere (natural) and 
the public, masculine sphere (civil) are opposed but gain meaning from each other, and the 
meaning of the civil freedom of public life is thrown into relief when counterposed to the natural 
subjection that characterizes the private realm…What it means to be an „individual‟, a maker of 
contracts and civilly free, is revealed by the subjection of women in the private sphere.
32
 
 
By recognizing the reciprocal relationship of the private and public spheres, and by 
offering a critical analysis of this relationship, Pateman reintroduces the importance of a 
relationship between nature and civil society.  Habermas, too, recognized this 
relationship; he criticized Adorno for ignoring the importance of the societal subject 
against the natural world. However, Habermas‟ notion of lifeworld as the proper 
reconciliation of the societal subject and the natural world serves as another leveling of 
the differences between intersubjective experience in public society and the personal 
experience of the private world.
33
 
Pateman‟s notion of subjection reintroduces the possibility of mediation between 
the two sides of the private/public antinomy.  Where Adorno identified the subject being 
                                                 
32
  Ibid., 11. 
33
  I am intentionally alluding to the second-wave feminist concern for the importance of respecting natural 
difference here, a concept I see connected more to Adorno‟s notion of emancipation than to Habermas‟ 
lifeworld.  The lifeworld seems to collapse natural difference into phenomenological experience.  However, 
I do not want to belabor the concept of natural difference, as I am aware of the practical concerns of 
reinforcing essentialist gender constructions.  Over the rest of the dissertation, I attempt to navigate a 
constructed intermediary, where real difference is important for future change and where “feminine” 
concerns for care and situated ethics are viable options, but also a space where individuation is not 
biologically predetermined, by sex or any other marker. 
12 
 
socially constructed and the object being socially named, Pateman identifies the structure 
of society in which the initial subjugation of women in the private sphere of the home 
parallels the subjugation of women in political discourse of the public sphere: “Women 
are subject to men in both the private and public spheres; indeed, men‟s patriarchal right 
is the major structural support binding the two spheres into a social whole.”34  The notion 
of patriarchal subjugation in both realms finds support in the misunderstanding for the 
role of sexual difference in society: 
The structure of our society and our everyday lives incorporates the patriarchal conception of 
sexual difference.  I shall show how the exclusion of women from the central category of the 
„individual‟ has been given social and legal expression and how the exclusion has structured the 
contracts with which I am concerned.  Despite many recent legal reforms and wider changes in the 
social position of women, we still do not have the same civil standing as men, yet this central 
political fact about our societies has rarely entered into contemporary discussions of contract 
theory and the practice of contract.
35
 
 
Contrary to Habermas‟ view that the public realm can allow for political equality 
regardless of gender difference, Pateman‟s reintroduction of subjugation as mediating 
both the private and the public suggests that difference and subjugation necessarily 
impact all aspects of society.   
Despite the seemingly altruistic and equality-based interests of Habermas‟ theory, 
his claims for political equality obviate the underlying existence of inequality in the 
private realm—an inequality which seeps out into the inherently related political/public 
aspects of society.  Pateman goes on to claim that theories of the kind to which Habermas 
seems to subscribe, at best relegate issues of patriarchy to private consideration, and, at 
worst, completely ignore the reciprocal impact of patriarchal subjugation in both realms:  
To argue that patriarchy is best confronted by endeavoring to render sexual difference politically 
irrelevant is to accept the view that the civil (public) realm and the „individual‟ are 
uncontaminated by patriarchal subordination.  Patriarchy is then seen as a private familial problem 
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that can be overcome if public laws and policies treat women as if they were exactly the same as 
men…The most dramatic example of the public aspect of patriarchal right is that men demand that 
women‟s bodies are for sale as commodities in the capitalist market; prostitution is a major 
capitalist industry.
36
 
 
By refusing to acknowledge the role of patriarchal domination in the public sphere, and 
by attempting to level any notion of sexual difference, Habermas is guilty of allowing his 
theory of communicative action the power to misappropriate the power of creativity.  For 
Pateman, as a neo-Marxist, all humans are fundamentally creatively productive.  
Additionally, in her particular feminist reading, women are reproductive, and so, by her 
account, even more fundamentally creative.  Although Habermas wants to claim that the 
productive and creative aspects of communicative action correspond to the needs and 
desires of society at large, without the understanding of sexual difference and 
subjugation, Habermas‟ theory necessarily forgets that the maternal power for creativity 
and production underlies the male-generated power of public political discourse.  
Pateman faults theories that forget this relationship; these theories not only forget the 
power of maternal reproduction, but they forget any powers unique to specific individuals 
as they are defined in the private realm.
37
  The forgetting of uniqueness, and the 
overemphasis on political equality, serves as its own form of a false reconciliation; a 
problem not only defined by Carole Pateman, but which Adorno identified in his own 
theory of negative dialectics. 
 Recognizing the potential problems of a theory presupposing equality and 
reconciliation, Catherine MacKinnon provides critical arguments which, in conjunction 
with Carole Pateman‟s theory, could prove detrimental to Habermas‟ theory of 
communicative action.  Specifically addressing Kantian-based systems of 
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universalization, toward which Habermas‟ theory for communicative action self-
admittedly strives, MacKinnon exposes the faulty misconception that a move to 
universalization would be equalizing and productive: 
Many readers (in the Kantian tradition) say that if a discourse is not generalized, universal, and 
agreed-upon, it is exclusionary.  The problem, however, is that the generalized, universal, or 
agreed-upon never did solve the disagreements, resolve the differences, cohere the specifics, and 
generalize the particularities.  Rather, it assimilated them to a false universal that imposed 
agreement, submerged specificity, and silenced particularity.
38
  
 
The problem with ignoring the private sphere, or of subsuming it into analysis of public 
society, emerges in the leveling of difference and the disregard for non-political (or de-
politicized) concerns.  Additionally, even if recognition of the private sphere is addressed 
(as in Habermas‟ theory), the problem of false or imposed universalization can still 
misrepresent the role of the private/individual/natural sphere.  As MacKinnon explains: 
In approaches that equate and collapse, women‟s problems are given no specificity or cross-class 
commonality at all.  They are totally subsumed under, telescoped within, assimilated to, a class 
analysis.  To the extent women exist at all within the theory [Marxist or post-Marxist], their 
problems are eclipsed by those of the working class and their remedy is collapsed into socialism.
39
 
 
Communicative action rests on the ideal of equitable consciousnesses engaging as active 
subjects in a constructive dialogue indicating desire for agreement; by this definition, to 
which Habermas repeatedly lays claim, communicative action is necessarily exclusionary 
where it intends to be universal.
40
  The collapse of individual rational interests into a 
theory of (public) social agreement disavows the important differences between private 
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interests and public society.  Additionally, this collapse further distances women from the 
public realm of society.  Because of their historical relegation to subjugation, women 
have never been able to constitute themselves as active, rational subjects in discourse.
41
  
Rather, according to MacKinnon, women are necessarily conceived of as objects: “For 
women, there is no distinction between objectification and alienation because women 
have not authored objectifications, they have been them.  Women have been the nature, 
the matter, the acted upon to be subdued by the acting subject seeking to embody himself 
in the social world.”42 
In her work on critical approaches to political feminism, Nancy Fraser recognizes 
that not only does the existent antinomy between the public and private remain 
untheorized in political thought, but also that a reinstated antinomy could offer a positive 
alternative to current conceptions of gender (in)equity in society.  A reinstatement of the 
tension between public and private could provide for what Fraser considers, a “universal 
caregiver” alternative to society.  In this model, men and women would each adopt 
traditionally private (caregiving) and public (breadwinning) roles, splitting the demands 
of each position in order to ensure gender equity (but not the leveling concept of 
„equality‟) for all of society.43  In Fraser‟s view, the antinomy between public and private 
interests must exist and not-exist simultaneously, and so she provides a deconstruction of 
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private and public interests.  In her estimation, the initial step consists of deconstructing 
the private role of caregiving and the public role of breadwinning and would encourage 
further deconstruction of additional aspects of the private/public antinomy.
44
  Fraser 
models this deconstructive work through analysis of traditional gender roles‟ 
correspondence to particular economic roles.  This position leaves open the necessity for 
a critical appraisal of individual caregiving and breadwinning roles.  The need for 
preserving a productive antinomy via deconstruction should not be confused, however, 
with a move to divide the public and private even further apart. 
Bonnie Honig reinforces the concept of the productive aspect of a two-sided 
dilemma (or antinomy), indicating that the productivity of identity/difference would 
correspond to the productivity of the tension between public and private.
45
 In her 
analysis, Honig proposes that the inherently conflictual enables and constitutes the 
subject—as well as the world: 
Indeed, we might think of the subject as positioned on multiple, conflictual axes of 
identity/difference such that her agency itself is constituted, even enabled—and not simply 
paralyzed—by dialing dilemmatic choices and negotiations.  The perspectives of this subject 
suggest that we ought not to think only in terms of dilemmas as discrete events onto which unitary 
agents with diverse commitments stumble occasionally…but perhaps also in terms of a 
dilemmatic space or spaces that both constitute us and form the terrain of our existence.
46
 
 
Honig‟s notion of dilemmatic space serves as a more productive concept of the 
Habermasian “lifeworld.”  Whereas the lifeworld necessarily constitutes a shared 
horizon, Honig‟s dilemmatic space is based on the actual tensions of the material world, 
reemphasizing the importance of productive difference.  
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Similar to Honig, Susan Gal recognizes that the reinstatement of the antinomy 
would also be much more realistic, in addition to restoring productive power to Critical 
Theory.  Mirroring Pateman‟s claims that the reciprocal relationship between separate 
public and private spheres is foundational for the actual existence of society, Gal claims 
that: 
Despite the assumption of „separate spheres‟, most social practices, relations, and transactions are 
not limited to the principles associated with one or another sphere.  Empirical research shows that 
monetary transactions of various kinds are common in social relations that are otherwise 
understood as intimate interactions within families: love and money are often intertwined.  
Similarly, the „personal in political‟ in part because private institutions such as families often 
operate, like the polity, through conflict, power hierarchies, and violence.
47
 
 
Basing her analysis on empirical research and transactions, Gal reinvigorates the notion 
of materiality in understanding the relationship between public and private spheres.  
Where Habermas criticized Adorno for disregarding the material in favor of an idealized 
natural, so, too, can the political feminists level claims against Habermas‟ neglect of the 
private sphere as ignoring important material actuality. 
  
A Partial Reappraisal 
Not all feminists are so critical of Habermas‟ project, however.  Many, in fact, 
recognize the importance of his conception of lifeworld as complimentary to feminist 
theorizing.  In one such alternative reading, Marie Fleming proposes that Habermas‟ own 
theory of communicative action can provide something closer to a productive mutually-
dependent interaction:  “Accordingly, the theory seems to illuminate how system and 
lifeworld—the public and private—are inextricably linked and mutually supportive; thus 
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it undermines any position based on absolute division.”48  If system loosely corresponds 
to the public dimension of communicative outcomes and lifeworld is intended as a 
conceptual placeholder for private interests, then the reciprocal nature of system and 
lifeworld actually supports an appropriate productive tension between public and private 
spheres.   
Another critique of the feminist perspectives espoused by Pateman, MacKinnon, 
Fraser, Honig and Gal focuses on the possibility that these feminist theories 
overemphasize the antinomy between public and private.  According to Noëlle McAfee‟s 
analysis of the “Two Feminisms,” the political feminism espoused by these scholars 
resembles an agonistic feminism which focuses too much on confrontation and over-
thematizes the “private sphere.”49  She explains that there are real limitations in focusing 
on struggle and agon in politics:  
The making of the public sphere always involves difference, struggle, discord, and tension; but 
this agonistic dimension of politics is not the meaning of politics per se.  In my many years of 
observing political processes, I see that central to politics, central to my motivation of anyone who 
cares to enter into the fray, is the hope that some kind of agreement might be reached.  Without 
such hope, there would be no will to enter.
50
 
  
According to MacAfee‟s interpretation, some feminists‟ emphasis on the role of gender 
difference and private inequality necessarily prioritizes the private realm of society over 
the public. This type of reversal would undermine the possibilities for these theories to 
provide a positive critique of Habermas‟ treatment of public and private; essentially, 
these women would be enacting the same type of leveling of which they accuse 
Habermas, with an overemphasis on the private rather than the public.  Additionally, the 
prioritization of the private realm potentially reintroduces the problem of subjective 
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instrumental reason, which Habermas worked diligently to overcome within his own 
theory.   
 
Conclusion 
Whereas Critical Theory attempts to restore the primacy of the antinomy between 
subject and object with society as a filter, political feminism, particularly that represented 
by Carole Pateman, attempts to restore a missing antinomy—a critical approach to 
society itself via a recognition of the tension between public and private.  Feminists often 
recognize an internal problem of Marxist theory as reinforcing the separation of public 
and private.
51
  However, this problematization usually falls short of requiring a critical 
reinstatement of the antinomy between public and private as potentially productive for 
the feminist critical position.  Reinvigorating the project of a critical approach to the 
private sphere, feminists such as Pateman have addressed the specific concerns of the 
feminine/private dimension of society.  Applying this notion of the importance of the 
private realm to a critique of Habermas‟ system of communicative action, several 
inconsistencies between Habermas‟ theory and feminist concerns emerge.  Pateman, 
MacKinnon and others contrast Habermas‟ notion of egalitarianism, universalization, and 
an emphasis on public discourse as being exclusionary to marginalized, individual and 
private concerns.  However, this feminist perspective may be limited as well; by 
developing a Critical Theory of the private as foundational for the public, Pateman, in 
particular, risks a false reconcilement of the antinomy in favor of the private sphere. 
Fleming and McAfee, for example, believe Habermas recognizes and addresses the 
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dichotomy between public and private.  But is this recognition and critical appraisal 
merely implicit?  Or does Habermas productively address the dichotomy?  
 Through the preceding discussion, I have implicitly suggested the value of a 
feminist position between neo-Marxist and Habermasian theories.  In the following two 
chapters, I articulate the role of feminist positions that exist in this middle-ground.  I 
propose a hybrid theory in which Habermas‟ concepts of intersubjectivity and the 
lifeworld are read alongside feminist critiques of public interest and increasingly formal 
normativity.  By offering a positive critical analysis of Habermasian theory in these 
feminist terms, it is my hope that Habermas‟ project can be enlivened and reinvigorated 
for an increasingly complex, differentiated, and cosmopolitan world.    
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Chapter 2  
Raising the Stakes: Normativity and the Problem of Feminist Belonging 
 
Although Habermas is even today the leading figure in contemporary Critical 
Theory, Axel Honneth as his Frankfurt School successor developed a „third generation‟ 
in Critical Theory.  Whereas Habermas emphasizes normative foundations, Honneth 
returns to issues of subjectivity and power.  For example, in Honneth‟s The Critique of 
Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory (1993), he argues that Critical 
Theory should not follow Habermas‟ aversion to Foucaultian critiques of power, but 
instead should share in its emphasis on socio-political relations.  This understanding of 
power informs many feminist critical theorists, as well.  Amy Allen, for example, in her 
book The Power of Feminist Theory: Domination, Resistance, Solidarity (1999) argues 
explicitly that a Foucaultian conception of power would make Critical Theory more 
palatable and applicable for feminist theory.
52
  It would seem that Honneth‟s emphasis on 
power relations and subjectivity would mark closer and continued engagements with 
feminist critical theorists; however, Habermas‟ lasting impact in the discipline has 
overshadowed much of the potential dialogue between feminist theory and Honneth.  
There are exceptions, of course; notably, Nancy Fraser and Seyla Benhabib have engaged 
explicitly with Honneth‟s theory.53  However, even these engagements are infused with 
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the tension emergent from Habermas‟ continuing influence.54  It is my contention that the 
secondary status granted to Honneth‟s theories is indicative of the feminists‟ 
understandable preoccupation with Habermas‟ devaluation of issues of power and 
valorization of the normative foundations for emancipatory ethics.
55
   
As a challenge to feminist aspirations for a kinship with Habermasian Critical 
Theory, many contemporary feminist philosophers recognize an inescapable tension with 
ethical theories founded in normativity as such.  Drucilla Cornell, voicing concerns 
shared by many feminists, explains her take on a qualified postmodernist feminist 
position in her essays, “What is Ethical Feminism?” and “Rethinking the Time for 
Feminism.”56  For Cornell, Critical Theory gets the questions right:  How should we 
understand the relationship between theory and practice?  How do we create/maintain 
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emancipatory and inclusionary social practices? And even the more Habermasian 
questions of how to theorize the relationships between political participation, linguistic 
expression, and lived experience.  However, Cornell is suspect of the answers given 
through contemporary Critical Theory grounded in notions of rationality, morality, and, 
of greatest interest here, normativity.  In this chapter I address the potentially productive 
tension between Habermas and feminists explicitly engaged with Critical Theory, as well 
as among various feminist positions on the issue of normativity.  I argue through this 
analysis that as Habermas developed his theory of communicative ethics, and his notion 
of normativity emerged, feminists found further fertile ground for a critical engagement.  
As in his theory of system and lifeworld, which feminists found both productive and 
challenging to an understanding of private interests in the public sphere, Habermas‟ 
theory of normativity is both vexing and inspiring for many theorists.  I begin by 
outlining Habermas‟ general conceptualization of normativity.  I then address how 
normativity is critically important for feminist ethics.  Once this affinity is established, I 
trace two contemporary feminist concerns to problematize the Habermasian normative 
framework: from the perspective of socioeconomic interests, and from the perspective of 
transnational feminist interests.   
  
What is Habermasian Normativity? 
 The concept of normativity and the notion of normatively guided society in 
Habermas stems logically from the development of his theory of communicative action 
and his corresponding theory of discourse ethics.  In what follows, I sketch an outline of 
communicative action and discourse ethics as they relate to normativity.  In order to 
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articulate normativity‟s initial emergence, as well as give a brief exegesis of its 
development, in this section I will deal primarily with The Theory of Communicative 
Action (1981), Communication and the Evolution of Society (1979), and Justification and 
Application (1993).  I start with an analysis of the relationship between reason, the 
lifeworld, and communication so as to provide sufficient background for the development 
of normativity.  Then, I outline the correspondence between communicative action and 
discourse ethics precisely upon the basis of normativity.  Finally, I suggest that 
Habermas‟ own treatment has necessarily grown with the expansion of his theoretical and 
practical interests. 
 There are two foundations for rationality. The first is the notion of rationality as 
based in an intersubjective lifeworld.  This notion of rationality is distinct from traditional 
philosophical notions—it is not centered on abstract logic or on metaphysics.  Instead, for 
Habermas, rationality is socially constituted through validity claims in the lifeworld.  The 
second foundation is the idea of rationality based in communicative acts.  Validity claims 
in an intersubjective lifeworld can only be evaluated through the medium of 
communicative action.  Reason in an intersubjective world involves reaching 
understanding and agreement with at least one other participant in communication.  
Rationality is not exclusively dependent upon others, however.  Early in The Theory of 
Communicative Action, Habermas identifies rationality as being heightened by self-
reflection and self-awareness—one of his many allusions to Hegel.57  For Habermas the 
telos of communicative action is not merely understanding, but rational agreement, which 
depends on the individual‟s commitment to a position, as well as the eventual consensus 
                                                 
57
 Habermas.  Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society.  
Trans. by Thomas McCarthy.  Boston: Beacon Press, 1985. p. 21. 
25 
 
orientation.  The end goal of communication should be agreement between two members 
of a linguistically united lifeworld, so communicative action can offer a real possibility 
for social integration:  “I have called the type of interaction in which all participants 
harmonize their individual plans of action with one another and thus pursue their 
illocutionary aims without reservation „communicative action‟.”58  In this way, the height 
of reason is a situation in which rationally motivated actors come together to form 
consensus.  Importantly, for Habermas, agreement cannot be forced or imposed:  
Agreement rests on common convictions.  The speech act of one person succeeds only if the other 
accepts the offer contained in it by taking (however implicitly) a „yes‟ or „no‟ position on a 
validity claim that is in principle criticizable. Both ego, who raises a validity claim with his 
utterance, and alter, who recognizes or rejects it, base their decisions on potential grounds or 
reasons.
59
  
 
Agreement then is a more or less normalized rational process of accepting the possibility 
of understanding and recognizing the communication itself, in addition to being a 
normalized rational process for consensus formation.  These validity claims can take 
three forms in Habermas‟ theory, as constative truth, normative rightness, or as subjective 
truthfulness.  Constative truth is what we generally conceive of as a truth, or a true fact, 
and forms the foundation for speech acts.  For example, “The sky is blue,” has constative 
truth.
60
  Normative rightness is based on the regulative constructs of a given society.  
Regulative ideals and laws express normative rightness in validity claims.  And finally, 
subjective truthfulness is based on the speaker expressing herself truthfully, rather than 
being deceptive or misleading.  The interrelationship between reason, validity, and 
normativity ensures that communicative acts are oriented toward understanding as much 
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as consensus, by establishing rational linguistic boundaries as well as social interpretive 
boundaries.  This establishes a philosophy of communication for creating and 
maintaining intersubjective relationships that provide the basis for a socio-ethical system. 
In his essay “Historical Materialism and the Development of Normative 
Structures,” Habermas articulates the importance of understanding justificatory structures 
in creating a socioethical philosophy: 
In its developmental dynamics, the change of normative structures remains dependent on 
evolutionary challenges posed by unresolved, economically conditioned, system problems and on 
learning processes that are a response to them.  In other words, culture remains a superstructural 
phenomenon, even if it does seem to play a more prominent role in the transition to new 
developmental levels than many Marxists have heretofore supposed.  This prominence explains 
the contribution that communication theory can, in my view, make to a renewed historical 
materialism.
61
 
   
Apropos of themes I articulated in Chapter 1, Habermas asserts that his theory of 
communicative action links Marxist historical materialism with lifeworld analysis.  
Normative structures are constantly created and re-created according to systemic 
development and changing conditions; particularly, for Habermas, changes in economic 
conditions.  The responsiveness to change ensures justification on a macro-scale for the 
normative structures. 
Following a developmental psychology model of subject identity-formation, 
Habermas contends that normative structures emerge in society in homologous ways.  
Using Piaget and Kohlberg‟s particular analyses of childhood development, Habermas 
explains that as humans grow and develop the process of subjectivation leads us to 
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universalizable moral understanding.
62
  This universalizable moral understanding does 
more for Habermas than it would appear to do for the developmental psychologists, 
however.  Whereas developmental psychologists are most interested in how children 
grow and move from one stage to the next, Habermas is interested in what social, 
cognitive, and linguistic capacities mean for the relationship between the individual and 
society: 
To begin with, the concept of ego development, ontogenesis, can be analyzed in terms of the 
capacity for cognition, speech, and action.  These three aspects of cognitive, linguistic, and 
interactive development can be brought under one unifying idea of ego development—the ego is 
formed in a system of demarcations.  The subjectivity of internal nature demarcates itself in 
relation to the objectivity of a perceptible external nature, in relation to the normativity of society, 
and in relation to the intersubjectivity of language.  In accomplishing these demarcations, the ego 
knows itself not only as a subjectivity but as something that has „always already‟ transcended the 
bounds of subjectivity in cognition, speech, and interaction simultaneously.
63  
 
For Habermas, then, ontogenesis is indicative of the importance of understanding the 
lifeworld in relation to the ethical, or what he will later call the “ethical-existential.”64  
This relationship to psychological development becomes further articulated with a move 
from justification to application in Habermas‟ Justification and Application, which I will 
detail at the end of this section.  
 The relationship between norms and communicative acts, however, is further 
complicated by the possibility for confusing purposive-rational acts with communicative 
acts.  Purposive-rational actions are guided by means-end rationality: “The rationality of 
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means requires technically utilizable, empirical knowledge; the rationality of decisions 
requires the explication and inner consistency of value systems and decision maxims, as 
well as the correct derivation of acts of choice.”65  Communicative action is distinct from 
this form of action, since its consistency is guaranteed through “intersubjectively binding 
norms that guarantee the fulfillment of the motivational conditions.”66  This means that 
even in Habermas‟ earliest incarnations of normatively guided communicative action, 
there was expressed the possibility of intersubjectively grounded consensus, not only in 
the outcome orientation of communicative action, but also in its very grounding for 
possibility.  This indicates additionally that norms are established by intersubjectively 
engaged ethical actors, who then participate in the normative grounding for 
communication oriented towards rational consensus.  Normativity is for Habermas 
developmentally grounded and materially, historically ensured.  It is also rationalizable, 
albeit neither by empirical knowledge, nor by internal logic.  Instead, norms are 
rationalized through generalization in social justificatory procedures.   
This early account of Habermas‟ theory of the reciprocal exchange between norm 
development and communicative action is further developed in Habermas‟ ever-
expanding theory.  At this stage, it seems as though norms are still quite abstract from 
application.  Communicative action in this early instantiation is more or less a way of 
differentiating from purposive-rational action, where communicative action is ensured 
consistency through intersubjectivity, while purposive-rational acts have internal rational 
consistency.  As Habermas‟ theory develops, and he seriously considers the application 
of such a system, communicative action grounds a discursive ethical system.  In 
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Justification and Application (1994), Habermas distances himself from the abstract 
concerns of idealism by asserting that, unlike ethicists in the tradition of the Kantian 
categorical imperative, he is an ethicist concerned with both justification and application.  
Idealized ethics always runs into the problem of fairly applying ethical norms: “Once 
moral justifications rest on a principle of universalization constraining participants in 
discourse to examine whether disputed norms could command the well-considered assent 
of all concerned, detached from practical situations and without regard to current 
motivations or existing institutions, the problem of how norms, thus grounded, could ever 
be applied becomes more acute.”67  In contradistinction, Habermas contends that the 
historical contingency of each application of a norm confines the justification:  
“Moreover, every justification of a norm is necessarily subject to the normal limitations 
of a finite, historically situated outlook that is provincial in regard to the future.”68  The 
relationship between communicative action and discourse ethics is in this particular 
application.  Communicative action is oriented towards norms that are open to challenges 
given the historical context and current emancipatory merit of such norms.  
In addition to highlighting the historical contingency of the justifiable application 
of norms, Habermas also highlights that the psychological processes of individuation play 
a major role in how ethical norms are taken into practice: “The standpoint of morality 
differs from that of concrete ethical life in its idealizing extension and reversal of 
interpretive perspectives that are tied to particular, established cultural lifeforms and are 
the result of individual processes of development.”69  In this way, Habermas asserts his 
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own recognition of individual contingency, and founds his ethical paradigm on 
psychological development.  Additionally, as a critic of Kant‟s transcendental idealism, 
Habermas suggests that ethics cannot be grounded in egocentrism—“Do unto others as 
you would have them do unto you”—but instead that ethics must be founded 
intersubjectively in the lifeworld.
70
  However, unlike feminist ethical theorists, who also 
understand the specificity of individuation, Habermas still sees individual psychological 
development culminating in the grasp of universalist principles.
71
  
Normativity, then, seems to progress gradually from an abstract theoretical 
concept that Habermas uses to unify reason with intersubjective justificatory processes to 
a concrete, historically contingent, and individually contestable, means of applying ethics 
in society.  However, just as Habermas seems to become more attuned to individuation 
and individual concerns, he returns to the universalizable appeal to reason, consensus, 
and stable systems.  He intimates that the ethical, which is particularized in the act of 
individuation in relation to society, is distinct from both the moral and the legal.  For 
Habermas, the ethical is a highly contextualized normative application of universalizable 
moral principles.   The moral is therefore simply the generalized and universalized 
concept of those normative structures.  The legal is the application of the moral structures 
as socially agreed upon and enforceable norms.  However, all three concepts are 
organized finally into a deontological moral theory that ultimately differentiates ethical, 
moral and legal questions only by degree.  He explains that a tenable deontological 
theory: 
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…[N]eed only maintain that ethical discussions, in contrast to moral arguments, are always 
already embedded in the traditional context of a hitherto accepted, identity-constituting form of 
life.  Moral judgments differ from ethical judgments only in their degree of contextuality.
72
 
  
With this reconstruction of a universalized notion of judgment, Habermas implicitly 
extends his conception of normativity to universal application as well.  This generalized 
and universalized normativity informs an increasingly formal notion of normativity in 
Habermas‟ theory.  This move to generalization and universalization is both a liability 
and an ally for feminist concerns with normativity. 
 
Feminist Critical Theory and the Dilemma of Normativity 
 In Chapter 1, I constructed a dialogue between neo-Marxist and critical theoretical 
feminists, identifying Habermasian themes as means for understanding their shared 
engagements with the philosophical and socio-ethical problem of private interests.  In this 
section of Chapter 2, I would like to take an already established philosophical debate 
among various feminist perspectives and demonstrate that the fundamental issues at stake 
are again best represented in relationship to Habermas.  In an attempt to understand the 
relationships between intersubjectivity, reason, and the justification for ethical 
frameworks, Seyla Benhabib, Judith Butler, and respondent Nancy Fraser came together 
for a symposium on feminism and postmodernism in the fall of 1990.  This debate was 
expanded, with the additional contribution of Drucilla Cornell, to a book first published 
in German in 1993, and then finally in English in 1995.
73
  Although the debate presented 
in this book is ostensibly on what relationship postmodernism may have with socio-
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ethically concerned feminist philosophy, I would like to recast the exchange in terms of 
normativity.  I contend that what is really at stake when Benhabib, Butler, Cornell, and 
Fraser are disputing the merits of postmodern methods is precisely the issue with which 
Habermas attempts to grapple in the development of his theory of the justification and 
application of norms.  By constructing the debate in this way, it is not only more apparent 
which philosophical and social issues are most relevant to the feminist project, but it also 
becomes clear that the feminist engagement with Habermas‟ influence is complex and 
potentially fruitful.  
 
Why is Normativity Problematic for Feminist Concerns? 
 Judith Butler and Drucilla Cornell voice the most direct anti-normative positions 
in Feminist Contentions.  According to Butler and Cornell, normativity and the 
corresponding determinate notions of the individual foreclose differences and fluidity.  In 
this foreclosure, otherwise emancipatory processes of subjectivation and resignification 
are limited, thereby stifling rather than preserving emancipatory goals.   
Cornell begins distancing herself from this characterization of contemporary Critical 
Theory by articulating a sharp distinction between ethics and morality.  For Cornell, 
ethics is grounded in non-violent respect of difference, without appropriation.  Morality, 
on the other hand, is systematic, not interested in difference, but ultimately interested in 
political, social and juridical universalism.  She writes: 
For my purposes, morality designates any attempt to theoretically spell out how one determines a 
system that absolutely governs the „right way to behave.‟  As Niklas Luhmann has succinctly 
defined it, „morality is a special form of communication which carries within it indications of 
approval or disapproval.‟  The ethical as I define it is not a system of behavioral rules, nor a 
system of positive standards by which to justify disapproval of others.  It is, rather, an attitude 
towards what is other than oneself.  This attitude shares much in common with those which 
Charles Peirce called fallibilism and musement.  Fallibilism implies a challenge to one‟s basic 
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organization of the world, while musement indicates the stance of amazement before the mysteries 
and marvels of life.
74
 
  
In contradistinction to morality based theories, Cornell advocates a feminist theory of 
ethics.  As she intimates, ethics is defined by the following characteristics: It is, first, a 
theory to guide attitudinal orientation.  Ethics is necessary because of the otherness of 
others; it is grounded precisely in what is not us.  Ethics must also allow for theoretical 
instability, both in regards to challenges to our own beliefs, theories, viewpoints, but also 
in regards to the unknown.
75
   
Cornell‟s insistence on the ultimate respect of and deference to alterity aligns her 
with a postmodern theory of difference: the Other is that which we cannot fully 
understand, although it is also that over-and-against which we formulate ourselves as 
subjects.  This ethical grounding not only shapes her notion of subjectivity, but it also 
shapes Cornell‟s understanding of Critical Theory.  For Cornell, Habermasian Critical 
Theory attempts to create “positive standards by which to justify” if not disapproval, then 
the correct method of intersubjective interaction.  She later refers to this system of 
normatively guided ethics as a theory of “causal appropriateness”:  
A classic example of the introduction of a theory of causal appropriateness into an account of 
practical reason is Habermas‟s attempt to incorporate Kohlberg‟s cognitive psychology into his 
theoretical justification of a dialogic conception of justice.  Rawls, on the other hand, correctly 
argues that we should not and cannot borrow from theoretical concepts of objectivity and 
incorporate them into the field of practical reason we call justice.
76
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“Causal appropriateness” is Cornell‟s term for the scientific acceptance of theories which 
seem to explain correspondence adequately in terms of causal chains.  In other words, 
Cornell sees danger in Habermas‟ willingness to accept the explanatory power of 
objective causation as theoretically sufficient.
77
   
Rather than focus on the normative guidelines that would dictate moral-ethical 
behavior, Cornell understands the goal of Critical Theory in terms of feminist ethics as 
“consciousness raising.”  Consciousness raising is not simply a political program for 
indicating another way of thinking, however.  It is instead a process of problematizing, of 
breaking apart meaning and signification in order to “re-imagine and re-symbolize the 
feminine within sexual difference so as to break the bonds of the meaning of Woman that 
have been taken for granted and that have been justifiable as fate.”78  Cornell not only 
differentiates herself from Habermas in this respect, but also from those feminists who 
take up, unquestioned, Habermasian normative guidelines.  She identifies a productive 
tension with such feminists, finding kinship with their utopian spirit, but 
disenfranchisement with their conservative understanding of morality confined to 
normative limits.  Cornell finds Seyla Benhabib to be a prime example of this type of 
feminist.  She writes, however, “Like Benhabib, I believe that feminism demands the 
thinking of the „wholly Other‟ and thus must retain, and proceed through, an unerasable 
moment of utopianism.”79  On the other hand she disagrees with Benhabib because of her 
commitment to the rational normative morality of the present: 
                                                 
77
 Although, to be fair to Habermas, Habermas is also wary of accepting scientistic arguments as 
philosophically rigorous.  For Habermas, Kohlberg‟s theory is helpful for describing ontogenesis, but it is 
ultimately the ego‟s relationship to society that completes the justificatory process.  
78
 Cornell, “What Is Ethical Feminism?” 82. 
79
 Cornell, “Rethinking the Time of Feminism,” 148 
35 
 
I take issue with Benhabib because she is not a utopian, in the specific sense that she thinks that 
feminism can operate within the philosophical tools provided by Habermas‟s attempt to theorize 
the legitimacy of a normative rational sphere of nature…Feminism is radical because it demands 
that we re-think the „origins‟ and the „limit‟ of philosophical discourse, even as we are challenged 
to do so philosophically, which is why feminism finds itself in alliance with thinkers such as 
Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas, as well as with Adorno and Benjamin.
80
 
  
For Cornell it is particularly the notion of limit that replaces the notion of normativity as 
the critical theoretical move.  Whereas Habermas sees the critical power of justification 
and application embodied in normativity, Cornell identifies the promise of a future, a 
time that has not yet come and cannot yet be theorized, as the critical space for ethical 
articulation.   
Judith Butler also suggests that feminist theory should be critical and utopic in the 
specific sense of future orientation.  She suggests that subject formation is an 
intersubjective process of recognizing alterity and reconstructing subjective identity.  She 
explains: “What is „outside‟ is not simply the Other—the „not me‟—but a notion of 
futurity—the „not yet‟—and these constitute the defining limit of the subject itself.”81  
More obliquely, Judith Butler shares Cornell‟s concerns about Habermas‟ theoretical 
foundations.  For Butler, theories that universalize normativity, like Habermas‟, reinstate 
the political hegemony of colonialism into the very social theories that should serve as 
challenges to social hegemonic institutions.  She writes: 
Within the political context of contemporary postcoloniality more generally, it is perhaps 
especially urgent to underscore the very category of the „universal‟ as a site of insistent contest 
and resignification.  Given the contested character of the term, to assume from the start a 
procedural or substantive notion of the universal is of necessity to impose a culturally hegemonic 
notion on the social field.  To herald that notion then as the philosophic instrument that will 
negotiate between conflicts of power is precisely to safeguard and reproduce a position of 
hegemonic power by installing it is the metapolitical site of ultimate normativity.
82
 
  
                                                 
80
 Ibid., 149. 
81
 Butler, “For a Careful Reading,” 142-143 
82
 Butler, “Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of „Postmodernism‟,” 40. 
36 
 
Rather than highlight the universal normative component of a socio-ethical theory, Butler 
contends that feminists should work to express the processes of subjectivation and 
resignification—the continual procedures by which subjects create themselves and 
meaning in a contextualized world.
83
 
 Just as Cornell identified with Benhabib‟s utopic moment, as she criticized 
simultaneously her normative complacency, Butler is sympathetic to the process of the 
productive power of discourse at the heart of Habermas‟ theory, even as she is most 
opposed to his hegemonic inclinations.  For Butler, it is precisely through discourse that 
subjects re-iterate and re-constitute themselves: 
‟Agency‟ is to be found precisely at such junctures where discourse is renewed.  That an „I‟ is 
founded through reciting the anonymous linguistic site of the „I‟ implies that citation is not 
performed by a subject, but is rather the invocation by which a subject comes into linguistic being.  
That this is a repeated process, an iterable procedure, is precisely the condition of agency within 
discourse.  If a subject were constituted one and for all, there would be no possibility of a 
reiteration of those constituting conventions or norms.  That the subject is that which must be 
constituted again and again implies that it is open to formations that are not fully constrained in 
advance.
84
 
  
The productive power of discourse is, in fact, the very ground by which Butler articulates 
her postmodern position.  For Habermas, discourse is rooted in reason, marking discourse 
as decidedly modernist.  However, for Butler, discourse is the procedure through which 
the ongoing process of subjectivation takes place.  It is not reason that gives power to 
discourse for Butler, but iterability and re-signification.  According to Butler‟s 
overarching theory, subjects are continually in a process of subjectivation through 
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performativity.  Performativity is a linguistic theory by which identity is constructed 
through the continued reiteration of certain discursive utterances and practices.  In 
Butler‟s estimation, there are specific discursive acts that work to create subjects.  For 
example, gender is a performative construction.  Through the repetition and recreation of 
certain discursive acts and ways of representing the self, an individual creates his or her 
own gender identity.  However, as discourse, these performative utterances and acts are 
contextualized in society, which provides an interpretive lens and framework for 
understanding the meaning of performativity. 
 
Why Normativity is Important for the Feminist Critical Theoretical Project? 
 Despite Cornell and Butler‟s reservations about normativity‟s role in feminist 
ethics, a Habermasian concept of normativity provides compelling theoretical grounding 
for feminist appeals to universal rights for democratic participation, recognition, and 
cooperation.  It is to these appeals that Benhabib and Fraser make recourse in their 
respective qualified support of a normative ethical system qua Habermas.  
In her position defending a critical theoretical approach to feminist philosophy, Benhabib 
defines an almost modernist notion of the rational individual, who she then describes as 
engaged in universalization-seeking emancipatory pursuits.  She criticizes the 
postmodernist position that would suggest that subjects are simply the products of 
language:  
Along with this dissolution of the subject into yet „another position in language‟ disappear of 
course concepts of intentionality, accountability, self-reflexivity, and autonomy.  The subject that 
is but another position in language can no longer master and create that distance between itself and 
the chain of significations in which it is immersed such that it can reflect upon them and creatively 
alter them.
85
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Here Benhabib obviously has Butler in mind.  Despite Butler‟s assertion that the 
possibility for resignifying and reconstructing the self through discourse is emancipatory, 
Benhabib contends that autonomy is lost, making freedom irrelevant. 
The issue of subjectivity is important for Benhabib‟s characterization of the feminist 
project.  Feminist philosophy is, for Benhabib, oriented toward the real emancipation of 
women in society.  Without the ability to appeal to an autonomous self, the important 
characteristics that make that self unique are also meaningless.  This means that not only 
is selfhood lost, but any appeal to a solidarity based in shared identification is also lost.  
For Benhabib, over-determination of a fluid postmodern subject brings only the detriment 
of women‟s movements and practical emancipatory procedures: “The postmodernist 
position(s) thought through to their conclusions may eliminate not only the specificity of 
feminist theory but place in question the very emancipatory ideals of the women‟s 
movements altogether.”86 This practical appeal to a modernist subject is more closely 
allied with Habermasian rational individuals, than Butlerian subjectivation processes. 
 Benhabib extends her affinity for Habermasian constructs to a theoretical level.  
In addition to arguing that a postmodern feminist ethics denies subjectivity on the level of 
practice, Benhabib argues that postmodern social criticism is empty of necessary formal 
theoretical structures.  Without the ability to appeal to normative legitimating criteria, 
postmodern feminists find themselves in a dilemma.  Either there is no justificatory 
criterion, in which case ethical relativism prevents productive critique, or the justificatory 
criterion is assumed, in which case postmodernists are more hegemonic in their uncritical 
acceptance of normative justification:  
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I am now arguing that the practice of immanent social criticism or situated social criticism has two 
defects: first, the turn to immanent or internal criteria of legitimation appears to exempt one from 
the task of philosophical justification only because the postmodernists assume, inter alia, that 
there is one obvious set of such criteria to appeal to.  But if cultures and traditions are more like 
competing sets of narratives and incoherent tapestries of meaning, then the social critic must 
herself construct out of these conflictual and incoherent accounts the set of criteria in the name of 
which she speaks.  The „hermeneutic monism of meaning‟ brings no exemption from the 
responsibility of normative justification.
87
  
  
 Benhabib does recognize, however, the concerns that postmodern feminists have 
with normative Critical Theory.  Normativity is universalizing, which threatens to level 
any number of differences in society, including gender difference.  Normativity, at least 
in the Habermasian vein, is also limited to a particular historical framework—one that 
highlights the current state of affairs, rather than the utopian desire for that which is to 
come.  However, Benhabib adopts a pragmatic-utopic attitude regarding the capacity for 
feminist theory.  She writes: 
The retreat from utopia within feminist theory in the last decade has taken the form of debunking 
as essentialist any attempt to formulate a feminist ethic, a feminist politics, a feminist concept of 
autonomy, and even a feminist aesthetic.  The fact that the views of Gilligan or Chodorow or Sara 
Ruddick (or for that matter Kristeva) articulate only the sensitivities of white, middle-class, 
affluent, first-world, heterosexual women may be true (although I even have empirical doubts 
about this).  Yet what are we ready to offer in their place?  As a project of ethics which should 
guide us in the future are we able to offer a better vision than the synthesis of autonomous justice 
thinking and empathetic care?  As a vision of the autonomous personality to aspire to in the future 
are we able to articulate a sense of self better than the model of autonomous individuality with 
fluid ego-boundaries and not threatened by otherness?  As a vision of feminist politics are we able 
to articulate a better model for the future than a radically democratic polity which also furthers the 
values of ecology, nonmilitarism, and solidarity of peoples?
88
 
  
For Benhabib, feminists should be charged with developing a truly critical ethics.  This 
means that despite the potential normative constraints of such a theory, such a theory has 
emancipation as its goal.  Normative feminist theories open themselves up for critical 
reappraisal by including evaluative measures in the theory.  At the same time, these 
theories open themselves into utopian goals by articulating a means for working towards 
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these goals; namely, for Benhabib, democratic participation.  Her vision of democratic 
participation owes as much to Habermas‟ theories of justification and application as it 
does to feminist care ethics and notions of solidarity.  
 Although Benhabib is herself skeptical of the affinity she shares with Nancy 
Fraser, Fraser‟s own commitment to Habermasian theory allies her more with Benhabib‟s 
utopic goals than with Butler‟s discursive mode of (re)iteration.89  For Fraser, normativity 
is integral to feminist ethical practice, as much as feminist theory.  Fraser identifies the 
normative framework as a pragmatic tool for solidarity.  Interestingly, for Fraser this is 
not simply a tool for macrolevel feminist concerns, but also for bringing together the 
theoretical positions represented in the Feminist Contentions volume.  She contends that 
it is theoretically productive to ally Butlerian conceptions of individuation with 
Benhabib‟s emphasis on the critical.90  Despite her optimism for theorizing with 
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postmodernism, rather than against it, Fraser does not offer an outline for the necessary 
theory.  In what follows at the end of this chapter, I attempt to articulate the need and 
practical grounds for such a hybrid theory.  In chapters 5 and 6, I attempt to construct 
theoretically my version of a feminist ethics grounded in Butler, Cornell, Benhabib and 
Allen, effectively completing Fraser‟s call for a pragmatic hybrid feminist approach.   
 
The United States Healthcare Debate and Feminist Concerns about Normativity 
 In order to think through why the issue of normativity is so important for feminist 
scholarship not merely in the abstract, but also in the theoretical-practical, I propose a 
consideration of two possible problem scenarios.  In the first, I suggest that the feminist 
relevance of healthcare reform in the United States has been occluded because of the 
normative construction of the terms of the debate.  In the second, I address a problem of 
particular relevance for both feminism and a Critical Theory of cosmopolitanism, the 
possibility for transnational feminist relations between Western feminist scholars and 
Afghani women.  Through these considerations, I demonstrate the possibilities for 
thinking with and against Habermasian normativity as it relates to feminist concerns, 
positing a productive tension between Habermas‟ hard-lined notions of normativity and 
postmodern concepts of fluidity and utopia.   
Habermas explicitly argues as a part of his theory of communicative action that 
social theory has mediatizations—namely, money and power—that influence the 
possibilities for transformation in the public sphere.
91
  Habermas explicates the 
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systematic development of these mediatizations in one of his only extended discussions 
of the role of power in society.  Borrowing from Weberian sociology and Parsons‟ theory 
of society, Habermas claims that money and power come to “colonize” the lifeworld 
through historical processes of development and mechanisms of legitimation.
92
  Initially, 
power was understood mainly through mythology and religion, but it has now become 
secularized as the way in which bureaucracies are controlled by legal means.
93
 As 
mediatizations, power and money must themselves be controlled through legitimation 
processes in the public sphere.  The private sphere of power plays no central role—it has 
to be translated as it were into the public.  In this way, the relationship between power as 
it has been normalized and the absence of power in those who are disenfranchised cannot 
be theorized in a Habermasian model.     
Often, from a feminist point of view, money and power are more than simple 
mediatizations; these are the grounds by which oppression is normalized.  Let us take a 
particular example, the problem of access to affordable health insurance in the United 
States.  Despite the passage of U.S. healthcare legislation in March 2010, the discussion 
about healthcare reform is still relevant and pressing: Who are the uninsured?  How 
should we continue to improve insurance access?  Should there be a socialized plan?  
What about undocumented immigrants?  Even this wide array of relevant questions 
regarding the status and application of healthcare in the U.S. uncovers the relatively 
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narrow breadth of discussion.  In media coverage it is overwhelmingly evident that the 
discussion has been normalized to be a debate about choice and political power—
disguising other relevant issues regarding class, gender, and race divisions in access to 
both existent healthcare, and the healthcare that will be available in 2019 as per the 2010 
Healthcare Reform Bill. 
The most contentious battles before the bill was passed, and even after, were 
about what healthcare reform meant for the future of power in the dominant political 
parties.  As New York Times contributors Robert Pear and David M. Herszenhorn framed 
it in the first paragraph of their article “Obama Hails Vote on Health Care as Answering 
„the Call of History‟,” “House Democrats approved a far-reaching overhaul of the 
nation‟s health system on Sunday, voting over unanimous Republican opposition to 
provide medical coverage to tens of millions of uninsured Americans after an epic 
political battle that could define the differences between the parties for years.”94  
Healthcare reform in this discussion seems to be predominately, even almost entirely, 
about which parties voted for what, and how successful those parties were at preserving 
political face.  It is not until near the end of the first page of the article that Pear and 
Herszenhorn even mention the numbers of Americans who will be left uninsured even 
after the effects of reform are in place:  “The budget office estimates that the bill would 
provide coverage to 32 million uninsured people, but still leave 23 million uninsured in 
2019.”95  This privileging of the debate about political power, even in the arguably 
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“liberal” news media outlet of The New York Times, exposes the limitations of the 
normatively agreed upon terms of the healthcare debate.  If we are able to enter 
discussion by the terms of communicative action in discursive ethics only by either, A.) 
challenging, or B.) keeping the current normative terms of the debate, then our discursive 
range is quite limited.  With something as pressing as healthcare access, do feminists 
have the time to convince news media that the terms of debate are inadequate, before they 
can even mention that nearly 21% of women are uninsured
96
 or that the U.S. has been 
victim to an as yet unexplained jump in maternal mortality rates since 1996
97
?   
In Habermasian terms, it would seem that once the discursive bounds are 
normatively established, the only recourse for expanding the topic at hand is by re-
circumscribing the normative bounds for debate.  However, the pressing needs of 
women‟s access to healthcare should be a part of any discussion, without having to 
reframe the debate.  Additionally, when power and money—especially as regards a topic 
so obviously tied to political prowess—mediate who is authorized to speak and what they 
are authorized to speak about, how do women in minority groups, impoverished women, 
and even non-profit organizations challenge these normative bounds?  This is especially 
problematic given the lack of interaction between private access to power and public 
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legitimation of that power.  Habermas can only appeal to the public access of voting as a 
means of legitimation. However, I am arguing here that the private nature of money and 
power restrict access to “real” decision making processes that go beyond voting in 
elections.  In Habermas‟ estimation it is not possible to circumvent mediations entirely in 
society; these are material conditions that cannot be willed away.  The best society can do 
is to develop mediatizations, and society‟s relationship to them, in the most inclusive and 
democratic way possible.  However, Habermas does not engage with the issues of how 
particular groups, or particular individuals, can find their specific roles in these 
mediatizations.
98
   
On the other hand, it seems clear that a productive discussion regarding women‟s 
healthcare needs must enter the public debate.  Without making recourse to some 
normative standards for human rights, how could this be accomplished?  For as Benhabib 
claims, appeals to human rights and universal recognition appear to depend on a 
rationally based process of social interaction that produces universalized normative 
values.  She writes, “By „normative foundations‟ of social criticism I mean exactly the 
conceptual possibility of justifying the norms of universal moral respect and egalitarian 
reciprocity on rational grounds; no more and no less.”99  Perhaps by appealing to a 
pragmatically qualified conception of normative value production, feminist critical 
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theorists can carve out space for a middle ground.  Fraser suggests the need for such an 
alternative when she writes: 
Feminists do need to make normative judgments and to offer emancipatory alternatives.  We are 
not for „anything goes.‟  Moreover, it is arguable that the current proliferation of identity-
dereifying, fungible, commodified images and significations constitutes as great a threat to 
women‟s liberation as do fixed, fundamentalist identities.  In fact, dereifying processes and 
reifying processes are two sides of the same postfordist coin.  They demand a two-sided response.  
Feminists need both deconstruction and reconstruction, destabilization of meaning and projection 
of utopian hope.
100
 
  
This synthesis of deconstructive and reconstructive, constructive and critical, abstract 
theoretical and pragmatic seems a necessary turn for feminist philosophy, especially as it 
considers real issues such as healthcare.  Although Fraser articulates this need, and 
Benhabib and Butler seem interested in productive critical engagement with their 
respective theories, the alternative is yet to be mapped out.    
 
Universalization and the Transnational Feminist Problem 
 Given the pitfalls of the relatively civil and democratic procedure for discussing 
U.S. healthcare reform, it is apparent that complexified feminist issues resultant from 
globalization and cosmopolitanism would engender even more difficulties for 
contemporary feminist socio-ethical theory.   For example, take the relationship between 
Western feminist theorists and Afghani women currently living in the Afghanistan war-
zone.  It is suddenly the case that women who have traditionally been forcibly kept from 
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educational opportunities, women whose voices were silenced even in their own villages, 
now play a major role in discussions of international politics and ethics.   Despite the 
seemingly beneficial move to the global recognition of these women as world citizens, 
the paternalistic move toward universalization pervades even the most well-intentioned 
Western feminist thought on the subject.   
Normativity is by nature universalizing.
101
  Universalization depends on 
consensus formation.  However, consensus formation seems to be undesirable and 
impossible in something as complex as the debate about relations between the U.S. and 
Afghanistan.  Given that each of the following statements are true, 
 (1) The U.S. war in Afghanistan is almost prohibitively costly for the US; 
(2) The U.S. goal of finding Bin Laden in Afghanistan seems increasingly  
unlikely; arguably, accomplishing this goal has been unlikely for years; 
 (3) There is a drug war in Afghanistan, fueled by lack of tribal control; 
 (4) Women in Afghanistan have had increasing political voice in the past few  
years, even gaining positions in parliament; 
 (5) Women in Afghanistan are torn between allegiance to the unique experience  
of Afghani women and Afghani people, and to fostering solidarity with 
organizations from the West offering hope for education, protection, and 
increasingly audible political voice; 
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then, what is the appropriate universalizable consensus?  Should it be that Afghani 
women seek protection in Western-centered women‟s organizations, like Women for 
Women, International?
102
  What happens when these same women are educated, given 
puppet political positions to appease Western pressures, and then condemned for their 
Western sympathies, as in the case of Malaila Joya?
103
 How then can Afghani women 
develop their own autonomous subjectivities, which was ostensibly the intent of Western 
non-profit organizations?  More basically, is it even possible to identify Afghani women 
as autonomous subjects, if they are influenced, supported, and structured by Western 
organizations?  Additionally, what happens to these organizations themselves as the 
status and usefulness of Western actors in Afghanistan is increasingly questionable?  The 
problem here seems to indicate that a rational consensus for a normative solution would 
be contentious at best.  Even disregarding the practical concerns of the political dilemma, 
how would a sensitive feminist theorist conceptualize a transnational solidarity that 
preserved and fostered autonomy, while simultaneously extending support and 
recognition?  This string of socio-ethical questions highlights an important tension 
between conventional Critical Theory and Critical Theory informed by feminist concerns.  
As I argued in Chapter 1, feminist theorists recognize that the public sphere of discourse 
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and debate is not an ideal rational plane of existence, but is instead always already 
infused with private interests.  That is not to say that these private interests are always 
considered during the consensus-formation projects of the public sphere, but instead that 
private concerns are more often forgotten and neglected in favor of idealizations.
104
  It is 
only through a feminist ethics that prioritizes the individual and the particular, at least as 
much as the general normative and the universal, that transnational recognition can take 
place.
105
  
 
Conclusion 
Far from answering Benhabib, Butler, Cornell, or Fraser‟s concerns regarding the 
status of Critical Theory and postmodernism, in this chapter I have sought to 
problematize the relationship between contemporary feminist scholars and Habermasian 
conceptions of normativity.  By recasting the discussion in this light, I have been able to 
find both the strengths and the weaknesses of Habermas‟ theory vis-à-vis feminist 
concerns regarding healthcare and transnational solidarity.  Although I have only briefly 
sketched the problem here, I return to the issue of particular feminist concerns in 
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healthcare ethics in my fourth chapter.  There, I argue that, as Habermasian normativity 
formalizes into an account of future subject formation, his theory further limits feminist 
interests in care relationships and utopian goals of expanding subjective possibility.  I 
articulate an alternative wherein intersubjective and contextualized relationships offer 
sufficient normative grounding for an ethics of care.  Additionally, as the example of 
Afghani women‟s concerns makes clear, the development of a socio-ethical theory which 
accounts for difference, even in solidarity, is of utmost concern.  I return to a discussion 
of the development of such a theory in Chapter 6, where I suggest an outline for a 
tenuous solidarity, as an inspired alternative to a discursive ethics dependent on 
normative consensus.  
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Chapter 3  
Seeking Utopia: A Feminist Critical Analysis of Habermas’ Consensus Orientation 
 
In his theory of communicative ethics, Habermas establishes a reinvigorated and 
reevaluated grounding for Critical Theory, a grounding that stems not only from his roots 
in the Frankfurt School, but also from asserted roots in the lineage of Enlightenment 
thought.  Explicitly, Habermas often identifies his philosophy with Kantianism and coins 
the description “post-metaphysical” to describe the Enlightenment roots of his unique 
development of Critical Theory. Habermas‟ ambivalence towards Hegel manifests itself 
most explicitly in the Hegelian attitude of his theory of communicative ethics. In Seyla 
Benhabib‟s essay “The Utopian Dimension in Communicative Ethics” (1991), she offers 
a critique using Habermasian ideas against Habermas himself.   Her critique rests on the 
grounds that Habermas over-determines the normatizing power of communicative action 
in fulfilling truth ideals to the detriment of the utopian and emancipatory transfiguring 
powers of critique.  Explicit in her claims is a neo-Kantian and feminist formulation of 
utopianism and emancipation as the primary outcomes of critical philosophy.   However, 
implicit in her claims lies a potentially illuminating reconstruction of Habermasian 
communicative ethics as a philosophy of Spirit rather than critique.  In this chapter, I seek 
to uncover Habermas‟ Hegelian tendencies, tracing his ethical formulation of labor and 
interaction in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (1990) to its Hegelian 
roots.  Then, by examining Benhabib‟s critiques of fulfillment-oriented philosophy, I 
argue that Habermas‟ description of normativity is not only linked more to his Hegelian 
heritage of philosophies of Spirit than to his critical allegiance with Kantianism, but it 
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also abandons the central critical theoretical goals of emancipation and utopianism.
106
  It 
is precisely these goals of transfiguration that allow for a feminist Critical Theory to 
emerge, and by recreating the philosophical historical lineage of Habermas‟ thought, I 
hope to reconfigure a contemporary Critical Theory that synthesizes Habermasian 
concepts with the ethical, political, and practical theoretical aspects of utopian feminist 
critique.  I end this chapter with an analysis of practical and theoretical issues illuminated 
by a case example of immigration legislation, culminating in a developed feminist 
utopian position using Honig‟s, Benhabib‟s, and Pateman‟s theories.  
 
Habermas’ Hegelian Heritage 
In Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Habermas defines the 
parameters for his discourse ethics.  He explains his theoretical lineage in terms of an 
affinity for the projects of modernity.  The pinnacle of modernity for Habermas, however, 
is not the expected Kant, but rather Hegel.   In fact, Habermas claims that his notion of 
lifeworld is best aligned with Hegel‟s explicit critique of Kant:  “Rooting the practice of 
argumentation in the lifeworld contexts of communicative action calls to mind Hegel‟s 
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critique of Kant...”107   From what follows in Moral Consciousness and Communicative 
Action, I take the critique to which Habermas is alluding to be Hegel‟s position that 
Kant‟s critical philosophy is overly subjective, and in that subjectivity it opens itself to 
skepticism.
108
   Habermas wants to avoid falling into a skeptical trap in his ethics, and 
attempts to do so by establishing firmly contextual foundations for ethics—the lifeworld.   
Habermas goes further to claim that his lifeworld is related to a Hegelian notion of ethics: 
Because morality is always embedded in what Hegel called ethical life  
(Sittlichkeit), discourse ethics is always subject to limitations, though not limitations that can 
devalue its critical function or strengthen the skeptic in his role as an advocate of the 
counterenlightenment.
109
 
  
Discourse ethics, then, is limited by the context of lived situatedness.  In this way, 
morality and the ethical life fit into the larger framework of lifeworld that pervades 
Habermas‟ overall theory: 
In a discursive framework we perceive the lived world of the communicative practice of everyday 
life from an artificial, retrospective point of view: as we hypothetically consider claims to validity, 
the world of institutionally ordered relations becomes moralized, just as the world of existing 
states of affairs becomes theoreticized.  Facts and norms that had previously gone unquestioned 
can now be true or false, valid or invalid.  Moreover, in the realm of subjectivity, modern art 
inaugurated a comparable thrust toward problemetization.  The world of lived experiences is 
aestheticized, that is, freed of the routines of everyday perception and the conventions of everyday 
action.  For this reason we do well to look at the relationship of morality and ethical life as part of 
a more complex whole.
110
 
  
For Habermas, the power of discourse exists both as a means for navigating 
intersubjective and cultural experience, and as a method for framing moral and 
theoretical considerations.  This power only exists in relation to the lifeworld.  On the one 
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hand, the lifeworld is that in which we experience the cultural and intersubjective.  On 
the other hand, the lifeworld allows us the subjective perspective to analyze, moralize and 
theorize.   
The ethical is not simply an extrapolation from the lifeworld, however.  The 
sphere of ethical life also contains the answers to lifeworld questions, in a sort of 
reciprocal relationship.  As part of its relation to justice, these questions are “always 
already” answered, according to Habermas: 
From the viewpoint of a participant in moral argumentation, the lifeworld that he has put at a 
distance, a world in which the unproblematic cultural givens of cognitive, expressive, or moral 
origin are interwoven with one another, appears as the sphere of ethical life.  In this sphere duties 
are so inextricably tied to concrete habitual behavior that they derive their self-evident quality 
from background convictions.  In the sphere of ethical life, questions of justice are posed only 
within the horizon of questions concerning the good life, questions which have always already 
been answered.
111
 
  
Habermas expresses an inextricable relationship between ethics and morality within the 
lifeworld; this depiction underscores Habermas‟ commitment to an Enlightenment notion 
of universalist morality.  Habermas claims that everyday duties are “self-evident,” they 
are concerned with “the good life,” and they relate to questions that merely concretize the 
knowledge of justice that already exists.  As subject to validity claims, ethics and 
morality would seem to indicate the Kantian element of Habermas‟ theory.  However, as 
I have already argued, Habermas‟ ethical system is rooted in the lifeworld, and this 
lifeworld is dependent, in part, on a Hegelian commitment to experiential reality, rather 
than subjective transcendence. 
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 Despite his argument that ethical life provides the formal sphere for a self-evident 
morality, Habermas does not rely on transcendent sources for his justification.
112
  Instead, 
Habermas claims that the self-evident nature of morality in ethical life is a function of 
rational decisions, thereby connecting discourse ethics, morality, and rational consensus 
in a concrete way.  As I explained in Chapter 2, Habermasian ethics can be systematized 
only insofar as ethical principles can be decided upon rationally.  These rational decisions 
lie, for Habermas, in the ability to be of generalizable interest: 
Thus, the development of the moral point of view goes hand in hand with the differentiation 
within the practical into moral questions and evaluative questions.  Moral questions can be 
decided rationally, i.e., in terms of justice or the generalizability of interests.  Evaluative questions 
present themselves at the most general level as issues of the good life (or of self-realization); they 
are accessible to rational discussion only within the unproblematic horizon of a concrete historical 
form of life or the conduct of an individual life.
113
 
  
It is here, I contend, that Habermas clarifies his conception of justice.  In the first place, 
Habermas explains that practical discourse works to distinguish universal from uniquely 
subjective concerns.  He also indicates that practical discourse functions to evaluate 
moral considerations in communicative action.  Moral considerations are of universal 
concern, which Habermas explains must be determined through a conception of justice.  
Although he does not provide a substantial argument here, Habermas links justice with 
generalizability.  I would argue that there is a further equivocation in play here, between 
generalizability and what he calls elsewhere, “universal.”  This equivocation is not 
necessarily a lapse in terminological concreteness, however.  I believe that the 
replacability of generalizability with universal merely further indicates the intractability 
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of the ethical from the moral.  Here, Habermas uses generalizability to describe the 
interpretation of interests, arguably an ethical consideration.  However, Habermas claims 
that this evaluation of interests is decided on the basis of moral questions.  Elsewhere, 
Habermas uses the term universal to indicate the deontological conclusion of his moral 
standpoint theory, as I explained in Chapter 2.   This means that moral questions emerge 
rationally, are decided rationally, and that rational parameters exist for evaluating the 
universalizability of a position.  Additionally, justice is only an issue in the face of 
generalizable concerns; personal concerns are addressed on an entirely different scale, 
namely, through an evaluation of “the good life.”  The good life, for Habermas, is 
entirely dependent on the self-realization of the individual.  It is a quasi-ethical moment 
insofar as the good life appears to offer the bridge to the contextual lifeworld; Habermas 
goes so far as to explain that these questions can only be addressed within the rational 
parameters of a “concrete historical form of life,” which means a subject within a 
particular discursive episteme.    
This relation to historical context again depends on a Habermasian affinity for 
Hegelian theory.  Habermas sees Hegel‟s project as understanding the necessarily 
historical component of lifeworld, lived experiences, and ethics: 
Hegel fashioned his dialectical mode of justification in deliberate opposition to the transcendental 
one of Kant.  Hegel—and I can only hint at this here—agrees with those who charge that in the 
end Kant failed to justify or ground the pure concepts of the understanding, for he merely culled 
them from the table of forms of judgment, unaware of their historical specificity.  Thus he failed, 
in Hegel‟s eyes, to prove that the a priori conditions of what makes the experience possible are 
truly necessary.  In the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel proposes to correct this flaw by taking a 
genetic approach.
114
 
 
In order to accommodate both the universalizable and the historically contingent in his 
theory of discourse ethics, Habermas provides a strict procedure by which he contends 
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we can evaluate the empirical and normative claims to validity. Following Hegel, 
Habermas argues that the historically contingent characteristic of the lifeworld must be 
understood in order to rationally evaluate the norms which are then justified and applied.  
However, in truly Hegelian fashion, this historical contingency is understood 
dialectically, through practical discourse:   
The principle of discourse ethics (D) makes reference to a procedure, namely the discursive 
redemption of normative claims to validity.  To that extent discourse ethics can properly be 
characterized as formal, for it provides no substantive guidelines, but only a procedure: practical 
discourse.  Practical discourse is not a procedure for generating justified norms but a procedure for 
testing the validity of norms that are being proposed ad hypothetically considered for adoption.
 115
 
  
 In other words, practical discourse is secondarily related to distributed normative 
agreement.  The agreement exists first, giving the grounds for practical discourse.  This 
seems to mean that normative claims in ethics and morality are primordial to practical 
application in the lifeworld.   
 Once this background for discourse ethics is in place, Habermas outlines its 
function in producing normative consensus as such.  This consensus seems to be almost 
entirely fulfillment oriented towards universalization.  Habermas even goes so far as to 
claim that distancing from norms is only possible inasmuch as it is important for 
understanding a hypothetical attitude.  This hypothetical attitude cannot be taken up as 
lived; instead we should be concerned with a deontological move which would expose 
the rational discourse for the prospect of normative consensus: 
Participants can distance themselves from norms and normative systems that have been set off 
from the totality of social life only to the extent necessary to assume a hypothetical attitude toward 
them.  Individuals who have been socialized cannot take a hypothetical attitude toward the form of 
life and the personal life history that have shaped their own identity.  We are now in a position to 
define the scope of application of a deontological ethics: it covers only practical questions that can 
be debated rationally, i.e., those that hold out the prospect of a consensus.  It deals not with the 
value preferences but with the normative validity of norms of action.
116
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It would seem that Habermas believes that we can never have a purely objective point of 
view.  To the extent that we cannot remove ourselves from the lifeworld context in which 
we find ourselves and continually create around us, Habermas does not believe we can be 
transcendentally objective.  However, for Habermas, we can be objective insofar as we 
are fundamentally rational beings.  Working through rational debate with others, in our 
search for consensus, provides us with a universal validating process.  Habermasian 
deontological ethics is simultaneously historically situated and universally valid; ethics 
can act in both modes only when grounded in rational consensus-oriented discourse.
117
  
Discourse is further bounded according to “norms of action,” which emerge through 
rational discourse, as well.  Habermas argues elsewhere that these norms emerge through 
specialized discourse.  Experts in diverse cultural fields develop and can then offer the 
appropriate evaluative abstraction in that particular field.
118
   
It would seem that an obvious critique of Habermasian discourse ethics would be 
a critique of the Enlightenment optimism for access to an ideal point of view, wherein 
one can become a participant in rational discourse, or even become an expert.  Yet, 
Habermas finds emancipatory potential in the emphasis on self-determination in relation 
to universal moral determination.  For Habermas, Enlightenment optimism does not 
necessarily lead to exclusion.  Instead, because the fundamental characteristic of 
Enlightenment thought is theorizing the increasing social tendency to individuate, 
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Habermas believes that an emphasis on individuation prevents the outcome of exclusion.  
As David Ingram explains: 
Although Habermas recognizes that this liberal phase of the bourgeois public sphere was not 
entirely free of contradictions, in that the great mass of workers and peasants were excluded from 
membership and private interests often supervened in what was ostensibly a rational articulation of 
the public interest, he nonetheless appreciates the principle of democratic self-determination and 
critical accountability that it embodied.
119
 
 
Although Ingram acknowledges the potential critique of modernism, which will in fact be 
levied against Habermas by the feminists, Ingram does his best to explain how Habermas 
can avoid modernist traps.  Ingram claims that it is in fact Habermas‟ commitment to 
Hegelian Philosophy of Spirit that ensures Habermasian ethics is not doomed to idealism: 
Modernity is defined by a consciousness of novelty, and it is this awareness that forms the 
cornerstone of Hegel‟s philosophy.  For Hegel, the most recent stage of history, beginning with 
the Reformation and continuing through the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, enjoys a 
special preeminence insofar as the principle that it brings to explicit articulation, freedom, is the 
motor force of history (novelty) itself.
120
 
  
Because Hegel emphasizes innovation in the progressive drive of dialectics, then 
Habermas need only appropriate Hegel‟s emphasis on novelty to highlight the 
groundedness of his theory.  An emphasis on novelty means that new voices only enrich 
the discursive situation, and that the expansion of dialogue creates greater 
universalizability in consensus formation. 
Ingram goes so far as to contend that Habermas works to complete Hegel‟s 
modernist project.  While Hegel could only allude to the possibility of historical 
fulfillment for all, Habermas actually introduces the potential for intersubjectively 
evaluating real social problems: 
Habermas remarks that Hegel‟s decision to ground his conception of Spirit in self-objectifying 
subjectivity rather than communicative intersubjectivity may well have dictated his choice of 
ethical community.  His model of rational society—as involving a strategic conflict of interests 
held in check by a bureaucratic administration—resolves the problem of modernity by devaluing 
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everyday life and minimizing social critique; subjectivism is criticized philosophically, while 
people‟s needs for a democratic community go unheeded.121 
 
In Ingram‟s estimation, Habermas criticizes Hegel for not completing the critical project.  
Despite Hegel‟s important move from the subject-object dilemma that plagues Kantian 
critical philosophy, Hegel‟s development of the ethical community is incomplete.  
Without adequately theorizing this ethical community, which I take to be analogous to 
Habermas‟ lifeworld, Hegel cannot effectively address practical problems.  Tom 
Rockmore, in his book Habermas on Historical Materialism (1989), agrees that 
Habermas essentially fills out Hegel‟s project.  In this elaboration, Habermas takes up a 
very Hegelian task; namely, to employ the historical materialist process of theoretical 
fulfillment:  
In other words, in the transition from theory reconstruction to theory replacement, Habermas does 
not alter his original intent, which is constantly to do better what historical materialism, as he 
understands it, was meant to accomplish.  What does change is the means he chooses to carry out 
this task and perhaps even the specific source for the inspiration for the wider framework he 
employs.  Although throughout his writings he is more critical of Hegel than Kant, in the effort to 
show that his own view is better adapted to reach the goal of a prior theory, in effect he employs a 
Hegelian strategy.
122
 
 
I agree with Rockmore that it is precisely the Hegelian attitude of his theoretical 
application that aligns Habermas with Hegelianism, despite Habermas‟ explicit critiques 
of Hegel and endorsements of Kant.  This mode of Hegelianism also forms the ground for 
Benhabib‟s critique of Habermas, which I will elaborate in the next section. 
Although it is clear in this analysis that Habermas privileges the modernist 
attitude towards reason and rational consensus, he also recognizes that ethical change 
depends on a certain motivation to change, to make things better, to increase freedom.  
However, Habermas sees even in the explorations of utopic ideals the appeal to reason 
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and dialectic.
123
  He admires Marcuse‟s utopist vision, but less because it inspired 
revolution, and more because of what it exposed in Marcuse‟s sensibilities: a romantic 
element grounded firmly in a commitment to idealist notions of reason, i.e., Kant, and an 
appreciation of history grounded firmly in Hegelian dialectics.
124
  Although it may be 
argued that Habermas himself does not have this romantic edge, Habermas‟ account of 
Marcuse is full of reverence and admiration for this quality.  So much so, that Habermas‟ 
own tone begins to wax romantic.  However, if Habermas identifies the core of 
Marcuse‟s romanticism in Kantian reason and Hegelian historicity, it is certainly because 
of his own predilection for these concepts.  Kantian reason and Hegelian historicity found 
his theory of communication; they are what allow for rational consensus and even speech 
act analysis.  In this way, Habermas introduces a utopic moment to his theory.  He has 
hope for a future made better through democratic participation, wherein the norms and 
values most helpful for all are rationally agreed to at the end of reasonable 
communicative action. 
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Benhabib’s Interests in Utopian Value 
Habermas‟ quasi-utopist vision parallels the goals and ideals of many “rebellious” 
thinkers, including many feminists whose critical optimism rests entirely in the hope for 
future change.    As I addressed in chapters 1 and 2, the feminist engagement with 
Habermas‟ theory involves varying degrees of accordance with and dependence upon 
Habermasian concepts.  The same holds true for the feminist engagement with 
Habermas‟ fulfillment-orientation.  In the coming sections, I primarily engage two of 
these feminist positions, Benhabib‟s and Honig‟s, in order to illustrate a possible 
modification of critical theoretical principles regarding utopianism and universalization. 
Although Habermas and these feminist positions share many of the same goals, 
the philosophical commitments are quite divergent.  As I explained above, Habermas is 
committed to a hard-lined notion of rational argumentation culminating in consensus.  
This consensus promotes normative values for society, and it is in these norms that 
Habermas expresses a qualified utopian promise.  Change occurs through consensus 
fulfillment, modeling a strong modernist position.  Many feminists have a quite different 
grounding.  Benhabib, for example, is closest to Habermas, in that she argues that a 
commitment to universalist reason is necessary for appealing to the empowering potential 
of change.   Without agreed upon notions of what good and better are, how else can we 
achieve a better future?  However, Benhabib is still distinct from Habermas in that she 
recognizes that this idealist notion of reason is only useful on a macro-level.  In order to 
even come together for utopian change, Benhabib contends that we must recognize the 
individual particularities that can never be subsumed into one programmatic norm for 
society, but are always instead concrete and particular.  Utopic promise can only arise 
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when a balance is met between the generalized and the concrete other.  Here utopianism 
is grounded less on Hegelian historicity and more on historically contingent and 
contextual psychologies.  
Benhabib‟s work is uniquely important to my own understanding of the debate 
between communicative action theory and feminists, because contrary to many of the 
feminist philosophers I have addressed thus far, Benhabib explicitly espouses a modified 
version of Habermas‟ theory.  Benhabib‟s critique of Habermas‟ Hegelianism is nuanced 
and qualified by her allegiance to an overall appropriation of Habermasian normative 
theory.  As I addressed in chapter 2, Benhabib believes that feminist ethics must be 
grounded in normative standards in order to preserve practical emancipatory possibility.  
For Benhabib, a system of Habermasian communicative action resolves conflicts, 
answers moral and political questions, and balances self-interest (private) with mutual 
understanding (public), albeit in a limited way given his emphasis on normativity.  As I 
outlined in chapter 1, Benhabib, Fleming, and others believe that Habermas recognizes 
and addresses the dichotomy between public and private, but that his application and 
extension of political discourse is limited by its normalizing nature to universalize.  In 
this section, I will develop a different vein of Benhabib‟s critique.  According to 
Benhabib, Habermas—to his detriment—minimizes the utopic vision of a Kantian 
inspired ethical system.
125
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In her essay “The Utopian Dimension in Communicative Ethics,” Benhabib 
exposes Habermas‟ latent affinity for a Hegelian system of ethics and fulfillment.126  To 
begin her analysis, Benhabib explains the difference between a utopian-oriented system 
of ethics and a normatively-oriented system of ethics as two possible understandings of 
an ethics of communicative action: 
It [the two possible interpretations of an ethics of communicative action] reveals the intimate 
relation between „transfiguration‟ and „fulfillment‟, between the poles of utopia and norm within 
which the discourse of a critical social theory unfolds.  By „transfiguration‟ I mean the future 
envisaged by a theory entails a radical rupture with the present, and in such a rupture a new and 
imaginative constellation of the values and meanings of the present takes place.  The concept of 
fulfillment, by contrast, refers to the fact that the society of the future executes and carries out the 
unfinished tasks of the present, without necessarily forging new, imaginative constellations out of 
this cultural heritage.  These are concepts which I use to designate an essential tension in the 
project of Critical theory and which can also be referred to as „utopia‟ and „norm‟ respectively.127 
  
Benhabib‟s evaluation of transfiguration and fulfillment exposes her own philosophical 
lineage and affinities.  Benhabib is more or less a neo-Kantian Critical Theorist; however, 
she writes elsewhere of her particular draw to Hegel and Hegelian inspired ethical 
understanding.
128
    In this case, Benhabib identifies a Kantian ethical system of theory 
replacement with transfiguration, while relegating Hegelian ethics to theory 
reconstruction through historically predetermined fulfillment.  Benhabib equates 
fulfillment with norms, and transfiguration with utopia.  Throughout the rest of the essay, 
Benhabib attempts to show how, despite his inclusion of both normative and utopian 
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elements, Habermas‟ favoring of normativity and generalization limits his capacity to 
bring the utopian and culturally sensitive aspects of his theory to fruition. 
Benhabib explains that fulfillment and over-generalized norms have been 
historically faulted for their inability to reconcile with the value of emancipation and 
universalization.  She explains that although Habermas tries to re-establish the link 
between critical political theory and the Enlightenment, he fails to see that the 
Enlightenment legacy excludes several groups from the universal rights and potentialities 
it claims to protect: 
Habermas has attempted to reestablish the link between the Enlightenment and emancipation, and 
to bring the project of emancipation into the light of the public by going back to the Enlightenment 
legacy of practical reason.  His project requires fulfilling the universalistic promise of social 
contract and consent theories which, since the 17
th
 century, have always limited such universalism 
on the basis of sex, class, race, and status distinctions.
129
 
 
Although Benhabib finds merit in the emancipatory project, she recognizes that any hope 
for universalized emancipation can emerge only through a utopian understanding of the 
value of the other.  Rather than generalizing the Other as that-standpoint-which-is-not-
my-own, Benhabib suggests a reevaluation of moral autonomy.  She chastises Habermas 
for simply accepting the view of the generalized other from Mead:  “My thesis is that 
Habermas, following Mead, restricts moral autonomy to the standpoint of the 
„generalized other‟, and does not do justice to the utopian dimension in his own 
project.”130   
According to Benhabib, the collapse of Habermas‟ project into simple fulfillment-
orientation and generalizability comes from a procedural notion of normative consensus: 
There are two premises shared by Rawls and Habermas.  I will call the first the „consensus 
principle of legitimacy‟ and define it as follows: the principle of rational consensus provides the 
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only criterion in light of which the legitimacy of norms and institutional arrangements can be 
justified.  More significantly, Rawls and Habermas share the meta-theoretical premise: the idea of 
such rational consensus is to be defined procedurally.  Rawls maintains that his theory of justice 
provides us with the only procedure of justification through which valid and binding norms of 
collective coexistence can be established.  Habermas argues that the „ideal speech situation‟ 
defines the formal properties of discourses, by engaging in which alone we can attain a rational 
consensus.  The fictive collective choice situation devised by Rawls and the „ideal speech 
situation‟ devised by Habermas are normative justification procedures serving to illustrate the 
consensus principle of legitimacy.
131
 
 
Benhabib‟s explanation of the “consensus principle of legitimacy” exposes another major 
flaw of Habermas‟ notion of normativity: it is sterile.  By creating an ideal speech 
situation, goals and justifications arise in a consensus whose establishment rests on the 
notion of a generalized other who legitimizes this normative position.  In other words, 
Habermas creates a procedure for communicative ethics that does not sufficiently account 
for the spontaneity, interconnectedness, historicity, and cultural relevance of real political 
speech.   
Although Benhabib is sympathetic to the Habermasian project of communicative 
action, she finds the problem of fixed normativity almost fatal to his project.  Benhabib 
believes that the alternative—an open, utopian-oriented ethical attitude whose goal is 
transfiguration and whose establishment rests on recognizing the concrete other—
exposes major flaws in Habermas‟ dichotomized system: 
If the highest stage of a universalistic ethical orientation is this open, reflexive communication 
about our needs and the cultural traditions in light of which they are interpreted, then a number of 
oppositions on which Communicative ethics seemed to rest begin to lose their force: questions of 
justice merge with questions of the good life; practical-moral discourses flow into aesthetic-
expressive ones; autonomy is not only self-determination in accordance with just norms but the 
capacity to assume the standpoint of the concrete other as well.
132
 
 
For Benhabib, Habermas‟ claim to a historically contingent and individually sensitive 
communicative ethics is impossible to maintain alongside his commitments to 
universalizable, justifiable norms and the social practice of consensus that founds these 
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norms.  Instead, Benhabib illustrates that true openness to particularized interests and 
individually contextualized needs undermines Habermas‟ emphasis on the distinctions 
between justice and the good life, between practical discourse and aesthetic discourse, 
and between self-determination and intersubjectivity.  Following Benhabib‟s logic, 
individual contextualization would not only determine the best path for self-
actualization—or the good life, in Habermasian terms—but it would also determine the 
specific interpretation of justice which a political actor would bring to the discursive 
public sphere.  Similarly, questions of taste and self-expression would influence practical 
determinations, as the self-identity of a subject would also influence that specific 
subject‟s relation to, and identification with, others.  Alternatively, bracketing these 
considerations out of public communicative action would force Habermas into a position 
of ahistorical and theoretical sterility.  Benhabib‟s critical analysis of Habermas leaves 
the question: If normativity forces communicative action in the public sphere into a role 
of self-restriction, then what alternative does the feminist project of Critical Theory 
have?
133
 
 
Honig, Foreignness and Universalization 
In order to uncover the impact of this tension between universalism and 
utopianism in normative ethics, I would like to take a modified approach to a familiar 
example in feminist Critical Theory, the issue of immigration.  For contemporary 
feminist philosophers, immigration and the status of immigrant citizens is of particular 
                                                 
133
 For further analysis of the role of the “concrete other” in Benhabib‟s thought, see “The Generalized and 
the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory,” in Situating the Self: Gender, 
Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics.  New York: Routledge, 1992. pp. 148-177. 
68 
 
concern in a globalized and increasingly cosmopolitan world.
134
  In a cosmopolitan 
world, women‟s rights are not simply an issue for an isolated group of persons in a 
national community, but they are instead the paradigms for evaluating human rights 
concerns on national, international, and transnational levels.  Because of this connection 
between women‟s rights, globalization, and citizenship, feminist theory often engages 
with issues of immigration that exemplify similar intersectional concerns.  Bonnie Honig, 
for example, argues in “Immigrant America? How Foreignness „Solves‟ Democracy‟s 
Problems” that U.S. immigration policy has served to reinforce the idealization of 
universalist ethical principles, while simultaneously exposing the practical impossibility 
to ensure universal democratic participation.
135
  Honig contends that the act of 
performing a naturalization process dramatizes the signature of a social contract: “In the 
case of the United States, this means (re)enacting for established citizens the otherwise 
too abstract universalism of America‟s democratic constitutionalism.”136  For Honig, 
foreign immigrants provide liberal legitimacy to the state by creating real situations of 
contractual agreement.  However, as Honig convincingly elaborates, these same 
immigrants are “infantilized” and made to seem unintelligent and “desperate” by native-
born citizens.
137
  Native-born citizens create media stereotypes of immigrants as needing 
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protection and safe-haven in the paternal authority of the United States.  Immigrants are 
accused of taking jobs from native citizens and of burdening social services like food-
stamps and Medicaid.  If the idealization of universalization is only possible in a 
fantastical re-enactment wherein the same re-enactment is ultimately undermined by 
generalization and stereotypes, then it seems that universalized normative democracy is 
untenable.  However, I would like to explore this scenario even further.   
 Habermas explicitly acknowledges that universalization is mediated by 
participation.  As I laid out in the last two chapters, Habermasian ethics depends on 
universal normative standards; these normative standards must be formulated on 
consensus in order to justify.
138
  Habermas further contends that normative justification is 
strengthened by incorporating as many disparate voices as possible: It should not be the 
white male voice alone, but individuals who have been socialized in particular ways.  In 
fact, Habermas contends that the individual socialization process is central to the 
effectiveness of communicative action.
139
  These concerns seem analogous to the feminist 
project, where the concerns of individuals must be considered in advance of democratic 
participation in order to ensure the inclusive efficacy of the emancipatory democratic 
process.
140
  However, as I illustrated above, Habermas‟ project rests on an overly ideal 
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notion of consensus fulfillment and ultimate universalization of normative morality, an 
Enlightenment project Habermas indicates can and should be fulfilled.  As I have already 
intimated, this orientation toward fulfillment inhibits the critical and utopic moments of 
Habermas‟ projects.  But what does this inhibition actually mean in practice? 
 Returning to the idea of immigration and the relationship between the utopic, the 
universal, and democratic participation, I would like to reimagine the case example 
Honig provides.  U.S. immigration policies and state laws are even more stringent and 
inscrutable in 2010 than they were in 1998.
141
  Today laws in Arizona require non-
citizens to offer proof of legal status at the whim of law enforcement, there is a partial 
wall separating the Mexico-U.S. Border, and to enter to and from Canada you must now 
have a passport.  What does this increased restriction on undocumented citizens, 
immigration, and border control mean for an analysis of Habermas‟ overly modernist 
tendencies?  I contend that these new systems and legal boundaries are intended to 
preserve an idealization of a social contract.  By constraining who counts as a member-
citizen in normatively circumscribed boundaries, immigration laws attempt to define 
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particular social contract relationships.  Society has a duty to protect you, but only if you 
are a true member of that society.  The increased stringency of immigration and border 
laws further narrow the definition of citizenship and membership, thereby further limiting 
the duties of society for protection.  However, at the same time that these laws and 
practices serve to exclude and limit persons from citizenship status, they also serve to 
make the duties of society appear better fulfilled.  For example, if a part of the perceived 
ideal social contract is the duty of protecting property rights, financial securities, and free 
marketplace trade, it is easier to perform these duties for a select number of accounted-for 
citizens who have legal-status jobs and participate in banking.  However, when members 
of a community without legal status are unable to participate in these systems and instead 
seek under-the-table employment and cannot invest in banks, it makes the entire system 
seem inefficient and incapable.  By pushing these marginalized individuals completely 
outside the bounds of the social contract, the duties appear more universally fulfilled, and 
therefore more universal in general.  But this universalizability is illusory, precisely 
because those who are expelled from the system are forced to function outside of the 
system, de-stabilizing the system itself. This is essentially the inverse of the problem 
Honig identified.         
 Benhabib contends that these issues are not merely the result of the practical 
deployment of current democratic institutions, but that they are, in fact, grounded in 
precisely the type of theory which Habermas endorses.
142
  She writes: 
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Habermas has attempted to reestablish the link between the Enlightenment and emancipation, and 
to bring the project of emancipation into the light of the public by going back to the Enlightenment 
legacy of practical reason.  His project requires fulfilling the universalistic promise of social 
contract and consent theories which, since the 17
th
 century, have always limited such universalism 
on the basis of sex, class, race, and status distinctions.
143
 
  
For Benhabib the greatest threat to emancipation is the idealization of modernist and 
Enlightenment conceptions of universalism.  By glorifying these positions, and by 
claiming that they help to establish the normative framework Habermasian 
communicative ethics needs, Habermas falls prey to a system of domination, rather than 
emancipation.  In the following section, I explain how my specific interpretation of 
Benhabib‟s and Honig‟s positions provides an alternative to Habermas‟ limitations. 
 
Utopian Cosmopolitanism 
As an alternative theory of democratic participation, both Honig and Benhabib 
endorse cosmopolitanism.  Although their conceptions of cosmopolitanism are quite 
distinct, both theorists share a principle value of utopianism as central to inclusive 
democracy.
144
  According to Honig, cosmopolitanism must be radically democratic, 
accommodating participants who are disenfranchised by other views of democratic 
participation:   
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 The goal of a democratic cosmopolitanism is to offset the risks and vouchsafe the benefits of a 
state (non)membership by widening the resources and energies of an emerging international civil 
society to contest or support state actions in matters of transnational and local interest, such as 
environmental, economic, military, cultural, and immigration policies.  This is a democratic 
cosmopolitanism because democracy—in the sense of a commitment to local and popular 
empowerment, effective representation, and the generation of actions in concert across lines of 
difference—is its goal.145 
   
By this definition, the democratic cosmopolitanism Honig endorses is utopian in its 
orientation towards not a singular, fulfillable goal, but to an ever-widening scope of 
inclusionary emancipation and participation.  Further, this utopian vision for transnational 
democracy depends on an ethics founded in relational difference, which utilizes 
contentious and complimentary solidarity as a mechanism for change.  Although Honig 
does not develop either of these positions, I argue that it is clear such a program is needed 
for transnational and local feminist concerns by her recommendation that democratic 
cosmopolitanism mediate “transnational and local interest” through the “generation of 
actions in concert across lines of difference.” In chapters 4, 5, and 6, I strive to articulate 
the possibility for theorizing these ethical foundations, by arguing for the development of 
a relational ethics modeled upon parental care ethics, grounded primarily in the 
recognition of mutual vulnerability, which requires specific acts of solidarity for its 
application.  Such a program is, like Honig‟s vision for democratic cosmopolitanism, 
fundamentally utopian.
146
  It is a procedure, always in process, never oriented to absolute 
fulfillment that gathers strength in its ability to be fungible and flexible. 
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 Benhabib, like Honig, advocates an expansionary definition of transnational 
democracy.  In her formulation of cosmopolitanism, Benhabib attempts to reconcile the 
universal with the particular, and the global with the local, by demonstrating their 
fundamental interdependence for justification.  Unlike Habermasian justifications, 
Benhabib argues, cosmopolitan justifications cannot rely on the rationalization processes 
of a nation-state.  Instead, cosmopolitanism depends as much on the particularity of 
intranational cultural differences as it does on the generalizability of international human 
rights.  As Benhabib explains: 
The spread of cosmopolitan norms, from interdictions of war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide to the increasing regulations of cross-border movements through the Geneva 
Conventions and other accords, has yielded a new political condition: the local, the national and 
the global are all imbricated in one another.  Future democratic iterations will make their 
interconnections and interdependence deeper and wider.  Rather than seeing this situation as 
undermining democratic sovereignty, we can view it as promising the emergence of new political 
configurations and new forms of agency, inspired by the interdependence—never frictionless but 
ever promising—of the local, the national, and the global.147 
  
 This definition of cosmopolitanism follows Benhabib‟s earlier injunction that 
universalism in ethics must be oriented toward open transfiguration, rather than 
transformative completion.  By highlighting the future orientation of increasingly 
cosmopolitan ethical navigation, Benhabib suggests a utopian openness is necessary for 
theorizing contemporary ethical problems.  In this account, neither the particular, nor the 
universal is given primacy, unlike the Habermasian account.  However, in distinction to 
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Honig‟s formulation, Benhabib still emphasizes a quasi-modernist notion of universal 
normative justification.  
Despite Habermas‟ fears that such an ethics would lose legitimacy in its 
theoretical justification, and efficacy in its practical application, using Benhabib and 
Honig to qualify Habermas‟ project, I argue that a feminist ethics of utopian 
cosmopolitanism would ultimately reorient Critical Theory to Habermas‟ own goals of 
emancipation.  In the next chapter, I address how utopian openness would also benefit 
Habermas‟ theory of human nature by providing the theoretical grounding for the 
expansion of an understanding of embodied subjectivity. 
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Chapter 4 
 The Future of Human Nature: 
A Critical Analysis of Habermas and the Ethics of Expanding Human Nature 
 
In his book The Future of Human Nature (2003), Jürgen Habermas challenges the 
ethics of medical enhancement by proposing that even something as seemingly benign as 
preimplantation genetic testing questions the very authenticity of subjective existence and 
personal autonomy.  Arguing that parental rights to interfere genetically with fetuses 
must be clearly delimited by the possibilities of the future person's decision-making 
ability, Habermas claims that the philosophical and political right to freedom is at stake 
in determining medical ethics.  Habermas' argument hinges on the notion of biological 
nature—he proposes that genetic interference is ultimately irreversible and formally final 
in the constitution of a person.  However, Habermas' strict definition of human nature and 
its future possibilities restricts the potential for reevaluating the very notion of human 
nature.  Habermas‟ concerns with normativity and autonomy are, therefore, too restrictive 
for Critical Theory when it comes to such normative and moral concerns as 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis.  In this case, his strictures actually limit normatively 
guaranteed autonomy by limiting parental decision-making and also by confining the free 
choice of the individual within biological and genetic constraints, forcing Habermas to 
propose a restrictive theory of human nature.  I propose that in order to evaluate the 
ethics of medical enhancement, the definition of "human nature" must be expanded to 
recognize the cultural, psychological, and self-constitutive forces that are, in fact, no 
longer fixed and yet contribute to the creation of personhood.  This notion of existential 
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personhood simultaneously respects the decision-making ability of the individual, while 
recognizing the expanded notions of human nature and parental responsibility.  In this 
chapter, I begin with a careful analysis of Habermas' core argument in The Future of 
Human Nature, providing an examination of challenges to his project, notably from 
Cristina Lafont on the role of parental responsibility and Nikolas Kompridis on 
normativity.  Once the core argument is established, I provide an analysis of an 
alternative ethical foundation through a modification of relational care ethics.  In this 
way, I challenge the fundamental assumption that genetic enhancement limits autonomy 
by proposing that a responsible medical ethics including genetic enhancement may 
instead expand existential freedom.  I end this chapter by bracing my argument with an 
analysis of Amy Allen‟s feminist critique of Habermasian notions of power, explaining 
that a synthesis of Habermas and more feminist-friendly relational notions of power 
dynamics allows for a fuller depiction of a self-constitutive subject.  It is in this 
framework, I contend, that the future human subject of the post-genetic age may in fact 
be better equipped to assert her freedom and autonomy through critical reflection on 
biological and cultural forces. 
 
Habermas and Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis 
 Seemingly breaking from his trademark essays and books on social normativity 
and its effects on communicative action, Habermas‟ work in The Future of Human 
Nature explores the ever-widening scope of medical ethics and the potential effects 
medical enhancement may have on ethical autonomy.  Medical enhancement‟s scope is 
so wide and so amorphous that Habermas limits his analysis to the specific developing 
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medical technique of preimplantation genetic diagnosis.  Habermas identifies his explicit 
understanding of preimplantation diagnosis as that diagnosis which: “permits genetic 
screening to be carried out on embryos at the eight-cell stage.”148  Habermas further 
clarifies his operational understanding of this diagnosis as a procedure explicitly 
“recommended, in the first place, to parents wanting to rule out the risk of transmitting a 
hereditary disease.”149  Following this concise definition of preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis as the paradigm advancement in contemporary medical society, Habermas 
begins to explore the potential problems and crises he sees arising from the expanding 
world of medical enhancement and its impact on the question of human nature. 
Although it initially seems that Habermas is breaking from his traditional work in 
communicative ethics and normativity by exploring a debate in contemporary medical 
ethics, it soon becomes clear that Habermas‟ fears about preimplantation genetic testing 
are rooted directly within the issues of familiar Habermasian Critical Theory.  Namely, 
Habermas fears the possibility that medical developments and research investments are 
moving at a pace beyond the scope of the limitations and regulations established by 
communicative action in the public sphere.  For Habermas, developments in medical 
enhancement represent a potential threat to communication and normativity on several 
levels.  Primarily, it is on the level of the autonomous individual, which will be the focus 
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of this chapter and something I will discuss in further detail in the coming sections, but 
also on the level of the ethicopolitical society.   
Habermas identifies several factors related to medical advancement techniques 
that problematize political society and the effectiveness of the public sphere.  In 
Habermas‟ estimation: “As biotechnological research is by now bound up with investors‟ 
interests as well as with the pressure for success felt by national governments, the 
development of genetic engineering has acquired a dynamic which threatens to steamroll 
the inherently slow-paced processes of an ethicopolitical opinion and will formation in 
the public sphere.”150  The very relation of medical development to funding sources and 
governmental recognition, according to Habermas, infuses the biotechnological debate 
with a force that is difficult to control via the normal public and political practices. 
Habermas believes that in order to combat hasty acceptance of medical advancement 
techniques, ethicopolitical society must engage in a more specific application of 
communicative action.  Evaluating the ethical standards for preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis, Habermas writes: 
 As a first step, the population in general as well as the political public sphere and parliament may 
come to feel that preimplanation genetic diagnosis as such may be morally permitted or legally 
tolerated if limited to a small number of well-defined cases of severe hereditary disease which the 
persons who are potentially affected by them in the future cannot be reasonably expected to cope 
with.
151
 
  
This line of reasoning seems to presuppose two major assumptions:  First, that the 
political public sphere is best suited to provide the ethical guidelines for the 
Kierkegaardian private determinations of the self on which Habermas is grounding his 
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argument.
152
  And secondly, that the “ability to cope” provides sufficient normative 
content to overcome the limitations of medical/economic and private/familial 
determinations of biotechnological ethics. 
Remarking on the relationship between biotechnological advances and legal 
restrictions to date, Habermas claims that the freedom of biotechnology has been in 
keeping with the freedoms of the rest of social society, and as such has been in large part 
protected, rather than restricted, by law:  “From this sober empirical perspective, 
legislative interventions restricting the freedom of biological research and banning the 
advances of genetic engineering seem but a vain attempt to set oneself against the 
dominant tendency to freedom of modern society.”153 Far from seeing this type of 
freedom as positive in a rationally motivated communicative society, Habermas seems to 
indicate that the unrestricted tendency towards “freedom” has potentially negative 
consequences.  Later in this chapter, I will examine in detail Habermas‟ conflicted 
attitude towards freedom in The Future of Human Nature and assess the possible 
normative ramifications of this attitude on the autonomous individual. 
 Parallel to his fears about the ethicopolitical ramifications of preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis and runaway medical advancements, Habermas expresses angst for the 
status of autonomous individuals in a post-genetic world.  Imagining the outcome of the 
“future person” affected by preimplantation genetic diagnosis--the former fetus-subject, 
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now an embodied adolescent--Habermas predicts an existential crisis beyond the scope of 
normal adolescent existential crises.  He writes: 
In this way, the dedifferentiation of the distinction between the grown and the made intrudes upon 
one‟s subjective mode of existence.  It might usher in the vertiginous awareness that, as a 
consequence of genetic intervention carried out before we were born, the subjective nature we 
experience as being something we cannot dispose over is actually the result of an 
instrumentalization of a part of our nature.
154
 
  
For Habermas, then, the most affecting result of genetic diagnosis and intervention is not 
the presumed goal of combating hereditary disease and ensuring fetal health; rather, the 
most affecting outcome is the potential inability for the “future person” to self-identify 
according to its subjective nature.
155
   
Habermas‟ warnings about the future of human nature in a post-genetic world 
then are two-fold:  First, he anticipates a world in which the speed of technology 
supercedes the effectiveness and abilities of political communication, which he compares 
to a “dominant tendency toward freedom in modern society.”  Additionally, and more 
relevant to this project, Habermas identifies the potential for new existential crises related 
to medical instrumentalization and formally final genetic interventions.
156
  In the 
remainder of this chapter, I want to highlight a particular problem with Habermas‟ 
explanation of PGD.  I argue that Habermas conflates the existential with the biological.  
Recognizing the detriment to autonomous self-understanding caused by the “disposing 
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over” the future human person, Habermas mistakenly attributes this danger to an 
inevitable consequence of PGD.  However, PGD as a biological-technology tool and 
intervention is not necessarily a practice of the anonymous disposing over by an 
unanswerable third party.  As an alternative, I propose in the following sections that if, 
instead, the normatively interested critical theorist looks to where normative decisions 
properly belong, namely the communicatively experienced lifeworld, an analysis of the 
appropriate normative ethical channels—practices of parenting, adolescent self-
constitution, the responsiveness of human rights—proves that PGD may retain its place 
as a practicable technique without disrupting individual autonomy.  In other words, if 
Habermas had focused on the distinction between the biological and the normative issues, 
he would have had to offer a more nuanced account of medical ethics, rather than 
resorting to a weak argument for formal biological normativity. 
 
Fixed Normativity and the Devaluation of the Critical in Critical Theory 
Nikolas Kompridis, in his book Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between 
Past and Future (2006), challenges the Habermasian position on both the notion of future 
and the notion of human autonomy and possibility.  Taking for his main interest the role 
of normative ethics in the disclosure of human facticity, Kompridis hones his appraisal of 
Habermas‟ distinction between proceduralist ethics and human nature. 
Although Kompridis‟ main objective is to rectify contemporary Critical Theory 
with a current reading of Heideggerian disclosure theory, underlying his entire project is 
an apt critique of Habermas—particularly the more recent works by Habermas.  
Kompridis begins his discussion of Habermas with an analysis of the Critical Theory 
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project of understanding future possibility.  According to Kompridis‟ estimation, 
contemporary Critical Theory is founded on recognition of renewal—a renewal which is 
historically constituted.  This concept of renewal is not only a notion of cultural 
reevaluation, but also a deeply personal responsibility of the individual in a normatively 
constructed lifeworld.  For Kompridis, Critical Theory demands that we reassess the 
normative as a reflective tool: 
Thus we can say that the normativity of the new contains both a problem-solving aspect that 
answers the ever-present need to make sense of the discontinuity against a shifting background of 
continuity, and a culture-orienting aspect that facilitates a reflective understanding of and relation 
to the past.
157
 
  
According to this assessment of the role of novelty in normative problem-solving, the 
responsible critical individual must retain a reflective relationship with the historical 
understandings of normativity and renewal.  This reflective relationship appears at the 
heart of both first generation Critical Theory and in Habermas‟ writings on modernity. 
 In his reading of Habermas‟ The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity158, 
Kompridis ascribes an important ethical paradigm to Habermas‟ interpretation of the 
„present‟: 
Within this ethically reinterpreted historical horizon we bear a special responsibility: we are the 
ones who must self-consciously renew and correct our forms of life, who must repair what is 
broken, or break with what seems irreparable.  We are the ones who must remake our languages 
and practices, and make something new out of something old.
159
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Individuals have a special reflective duty to renew both their autonomous lives and the 
intersubjective lifeworld around them in Habermas‟ assessment of modernity.  It is this 
duty—to renew and rehabilitate the individual in the face of a historical present—that 
Kompridis finds lacking in the more recent Habermas.  Kompridis finds that Habermas 
moves further and further away from the project of innovation by his interest in 
proceduralist ethics.  According to a Habermasian system of proceduralist ethics, the goal 
of communicative action is a rational goal—namely, to achieve a norm to which all 
communicative actors in the lifeworld can ascribe.  However, Kompridis argues against 
Habermas‟ claims to neutrality and distance from content-rich ideas of the good life.  Not 
only is this position self-defeating—in order for Habermas to make claims about rational 
standards, he must elevate the notion of rationality to a „good‟—but also, the position is 
potentially harmful to the critical capacity of Critical Theory.  As Kompridis wryly states, 
“A good that has no significant content has no critical potential.”160  The problem of 
neutrality and empty goods also points to a much larger problem stifling Habermas‟ full 
critical potential.  Kompridis identifies a Habermasian shift from an emphasis in 
historically centered philosophy of the subject (key to first generation Critical Theory) to 
what Kompridis calls a “more foundationalist theoretical structure.”161  Kompridis finds 
the totalizing nature of this move problematic for Critical Theory‟s own ability to retain 
its critical identity, where Kompridis identifies the critical capacity with an emphasis on 
historical situatedness and particularization.  The shift finalized in Between Facts and 
Norms situates Habermas‟ contemporary brand of Critical Theory within a proceduralist 
vision of ethics—a restrictive vision Kompridis distills as “…through which the role of 
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philosophy is largely restricted to the problem of designing procedures for determining 
the validity of the generalizable, collectively binding norms.”162  In his new work, 
therefore, Habermas has moved away from the important critical goal of reflective 
innovation, to the severely limited philosophical action of rationally assessing validity.   
  Despite Habermas‟ insistence that communicatively centered Critical Theory 
avoids the postmodern trap of „otherness,‟ or more specifically, the other of reason, 
Kompridis points out the impossibility of avoiding otherness based on the very practices 
of communicative Critical Theory: 
Nonetheless, communicative rationality does produce its own „other‟ of reason because it denies a 
transformative role for reason, a role it cannot help but deny so long as it is narrowly framed by a 
proceduralist conception of rationality that privileges the justificatory role of reason.  This is not a 
problem that is easily rectified, since the basic concepts of communicative rationality are not 
designed to make sense of—but simply take for granted—the ways in which human beings 
transform the meanings, ideals, norms, institutions, practices, and traditions they inherit and pass 
on.
163
 
  
According to this assessment, Kompridis not only identifies the problem communicative 
Critical Theory faces—namely, that the justificatory purpose of rationally motivated 
communication eliminates the acceptance of other notions of reason—but he also hints at 
the solution.  If communicative rationality ignores the transformative power of human 
beings, then a refocusing of Critical Theory precisely on that which is transformative, 
innovative, and creative would revive the critical and historical situatedness of 
communication and Critical Theory.  
 It would seem then, that Habermas‟ interest in genetic innovation in The Future of 
Human Nature is exactly what his philosophical system needs in order to revitalize its 
critical character.  Unfortunately for Habermas, however, Kompridis finds that far from 
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revitalizing his project, Habermas simply exposes his system‟s own limitations.  
According to Kompridis, although Habermas‟ previous works establish a specific role for 
philosophy--as a procedural method for establishing rationally motivated normative 
ethics—The Future of Human Nature explicitly changes the purpose and goal of 
philosophy to an intervention in the lifeworld.   Kompridis clarifies this new goal, when 
he writes:  
Philosophy is not just being asked to play a mediating role; it is expected to have a say in 
determining “the right understanding of cultural forms of life in general.”  Now that calls for a 
great deal more than what Habermas‟ procedural conception allows: it calls for critical 
illumination of what it means to be a human being.
164
 
  
Habermas‟ call to define human life changes the Habermasian system; now, far from 
offering a proceduralist system for rational communication, Habermas advocates a 
normative definition of human person as primary to any philosophical understanding.  
This new direction poses a unique problem for Habermas; it forces Habermas to 
acknowledge the necessity of conceiving of the being and life of the communicative 
subject before the communicative act can actually take place.   According to Kompridis, 
the arguments in The Future of Human Nature ultimately force Habermas to reverse the 
priority of his positions.  Justice as the outcome of communicative action must now be 
secondary to “…a prior background understanding of what it is to be a human being.”165 
However, what Habermas offers in the way of understanding human nature does not 
fulfill the necessary requirements for an existential understanding of human nature.  
Whereas theories of world disclosure involve the creative and the reflective activities of 
the self as self-constitutive, even in The Future of Human Nature, Habermas merely 
provides a fixed prescription for what humanness requires.  According to the previously 
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discussed fear Habermas has about the existential ramifications of genetic diagnosis on 
autonomy, the person is unable to reassess and redefine her own nature in the face of 
genetic manipulation.  In other words, the human person is formally constituted by his or 
her genetic code. 
 Because of the limitations of a Habermasian system of communicative ethics, 
specifically the form of ethics restricted by proceduralist and rationalist interests, 
Kompridis offers his own version of a Critical Theory perspective on human nature.  
Addressing the need for the innovative and world-disclosing characteristics of Critical 
Theory—the very qualities he finds lacking in Habermas‟ Between Facts and Norms—in 
conjunction with a notion of being in a „genetic‟ world, Kompridis advocates a critical 
position in which the meaning of “human being” is continuously redisclosed in the face 
of historical presence:  “For it is not enough simply to offer reminders of what it means to 
be a human being; philosophy must do what it can to speak in the name of the human, 
disclosing and redisclosing the meaning of human being in the face of all that threatens 
it—including those expert cultures which claim to know the human.”166  In order to avoid 
the antiseptic and ultimately overly rationalist conception of the world in Habermasian 
Critical Theory, Kompridis revitalizes the concepts of renewal, critique, and historicity
167
 
integral to world-disclosing existential perspectives and first generation Critical 
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Theory.
168
  In the context of the future possibilities of human nature, this alternative also 
opens the evaluation of what it means to be human to further interpretation and 
possibility, a concept I will return to in the final section of this chapter. 
 
Parental Responsibility: The Subtle Differences Between Negative and Positive Eugenics 
 Despite his critique, even Kompridis recognizes the timely importance of 
Habermas‟ contribution to medical ethics.  In the context of an increasingly important 
philosophical discussion about medical ethics and advancing medical technologies, The 
Future of Human Nature offers new insight into the possible ethical and existential 
ramifications of a system of positive eugenics.  However, as Cristina Lafont has made 
clear in her “Remarks on Habermas‟ The Future of Human Nature,” it is important to 
distill the apt critique of the potential harms of genetic intervention from a conflation of 
negative and positive eugenics.  
 Habermas does attempt to enunciate a clear definition of positive eugenics for the 
purposes of his project.  He writes:  “Genetic interventions involving the manipulation of 
traits constitute positive eugenics if they cross the line defined by the logic of healing, 
that is, the prevention of evils which one may assume to be subject to general consent.”169 
In other words, Habermas indicates that positive eugenics is that medical intervention 
which has been agreed upon as beyond the scope of medical „treatment‟.  However, in 
this account of positive eugenics it is arguable that given the blurred distinction between 
treatment and enhancement as it already stands in medicine, many forms of genetic 
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intervention could equally be interpreted as negative or positive eugenics.  For example, 
depending on the definition of medical treatment, using Ritalin as a medication for 
increased focus rather than Attention Deficit Disorder is sometimes considered 
inappropriate use of medicine, and sometimes as a legitimate treatment option.  If 
normative standards are the ultimate weighing mechanism for Habermas‟ treatment of 
eugenics, not only does this definition seem unclear, but it also gives way to 
inconsistencies in Habermas‟ own argument. 
In her “Remarks on Habermas‟ The Future of Human Nature,” Cristina Lafont 
explores the inconsistencies in Habermas‟ argument from the very structure of his 
argumentation.  Beginning with Habermas‟ position that the future will of the fetus must 
be considered in genetic intervention, Lafont identifies “The Principle of Counterfactual 
Consent,” or the PCC, in Habermas‟ argument.  According to Lafont, the PCC, “[S]tates: 
„all genetic interventions, including prenatal ones, must remain dependent on a consent 
that is at least counterfactually attributed to those possibly affected by them‟.”170   Lafont 
goes on to claim that the PCC forms the foundation for Habermas‟ argument for the 
necessity of “The Principle of Abstention Under Certainty,” or PAU: Namely that, “„we 
should abstain from any genetic intervention whenever there is no certainty that it would 
meet with the counterfactually attributed consent of those possibly affected by it‟.”171 
Following the principles of PCC and PAU through Habermas‟ argument we find this 
basic argument: 
 In cases of extreme suffering, we can assume conterfactual consent. 
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 In cases where suffering is not apparent, we cannot be certain of  
counterfactual consent. 
Therefore, we must abstain from all interventions where suffering is not apparent, 
because we do not have counterfactual consent. 
 As Lafont explains: 
The problem with this argument is that it relies on a symmetry that is only apparent.  PCC tells us 
to make our decisions dependent on the counterfactual consent or dissent of those affected by the 
intervention at issue.  Thus, whenever we are (reasonably) certain of the counterfactual consent of 
the affected, intervention should be permitted, and whenever we are (reasonably) certain of their 
dissent it should be prohibited.  But for that very reason this principle has no application for cases 
in which we are uncertain about the counterfactual consent or dissent of those affected.  Given that 
our uncertainty is as close to their dissent as to their consent, in such cases we cannot make our 
decisions dependent on either.
172
 
  
Following this logic, Habermas links uncertainty with dissent, and thus confuses the 
distinction between positive and negative eugenics and the normative value of each.  By 
claiming that a lack of foreknowledge about the future-person‟s wishes amounts to the 
future person‟s dissent, Habermas offers his own interpretation of uncertainty as dissent.  
This replacement of uncertainty with a specific interpretive meaning is itself explicitly 
making a final determination on behalf of the future-human person, exactly what 
Habermas argues would be problematic by assuming assent.  Additionally, by confusing 
the PCC with the PAU, Habermas forgets that the PCC is necessarily linked to negative 
eugenics.  The PCC claims that we can assume counterfactual consent in cases of 
extreme suffering, precisely those cases that negative eugenics and a practice of treating 
illnesses diagnosed by PGD would be oriented towards.     
 In other places in his argument, Habermas does specifically address the issue of 
dissent and the PAU.  Habermas claims that even presuming a child would desire genes 
that ensure higher intelligence, or eliminate the chance of a minor disability, parents—
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and by extension communicative society—cannot know what qualities and genes would 
actually prove to be objectively best for the child.   The conclusion is again, that in the 
face of uncertainty the parents must choose inaction.  Lafont argues that this argument 
not only changes the criteria for evaluation—changing from PCC to a new criterion of 
objective best and general consent—but that this new argument for the PAU is also self-
defeating: 
For even if we could anticipate the consent of the affected person to, say, the elimination of a mild 
handicap (which is not hard to imagine especially at those early times of her life history in which 
she would suffer the most under its consequences), according to PAU we should still abstain from 
intervening in view of the fact that the handicap could turn out to be best for her in the end, 
regardless of her dissent at any prior time.
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Lafont goes on to claim that following this argument, Habermas also introduces the 
possibility for a different type of resentment and unhappiness with the genetic self:  a 
teenager who discovers that she could have been smarter and could have been healthier 
with genetic intervention may conclude that her parents failed in their roles to act 
constructively on her behalf.   
Although Habermas argues that eugenics precludes participation in the 
communicative sphere—“With genetic enhancement, there is no communicative scope 
for the projected child to be addressed as a second person and to be involved in a 
communication process”—following Lafont‟s apt critique, this argument may be 
interpreted as disingenuous.
174
  If Habermas feels that parents must be respectful of a 
“projected child‟s” potential in all decisions regarding the fetus, then is it not possible for 
parents to project the communicative interactions with the future child to determine the 
desirability of a genetic intervention?  For example, if parents discover that their fetus 
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shows the genetic marker for hemophilia and that sufficient medical development has 
been achieved to treat the genetic defect prenatally, is it not only possible, but desirable, 
for the parents to consider the interests of the future person and determine that, given the 
choice between hemophilia and no hemophilia, the child would most likely normatively 
choose no hemophilia?  Additionally, in this situation, are the parents really restricting 
the child‟s potential by treating the hemophiliac gene, or are they opening the child‟s 
potentials by freeing the child from the restrictions the disease imposes on those who 
carry it? Or, in Lafont‟s words, “…It is hard to see how abstaining from an intervention is 
less determinative of such a range of opportunities than intervention.”175  
 
Care Ethics and Parental Autonomy  
Lafont‟s analysis of The Future of Human Nature exposes weaknesses in 
Habermas‟ argument about the role of parental rights.  According to Habermas, parental 
rights are secondary to the potential rights of the future person.  In Habermas‟ estimation, 
the future person loses his or her capacity to engage in communicative dialogue about her 
very person once the parents have unilaterally decided to use preimplantation genetic 
testing.  Habermas claims that this unilateral decision on the part of the parents disallows 
the autonomous development of the child, and severely limits her ability to self-identify 
as an autonomous individual.  He writes: 
Irrespective of how far genetic programming could actually go in fixing properties, dispositions, 
and skills, as well as in determining the behavior of the future person, post factum knowledge of 
this circumstance may intervene in the self-relation of the person, the relation to her bodily or 
mental existence.  The change would take place in the mind.  Awareness would shift, as a 
consequence of this change of perspective, from the performative attitude of a first person living 
                                                 
175
 Lafont, “Remarks.” 
93 
 
her own life to the observer perspective which governed the intervention one‟s own body was 
subjected to before birth.
176
 
  
However, as Lafont aptly points out, Habermas‟ evaluation of the genetically diagnosed 
child‟s abilities seems to ignore already existing parental interventions in normal 
childhood development.   She writes: “Here I suppose that an important source of 
disagreement with Habermas lies in the extent to which I see cultural intervention as even 
more irrevocable in their existential import than most of the genetic determinations one 
can realistically think of.”177  Lafont alludes here to the already normatively established 
cultural practices in Western societies for a child to be raised according to her parent‟s 
cultural practices.   
As a matter of practice, parents have a considerable amount of influence as to 
what their children are environmentally and culturally exposed.  And this level of 
parental control seems almost universally acceptable.  If the parents are Catholic, for 
example, they have the recognized right and authority to bring their child to Catholic 
Sunday School and teach their children Catholic morals.  Existing parental control is not 
merely limited to cultural practices, either.  Parents make decisions about their children‟s 
food and diet, they choose to give or withhold vaccines and certain medicines, and they 
even enroll their children in sports teams and activities—all of these parental decisions 
have a direct impact on the “health” of the child.  With regard to genetic intervention, 
even without the technical capacity of preimplantation genetic diagnosis, parents often 
choose reproductive partners based on obvious genetic traits. Genetic manipulation, on a 
pre-technological basis, is a part of normative reproduction in contemporary Western 
                                                 
176
 Habermas, Nature, 53. 
177
 Lafont, “Remarks.” 
94 
 
civilization.  And within certain normatively proscribed limits, these parental decisions 
and interventions are not only acceptable, but ostensibly the established ethical method 
for parenting in Western societies.  Although Lafont does not make specific reference to 
care ethics as influential in normative parenting practices, her recognition of parental 
responsibility and cultural interventions aligns her argument well within the bounds of an 
approach to parental guidelines based in care ethics.   
Care Ethics is the branch of ethics emergent from Carol Gilligan‟s analysis of 
Lawrence Kohlberg.
178
  In light of my previous discussion of Habermas‟ commitment to 
Kohlberg in Chapter 2, it is an especially interesting alternative basis for an ethical 
theory.  Like discourse ethics, the ethics of care is a normative ethical theory insofar as it 
is a theory that takes a stance about what makes actions right or wrong.  Far from being 
the only feminist alternative to traditional moral and ethical theories, it is one of a cluster 
of normative ethical theories that were developed by feminists in the second half of the 
twentieth century. While consequentialist and deontological ethical theories emphasize 
universal standards and impartiality, ethics of care emphasizes the importance of 
relationships.  The basis of the theory is the recognition of the interdependence and 
mutual vulnerability of all individuals in specific historical, cultural, and relational 
contexts.  Different relationships in different contexts with correspondingly differing 
levels of intersubjective vulnerability and interdependence make each ethical decision in 
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a care ethical paradigm situation specific.  However, at the same time, by highlighting the 
intersubjective character of relationality, and emphasizing that there are appropriate 
decisions for each context, care ethical paradigms still represent a normative rather than 
relativistic ethical theory. 
Care ethics is a normative system of ethics founded on the principle that a mutual 
recognition of responsibility and attachment is essential for guiding ethical behavior 
towards those people closest to you, wherein appropriate parenting typifies appropriate 
ethical relations in general.  In more contemporary formulations of this ethical position, 
familial relationships form models for private, public, and even transnational ethical 
decisions.  According to Virginia Held in The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political and 
Global: 
Consider mothering or fathering in the sense of caring for a child, or “parenting,” if one prefers 
this term.  This is probably the most caring of the caring practices since the emotional tie between 
carer and cared-for is characteristically so strong.  This practice has caring well for the child as its 
primary value.  But as understanding of what this involves becomes more adequate, it should 
include normative guidance on how to avoid such tendencies as parents may have to unduly 
interfere and control, and it can include the aspect well delineated by Ruddick: “respect for 
„embodied willfulness‟.” 179 
 
The care ethics guidelines for parenting include a consideration for the well-being of the 
child, the avoidance of undue interference with the child, and respect for the wishes of 
the child.  In Held‟s estimation, this paradigm is reciprocally related to social ethics.  
Modeling familial interdependence ensures the recognition of social intersubjective 
vulnerability, while the emergent social structure can then reflect and intervene on 
familial practices. 
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To ensure that appropriate parental decisions can be made in the age of 
developing scientific interventions, Lafont recommends the addition of a new principle in 
place of Habermas‟ argument for the Principle of Abstention in the face of Uncertainty.   
Following the logic of parental responsibility and the undeniability of the reality of 
medical capabilities, Lafont introduces the Plausible Precautionary Principle to the 
Principle of Consent: “The precautionary principle states: „when an activity raises threats 
of harm to the environment or human health, precautionary measures should be taken 
even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically‟.”180 
Lafont‟s recommendation, therefore, hinges on the reality of scientific discovery and the 
breadth of scientific knowledge.  Parents should be mindful of the actual effects of 
scientific interventions, and weigh any decisions against the available scientific evidence.  
This common-sense principle, combined with the principle of consent, creates a clear 
ethical guideline for responsible parenting in an innovative world: 
Thus, if we added to a plausible precautionary principle the equally plausible principle of consent, 
we could as citizens of a democratic community draw a line for permissible genetic intervention 
that falls very close to the distinction between positive and negative eugenics, at least for the time 
being.  But, of course, as the latter qualification already indicates, we would be doing so for 
entirely different kinds of reasons than those that Habermas‟ argument aims to support.181 
  
Following this ethical guideline, parents may employ appropriate interventions to provide 
reasonable care to a future child.  This type of intervention would not only be allowable 
according to care ethical guidelines concerning parenthood, it would also preserve the 
established criteria for parental autonomy—namely, freedom to provide the best possible 
future for a child as long as the intervention (biological, cultural, or otherwise) does not 
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inhibit the health and happiness of the child, or the future autonomy of the adult 
individual. 
 Although I do not have time to go into sufficient detail, it is worth noting that this 
type of common sense, pragmatic approach to critical bioethics and care ethics does not 
compensate for another potential problem in genetic intervention.  As I addressed in 
Chapter 2, fundamental inequalities exist in access to medical care and intervention.  
Without sufficient access to the most basic medical care, it is increasingly likely that 
these excluded groups and individuals would face further degrees of unequal access to 
future medical developments.  These inequalities, frequently affecting non-Whites, 
citizens of lower socio-economic class, immigrants, and unmarried women, are worthy of 
further analysis.  Additionally, these excluded groups have a different set of historically 
grounded concerns about the future of biomedicine.  As disenfranchised members of 
society, minority women have often been treated as biomedical guinea pigs, or as the 
victims of positive eugenics legislation.  Carole Pateman, for example, addresses the 
relationships between race, class, gender, eugenics and political participation in The 
Contract and Domination (2008).
182
  However, these critiques, based in issues of class 
and race, are fundamentally different in kind from those Habermas levies.
183
 
 
The Future of Human Nature and the Expansion of Existential Autonomy 
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 Although Cristina Lafont and Nikolas Kompridis provide very different criticisms 
of Habermas‟ project, they do share a common interest in the notion of individual 
autonomy and a real respect for innovation in the lifeworld.  Both see limitations in 
Habermas‟ theory in the very things he wants to protect—existential freedom and 
communicative consent.  In Lafont‟s estimation, Habermas neglects to recognize the real 
outcomes of the future person‟s possible dissent and the child‟s and parents‟ right to 
existential freedom.  In Kompridis‟ account, Habermas fails to address the critical role of 
innovation—both in the existential lifeworld and within the bounds of different 
rationalities.  By combining Lafont‟s critique of Habermas with a care ethics 
interpretation of parental responsibility, I have already provided a certain degree of 
evidence that genetic diagnosis may offer an expansion of autonomy—albeit in this case 
also the autonomy of the ethically responsible parents.  Addressing Kompridis‟ 
alternative to Habermasian Critical Theory, namely a re-evaluation of the notion of 
innovation and renewal as integral to a critical perspective of the lifeworld, I have also 
introduced the possibility that the new possibilities for the future of human nature, in 
their very character as new, may offer fruitful ground for the critically reflective 
individual.  However simply allowing more freedom to parents, or merely glorifying the 
concept of the „new‟, does little to support the actual possibility of the expansion of 
human nature. 
To offer my own alternative understanding of the expansion of human nature, I 
must first begin by agreeing with Habermas‟ claims that instrumentalization of human 
beings as human beings leads to negative outcomes, both normatively and existentially, I 
contest his simplified claim that genetic diagnosis equates to the most egregious 
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instrumentalization.   Genetic diagnosis, at the very worst, merely instrumentalizes the 
genes and genetic diseases which are, in the end, non-determinative parts of eventual 
human subjectivity.  And, at the very best, what Habermas fears to be instrumentalizing, 
may in fact offer the possibility of life itself.
184
  In addition, with an expanded 
understanding of the ability to provide better circumstances for the full development of 
the human person (inclusive of PGD), it may be that our existential self-understanding 
will include a deeper recognition of bodily relation and relativity.  Despite Habermas‟ 
claim that birth is philosophically considered the beginning of the human life,
185
 it is 
already well established that medical interventions happen postnatally as well.
186
  Take 
for example the cases in which parents ostensibly “choose” the sex of their 
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hermaphroditic children upon birth.  More commonly seen is the long-standing tradition 
of male circumcision, which medical communities not only accept as a standard parental 
choice, but also explicitly offer as a medically supported option to new parents.  Although 
there is considerable ethical debate over the former example (popular culture has even 
addressed the subject in literature and television), the latter example is considered so 
banal that no one questions the ability of a circumcised male to self-identify as opposed 
to an un-circumcised male.
 187
  In these cases, the modified body is seen relationally to 
the constitution of the person, not as formally final.  Habermas goes further to contend 
that: 
Being at odds with the genetically fixed intention of a third person is hopeless.  The genetic 
program is a mute and, in a sense, unanswerable fact; for unlike persons born naturally, someone 
who is at odds with genetically fixed interventions is barred from developing, in the course of a 
reflectively appropriated and deliberately continued life history, an attitude towards her talents 
(and handicaps) which implies a revised self-understanding and allows for a productive response 
to the initial situation.
188
  
 
However, I find it questionable that Habermas should take for granted the silence of 
genetics, and the answerability of the person at odds with their genetic code.  Adults in 
contemporary society often feel at odds with their genetic code, and actively seek to 
remedy that division—through cosmetic surgery, through chemical treatment, through the 
active performance of another bodily orientation.  Additionally, increasing medical 
evidence is showing that the genetic code (even in adults) may not be as fixed or as 
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clearly defined as previously thought.  Whereas, in years past, gender dysphoria was 
considered a medical disorder because gender was believed to be clearly genetically 
defined, current research indicates that there may be more than one way of defining even 
“biological” gender.  Even without the completion of studies that may redefine our 
notions of genetically-fixed gender, many adults actively perform and identify against 
their “genetically defined” gender.  Genetic makeup is not completely inscrutable and 
unanswerable.  It may be possible, therefore, to not only respond to our genetic code—
manipulated, tested, or not—but it may also improve our understanding of bodily 
complexity and the relation between our bodies and our self-identity. 
In addition to the possibilities for individual autonomy and expansion in the face 
of increased complexity in human nature, openness and complexity are also foundational 
to a full understanding of human rights.  For example, complex understandings of the 
human person do not limit the possibilities and opportunities of that person, but by 
introducing complexity to the sphere of communication and the establishment of norms, 
these complex understandings give way to new and complex rights and responsibilities.  
As Marcelo Neves describes in his article, “The Symbolic Force of Human Rights”: 
But it is not just a matter of recognizing and confirming this openness to the future.  To the 
cognitive recognition and confirmation of social contingency and uncertainty about the future in 
modern society, human rights respond with the normative demand of structuring the „openness to 
the future‟.  This means that human rights contribute to the transformation of unstructured 
complexity into structured complexity, which entails a claim to justify certain normative 
expectations and exclude the legal validity of others.  The role of human rights in structuring the 
openness to the future and complexity relates to normative requirements that are sensitive to 
cognitive recognition of the surplus of possibilities and risks inherent in modern society.
189
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These open possibilities may include their own risks, but far from limiting the 
autonomous existence of the individual, even these risks have productive value in the 
lived sphere of human rights and recognition. 
 This deeper understanding of the relation between bodies, social recognition and 
our self-identity is of important concern to a feminist project of Critical Theory.  Amy 
Allen‟s recent work The Politics of Our Selves: Power, Autonomy, and Gender in 
Contemporary Critical Theory explores the limitations of Habermas‟ “normative 
idealizations” of human life, offering an alternative wherein, “The key is to give up on 
the demand for purity and to develop the Habermasian critical-theoretical project in a 
more contextualist and pragmatic direction.”190  In other words, constituting a subject is 
not biologically, but socially determined.  Genetic intervention may have a determinative 
influence on hard biology, but Habermas‟ account also indicates his belief that it is 
determinative of subjective identity.  This position undermines his own acceptance of 
communicative action as self-empowering, and ultimately intersubjective.  In the next 
two chapters, I would like to consider how expanded notions of human nature may offer 
the appropriate context for a feminist ethical understanding of power and autonomy in 
Critical Theory. 
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Chapter 5 
 Mourning and Vulnerability: What Butler and Cornell Offer to Habermas’ 
Theories of Human Nature 
 
Using Habermas‟ The Future of Human Nature and Between Naturalism and 
Religion as a grounding, I propose that Habermas‟ recent projects have been preoccupied 
with an account of human nature as such.  These accounts, though an important addition 
to Habermas‟ overarching ethical project, pose new challenges to critical appraisals of 
Habermas‟ work.  If Critical Theory‟s explicit goal is to uncover the possibilities for 
human emancipation, then what is the framework for the notion of “human” that 
underlies this emancipatory goal?  Habermas, it seems, argues that human nature is 
circumscribed by the Kantian, and other modern, models that proclaim human nature to 
be “rational” or otherwise determined by the individual‟s ability to employ reason.  
Granted, for Habermas, this reason/rationality which defines human nature is not 
ahistorical, solipsistic or monolithic as it can be in uncritical philosophical accounts.  
Habermas avoids this trap by defining reason and rationality in the context of 
communication and the normative ethics of the public sphere.  However, Habermas 
continues to argue for a formalistic account of human nature—one that is all but 
solidified in the prenatal stage of biological life, and determinate of potential political 
action in the public sphere.  In the previous chapter, I argued that this formalism is 
problematic for feminists on the grounds that it overdetermines the effects of biological 
formalism and culturally imposed normativity.  In this chapter, I wish to argue that 
Habermas‟ formulation of human nature is problematic because it forecloses important 
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characteristics of potential political actors that make participation in the public sphere not 
only possible, but meaningful and oriented towards a more complete emancipation. To 
make this argument, I rely on the feminist methodologies of Judith Butler and Drucilla 
Cornell.   
Ethical considerations of fragility and vulnerability have become increasingly 
important in the wake of 21
st
 Century philosophical explorations of violence and 
mourning.  Perhaps most notably, Judith Butler argues in Precarious Life (2004) that the 
most profound way we can hope for ethical recognition of the other, is through an 
understanding of mourning.  Butler explains that the foundation for human interaction is 
not our shared ability to reason and exchange meaningful ideas, but it is instead in 
inhabiting a world in which we are all always vulnerable.  Similarly, Drucilla Cornell‟s 
work in Moral Images of Freedom: A Future for Critical Theory (2008) finds ethical 
hope in what she calls the “redemptive imagination,” or the possibility of practically and 
theoretically reconfiguring emancipatory ideals.  For Cornell, this potential for 
reconfiguration gives space in Critical Theory for necessarily expansive and inclusionary 
conceptions of humanism and freedom.  Like Butler, Cornell finds this redemptive 
potential in solidarity based on lived experience; also like Butler, Cornell recognizes the 
irreducibility of lived experience to an objective totality.  For both Butler and Cornell, we 
must seek transnational solidarity as an ethical imperative but always with a wary eye 
towards the Western and modernist tendencies to reductionism.   
I further contend that their uniquely feminist positions offer a necessary corrective 
to contemporary Critical Theory.   I start with an explanation of Habermas‟ depiction of 
human nature, as it unfolds in Between Naturalism and Religion (2008).  Once this 
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groundwork is in place, I critique Habermas using feminist arguments.  First, I explain 
why the meaning of human life as such is not a foregone conclusion, using Judith 
Butler‟s argument for the validating effects of the recognition of vulnerability from 
Precarious Life.  Then, I explain how the conceptions of forgiveness and moral 
imagination open potentiality for expansive human nature using Cornell‟s ethical analysis 
from Moral Images of Freedom.    
 
Habermas: Between Naturalism and Religion There is But the Rationally Motivated 
Citizen of the World 
Habermas seems to be preoccupied of late with the questions of human nature, 
and to a certain extent, human character, that ground any discussion of humanistic ethics 
and political action.  Habermas rightly argues in Between Naturalism and Religion that 
the two countervailing trends of contemporary political discourse center on the expansion 
of biomedical scientific understandings of human psychology and embodiment and the 
development of what he conceptualizes as a “post-secular” age.  For Habermas, both the 
overly scientistic account of naturalistic human psychology and physiology and the 
increasing tension among world religions and secularists pose grave problems for the 
idealized vision of a rationally motivated, normatively ethical and cosmopolitan society 
Habermas has been arguing for over the course of the past 40 years.   
 Habermas‟ relationship to science and scientific development is appropriately 
ambivalent.  He recognizes the importance of respecting scientific developments as a part 
of expert discourses of technology.  However, he is also wary of scientistic accounts that 
reduce human cognition and human reason to a series of predictable neurotransmitter 
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signals.  Human freedom depends upon an open scientific system.  Habermas finds the 
most problematic scientific accounts those that eliminate human freedom and 
development in favor of neurobiological determinism.
191
  
In his attempts to respect science, while at the same time providing a suitable 
critique, Habermas makes recourse to a sort of positive dialectical middle ground.  Yes, 
human development models a natural evolutionary trajectory that seems to undergird 
naturalist claims for biological determinism.  But it is also true for Habermas that this 
evolution is not simply something done to the human body by mysterious outside 
scientific forces.  Instead, it is founded on human interaction and participation with the 
lifeworld.  Problematic for me here, is Habermas‟ apparent assumption that the evidence 
for this is our need to talk about science and scientific ideas through the regular channels 
of normative discourse.       
It is my contention that Between Naturalism and Religion continues Habermas‟ 
strong formalistic stance on the definition of human nature he began in The Future of 
Human Nature.  In The Future of Human Nature, Habermas claims that pre-implantation 
genetic diagnosis limits human autonomy and freedom by foreclosing possibilities for 
full participation in the communicative action of the public sphere.  This foreclosure 
occurs ostensibly on two levels.  First, the human actors are limited by the fact of external 
biological interference, interference which literally, genetically provides specific 
boundaries for the physiological development of specific human persons.  Although there 
                                                 
191
 Interestingly, as Habermas‟s own account of PGD relies on the assumption that something about genetic 
manipulation is unanswerable.  What makes this account of biological formalism different from scientistic 
accounts, aside from the biomedical ethical questions of whether such determinate biotechnologies should 
be manipulated? 
107 
 
are legitimate concerns from such a biomedically motivated determination of human 
development, Habermas‟ own concerns seem to be less ethically relevant.  As I argued in 
the last chapter, Habermas seems most worried, at least on this level, about the future 
human person feeling limited by the knowledge of this intervention.  The second 
foreclosure exists in terms of recognition of these persons as complete actors in the public 
sphere.  This argument is vaguer, but Habermas seems to contend that these biologically 
manipulated persons have been so over-determined through genetic intervention that their 
participation in the public sphere will also be limited.   
 In Between Naturalism and Religion these formalistic interpretations are further 
fleshed out.  Here Habermas claims that human persons strive for recognition in their 
quest for individuation.  For Habermas, this recognition comes expressly through 
rationally motivated discourse in a public sphere.  He explains the relationship between 
reason, mutual understanding, and his take on the Kantian moral agent: 
Reason, for Kant, finds its true home in the domain of practice, because it is constitutive only for 
moral action alone.  This is what inspires the search for traces of detranscendentalized reason in 
communicative action.  The expression „communicative action‟ refers to those social interactions 
in which the use of language oriented to reaching understanding takes on a coordinating role.  The 
idealizing presuppositions migrate via linguistic communication into action oriented to reaching 
understanding.
192
 
  
Reason, however, is not simply a way of ensuring recognition on an abstract level.  
Practical reason as it is expressed in communicative action is also the embodiment of 
Habermasian freedom.  In other words, reason is, at base, the practical application of 
human freedom.  Habermas equates freedom with freedom of action, finally all but 
                                                 
192
 Habermas, J. Between Naturalism and Religion. Trans. by Ciarin Cronin.  Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 
2008. p. 53. Originally published in German as Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion.  Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 
Verlag, 2005. 
108 
 
referring to evidence for freedom entirely in terms of action.
193
   Following a certain vein 
of Kantian argumentation, Habermas goes on to differentiate a rationalist explanation of 
freedom from a causal determinist position.  Wary of slipping into an analytic theory of 
causation, Habermas explains that his theory of reason-based freedom avoids the traps of 
determinism: 
Unlike standard causal explanations, rational explanations of action do not permit the inference 
that any given person would reach the same decision given the same antecedent conditions.  
Specifying the rational motives for action is not sufficient to transform the explanation into a 
prediction.  Responsible agency is not merely a matter of being motivated by reasons but by taking 
the initiative for specific reasons and attributing the initiative to oneself.  That is what makes the 
agent the “author” of her actions.194 
 
Determinism is, therefore, the pinnacle of reductionist notions of freedom.  A stringent 
theory of causation not only reduces action to cause and effect relationships, but it also 
effectively eliminates the responsibility actors have to their decisions. 
In Between Naturalism and Religion, Habermas attempts to get himself out of the 
reductionist trap by explaining that even though freedom is rationally motivated and 
ensured, this form of reason is phenomenological-existential: 
Rational explanations of action also assume that actors are embedded in contexts and entangled in 
biographical involvements when they make decisions.  Actors are not situated outside of the world 
when they let their will be determined by what is within their power and what they regard as right.  
They are dependent on enabling organic conditions, on their biography, character, and capabilities, 
on their social and cultural surroundings, and not least on the actual circumstances of the situation 
of action.
195
 
 
This phenomenological-existential argument appears to almost embrace a situational 
ethics.  Habermas understands that rational decisions are circumscribed by the conditions 
within which agents make those decisions.  Context and biography play as great a role as 
rational thought in this explanation.  If Habermas‟ position began and ended here, then 
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Habermas would have far more in common with the care ethical position I advocated in 
chapter 4.  However, Habermas goes on to explain that the paradigm for free action is 
social communication, reiterating his earlier positions that it is within the “public „space 
of reasons‟” that freedom is expressed.196  Arguably, this is itself a reductionist 
explanation for human nature and human freedom: We are free because at least we get to 
talk about it and debate it?  The content of that freedom and our nature seems empty here.  
His claim that this is a Kantian notion of freedom seems to ignore the equally important 
Kantian conception that freedom must be set squarely in human imagination.  In chapter 
3, I addressed that Habermas has neglected the utopic vision of Kant in favor of a 
Hegelian dialogical freedom in communicative action.   
 
The Death of the Other: How Butler’s Mourning Helps Us to Ethically Relate to the 
Other 
Judith Butler argues in Precarious Life that perhaps the most profound way we 
can hope for ethical recognition of the other is through an understanding of mourning.
197
  
Butler explains that the foundation for human interaction is not our shared ability to 
reason and exchange meaningful ideas, but it is instead in inhabiting a world in which we 
are all always vulnerable.  Interestingly, Habermas‟ first chapter in Between Naturalism 
and Religion, “Public Space and Political Public Sphere—The Biographical Roots of 
Two Motifs in My Thought,” is one of the closest things Habermas has ever written to an 
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account of fluid subjectivity and postmodernist accounts of vulnerability.
198
  In this 
chapter, we can identify Habermas‟ commitments to a quasi-Butlerian notion of 
vulnerability and fragility.  Waxing autobiographical, Habermas claims that a childhood 
surgery “may well have awakened the feelings of dependence and vulnerability and the 
sense of the relevance of our interactions with others.”199  It is clear to me that this is a 
part of the implicit background for Habermas‟ arguments in The Future of Human 
Nature.  Habermas finds in his own experience that humans are fundamentally at the 
mercy of others.  While his argument in The Future of Human Nature sought to obviate 
this vulnerability insofar as it was possible to ethically limit prenatal interventions, in 
Between Naturalism and Religion Habermas resigns himself to the unavoidability of 
embodied intersubjective dependence.   
Reversing the emphasis from the personal to the political, Butler makes a similar 
claim about the fundamental fact of human vulnerability.  She writes about the aftermath 
of 9/11: “One insight that injury affords is that there are others out there on whom my life 
depends, people I do not know and may never know.  This fundamental dependency on 
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anonymous others is not a condition that I can will away.”200  Butler emphasizes that as 
embodied subjects, we are not simply vulnerable in an immediate sense, but that we are 
always vulnerable to the totality of humanity.  On the one hand, this vulnerability is 
beyond our control, and signifies a limit to individual human power and control.  On the 
other hand, this vulnerability is the great leveler—every other human being, by virtue of 
his or her psychological and bodily existence, is also vulnerable.   
Where Habermas and Butler ultimately differ is the way in which the fact of 
vulnerability mediates ethical and political decisions and outcomes.  For Habermas, as I 
have already intimated, intersubjectivity grounds consensus through communicative 
action.  Vulnerability is effaced through normative decisions that adjudicate and protect 
interests.  These normative decisions are reached through reasonable communication and 
ultimately resolve themselves in consensus.  For Butler, however, vulnerability 
demonstrates the limits of reasonable and individualistic political actors.   
This concept of vulnerability changes the dynamic of political action.  Rather than 
coming to an ideal speech situation with a clear expression of need, and an idea for 
rational action, the Butlerian ethico-political actor makes decisions that do not, “proceed 
from my autonomy or my reflexivity.  It comes to me from elsewhere, unbidden, 
unexpected and unplanned.”201   This anti-rationalist experience of intersubjective 
vulnerability does not reduce itself into relativistic and hopeless ethical situations, 
however.  For Butler, these dynamics open new space for exploring moral and ethical 
relationships.  The facts of vulnerability, difference, and confrontation allow novel 
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critical discourses to emerge, with an eye to openness rather than consensus.  Or as she 
writes: 
We have to interrogate the emergence and the vanishing of the human at the limits of what we can 
know, what we can hear, what we can see, what we can sense.  This might prompt us, affectively, 
to reinvigorate the intellectual projects of critique, of questioning, of coming to understand the 
difficulties and the demands of cultural translation and dissent, and to create a sense of the public 
in which oppositional voices are not feared, degraded or dismissed, but valued for the instigation 
to a sensate democracy they occasionally perform.
202
 
 
Democratic participation and ethical recognition are then, for Butler, embodied realities.  
The vulnerable body is the limit of what we can know, what we can control, what we can 
protect; but it is also the call to create the ethical relationship.  This vulnerability is 
predictably complex: it is not reducible to bodily weakness, nor is it extricable from lived 
experience.  What Butler‟s concept does provide, is an account of ethical relations based 
in a solidarity of lived experience; it is always possible, and necessary, to mourn human 
life. 
Butler grounds her conception of the other, not in understanding, but in the 
concept of the Levinasian face—a concrete other, before me, making demands of me, but 
whom I cannot understand as an individual totality because it is infused with the concepts 
of Otherness, existence as-such, and the shared existential attitude towards death.
203
  This 
face simultaneously exposes the concrete fact of bodily vulnerability, while offering a 
quasi-psychoanalytic grounding for vulnerability—the face appears to me with the 
injunction “Thou shalt not kill,” implying its own susceptibility to death and my own 
potential for both killing and preserving the Other.   
This conception of mourning retains emotional, psychical, and traditional 
valences.  However, through her ethical analog to the Levinasian face, Butler seems to 
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indicate that these characteristics are only part of the philosophical nature of mourning.  
The other important dimension of mourning is its relation to recognition, specifically on 
an ethical and existential level.  By seeing the face, and becoming aware of the demands 
it makes of me, I am called to offer acknowledgement and recognition.  As it relates to 
vulnerability, and the concrete reality of death, this recognition is embodied 
philosophically and literally through mourning.   
 
Cornell and Imagination:  How the Moral Image of Freedom Requires Critical Theory to 
Expand its Notions of Human Possibility and Openness  
Butler may reconfigure our understanding of vulnerability as the grounds for a 
politically oriented feminist ethics, but I believe that Drucilla Cornell completes the 
ethical formulation of potentiality which ultimately guides feminist-friendly Critical 
Theory.  In her book Moral Images of Freedom, Cornell argues that human freedom is 
delimited through the philosophical notion of a limit itself.  She explains that the concept 
of a limit is itself limiting.  Philosophical thought and progress is constrained by a notion 
of the finite, the absolute, or the end of possibility.  In modernism, there are rational 
limits, in post-modernism there is a hopelessness of possibility.  Both are limits to human 
freedom, as such, by confining what potential exists for individuals. 
 Against the threat of modernist totality or finality—she implicates Hegel, Marxist 
determinism, and Habermasian consensus—Cornell claims that Derrida and Benjamin 
offer theoretical grounding for her own “philosophy of the limit.”204  In this philosophy, 
there is no end to aspire to, nor is there a pessimistic hopelessness about possibility.  
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Instead, the “impossible” is seen as a daily reality, in which the call of the other is always 
upon us to respect the ethical boundaries of the impossible as just that: the impossible, the 
impossible to know, the impossible to configure, the impossible to constrain.  This 
impossibility is not an impasse, but the exact opposite.  It is an opportunity to live with 
expectations for open possibilities, since we cannot comprehend the true limits.  In the 
face of this incomprehension, she makes recourse to Kant.  At the same time Kant 
constrains reason to representation, he also introduces the aesthetic imaginary.  The 
aesthetic experience spurs the individual to react to the beautiful—which is still confined 
by reason—and the sublime—which is beyond reason.  In Kant‟s Third Critique, the 
sublime extends beyond the conceptual to that which is impossible to conceive.  Before 
the sublime, Kant claims, we are introduced to the limits of our conceptualization.  
However, the flip side of this, Cornell explains, is that the sublime opens us to that which 
is beyond reason and concept, to receptivity for that which we cannot comprehend.
205
  On 
an ethical level, this is the Other. 
 By recognizing our human limits to comprehend and adequately theorize reason, 
Cornell explains that this move to the moral imaginary is important on a theoretical level.  
However, the necessity for openness and the illimitable is equally practically important.  
Modernist theories of reason depend largely on Western theories of the parameters of 
reason.  By attempting to universalize these parameters, theory becomes an actively 
colonizing force.  Cornell contends that the only way of avoiding the trap of colonization 
is by opening our understanding of freedom-in-action to an anti-rationalist conception of 
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intersubjectivity.  Following Fanon, Cornell argues that we must re-symbolize our entire 
understanding of the world:   
Thus, for Fanon, there are two ways for the imago to defend itself against the horrors of 
colonialism and the struggle for self-symbolization: a self-defeating retreat into the individual 
fantasy of conflated personhood or the collective action of liberation to remake, literally, the 
symbolization of the world giving equal standing to all people.
206
  
 
For the purposes of my argument, Cornell‟s claims have an important politico-ethical 
weight.  If the ethical is grounded in receptivity for that which is beyond immediate 
understanding, then ethics is grounded concretely within difference, otherness, the non-
identical.  Rather than subsuming the distinct desires, needs, and particularities of 
individual political actors to a rationalist and normative ideal, Cornell‟s ethics 
emphasizes the preservation of these characteristics as the very grounding for the ethico-
political situation.  Freedom and emancipation are grounded within this recognition of 
difference and limitation through the “redemptive imagination”—Cornell‟s postmodern 
term for the ethical implications of Kantian sublime experience.   
As a way of respecting difference and utopian openness to future possibilities, the 
redemptive imagination allows for ethical responsiveness that respects, rather than 
sublimates, the Other.  In ethical and political application, this means that the still 
universal claims to humanity and freedom are not grounded in some sort of normative 
equalizing structure, but are instead always grounded within the context of the different 
cultures and traditions that give rise to different ways of living in the world, with the 
respective ethical needs that occur in those ways of life: 
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 Universal validity, then, demands that we give legitimate place to clarify claims of our humanity 
within the context of different cultures and traditions and not simply those that arose in the West.  
Revision of a worldview that could give place to the ideal of freedom and the ideal of perpetual 
peace is of pressing concern; despite the threat of annihilation in a world eaten up by war such 
work opens up a limited space for self-determined life, as these ideals are animated to guide actual 
institutional structures of international law. 
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Universalism for Cornell seems akin to Benhabib‟s utopian universalism, which I 
explained in chapter 3.  Like Benhabib‟s position, Cornell‟s notion of universal validity is 
distinct from the Habermasian in that it highlights the primacy of context and 
individuation as the basis for universality, rather than the other way around.  Universality 
is not an attempt to gain consensus, but rather an attempt to gain universal recognition of 
particularity.  
 
American Masculinity and Feminism 
 Butler and Cornell‟s combined ethical formulations encourage a world in which 
difference, potential, and emotional and psychical receptivity are primary.  These ethical 
paradigms stand in direct contrast to many traditional conceptions of what it is to be a 
political actor in the Western world.  More commonly in practice, the world is still 
dominated to a large extent by white, Protestant, male political personages.  This 
uniformity of political power emphasizes sameness, consistency, and rational normative 
consensus, even in its most “liberal” formulations.  So how can a feminist political 
philosophy gain entrance into the dominant ethical and political spheres of action?  
Furthermore, how can emerging challenges to political and ethical dialogues avoid 
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disenfranchising those voices that are now dominant—a necessary move for any real 
respect of difference and universal appeals to freedom?
208
   
 To explain this point, I make recourse to a different work by Drucilla Cornell, 
Clint Eastwood and Issues of American Masculinity (2009).  In this book, Cornell uses a 
close reading of various films that Clint Eastwood has directed to develop both a theory 
of the ideal of American masculinity, and an intergendered challenge to this ideal.  
Through this reading of Eastwood‟s films, Cornell finds support for the cultural ideal of 
the lone gunslinger, a strong and just figure whose strength and power inhibits his 
emotional capacity for personal connection, but whose independence insures his ability to 
save women, children, and other impotent and unempowered persons from their 
otherwise doomed fates.  Although Cornell explicitly finds this archetypal figure in 
Eastwood‟s films, she rightly makes the connection between this character-type and the 
more pervasive psychoanalytic idealization of Man.  The psychoanalytic figure 
transcends the artistic boundaries to find its corollary in ethical and political reality—
where men attempt to live an untenable, imaginary ideal. 
For Cornell, the importance of deconstructing Eastwood‟s films lies in 
Eastwood‟s directorial ability to call into question the very archetypes he appears to 
uphold: 
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What I am suggesting is that by reading Eastwood‟s involvement in these films against the grain 
of even his best critics, we can grapple with some of the most searing issues of masculinity that 
confront us in late twentieth and early twenty-first century America.  Yes, Eastwood rides off into 
the sunset at the end of some of his films, a solitary figure with no need or promise for the 
complexity of a lasting connection, but he also struggles visibly with the contradictions of 
masculinity in relationships with both men and women.
209
  
  
For example, Cornell points out that in Eastwood‟s 1993 film A Perfect World, the film 
ends in what could be misconstrued as a traditional Oedipal tragedy—a young boy 
ultimately causes the death of a father-like figure by wounding him and leaving him 
vulnerable to authorities.  However, in Cornell‟s nuanced reading, Eastwood‟s portrayal 
of the impotence of authority to prevent Oedipal violence exposes the untenable nature of 
the Oedipal myth as such: “It is, indeed, one of his saddest films but also one that 
questions Oedipal ideals of masculinity because they promote violence in the very effort 
to live up to them.”210  By illuminating the ultimate impotence of living up to an Oedipal 
ideal, Eastwood‟s filmmaking does more to expose the vulnerability of man, rather than 
his unquestioned strength.  By displaying this vulnerability alongside the pathos of 
emotional situations, Eastwood challenges the normative and psychoanalytic portrayal of 
man as the source of phallic power, and situates man instead in an emotionally grounded 
world of complexities.  Eastwood‟s man may try to protect women, children and the 
unempowered, but in his attempts to do so, his own vulnerable humanity is exposed. 
 For Cornell, this reading of Eastwood‟s films provides concrete examples of a 
reconfiguration of American masculinity as such.  For my purposes, this deconstruction 
of American masculinity provides a basis for intergendered relationships.  If man as man 
is not the psychical idealization of phallic power, and if man is also an embodied, 
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socially-situated, and vulnerable existential being, then men and women have a common 
foundation for ethical relationships.  Recognition of this common foundation may 
strengthen Butler and Cornell‟s claims for utopic and embodied ethics, and may help to 
improve philosophical notions of solidarity.  
 
Violence, Trauma, and Redemption in The Girl With the Dragon Tattoo
211
 
 Because the contemporary liberal formulation of solidarity often involves either 
totalizing collapsibility into the generalized needs of a political group, or the over-
determination of solidarity as a political tactic for extreme outsiders, it is difficult to 
provide an analytic example for illustrating the powers of a complex utopian and 
embodied solidarity.  In order to provide a framework for articulating complex solidarity 
in contradistinction to the liberal model I propose an evaluation of a fictional relationship 
of solidarity, one I feel comes closest to the alternative feminist position for which I am 
arguing.  In the popular detective novel, The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo by Stieg 
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Larsson, the two protagonists form a complex and mutually dependent relationship out of 
a shared recognition of their vulnerable need to one another.
212
   
The novel begins with the character Mikael Blomkvist, a journalist for a business 
magazine that famously calls into question unethical corporate practices, who, in the 
course of his last article expose, has been framed to commit slander and sentenced to jail 
time for this crime.  Before going to jail, Blomkvist is solicited by the patriarch of a 
famous corporate family—Henrik Vanger.  Vanger wants Blomkvist to use his 
journalistic skill to uncover a family mystery, the 30 year old disappearance of Harriet 
Vanger, Henrik‟s niece.  In exchange, Vanger promises to offer redemptive information 
on Blomkvist‟s slander trial, and financial compensation that may keep Blomkvist‟s 
magazine, Millenium, afloat.  Blomkvist moves to the Vanger estate to begin research, 
and runs into multiple dead ends, until he discovers that Lisbeth Salander has hacked his 
computer, and has the intelligence and wherewithal to help him solve the mystery.  
Together, Salander and Blomkvist discover that Harriet was not murdered, or forcibly 
kidnapped, but rather that she fled to Australia to avoid further victimization from her 
sadistic older brother, Martin, who has assaulted and killed many other women.  Martin 
tries to kill Blomkvist, but Salander intervenes, causing Martin to run his car off the road.   
 Given this plotline, Larsson has taken the familiar detective novel tropes of 
violence, trauma and redemption, and turned them on their heads.  Like Cornell‟s 
analysis of Eastwood‟s films, I argue that Larsson provides a rich and complex timbre to 
the novel that questions our comfortability in identifying heroism, victimhood, and 
revenge.  The hero relies on the heroine, who in turn has difficulty with basic emotional 
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functionality.  There are various layers of victimization in the novel—Henrik Vanger 
seems to be the most incapacitated by his inconsolable mourning of his lost niece, and 
Blomkvist comes the closest to death in terms of bodily danger during the novel‟s own 
timeline, although Salander, Harriet Vanger, and countless other women suffer deeply 
disturbing events of sexual violence.  And the concept of revenge is also questioned; 
despite Salander‟s relatively just anger at her guardian‟s violent sexual assaults on her, 
Blomkvist calls into question her violent tendencies, and points out the potential harm in 
revenge.  The novel then, like an Eastwood film, seems to offer an aesthetically rich 
challenge to traditional conceptions of masculinity and phallologocentric society.  
However, even more interesting and original for me, is the novel‟s ability to provide an 
example for complex and realistic inter-gendered solidarity. 
 
A Model for Complimentary Solidarity 
When political and public action is represented in terms of participatory 
democracy in the modern liberal state, a common debate arises between the model of 
participation in terms of solidarity, or in terms of normative consensus-oriented action.  
In traditional constructions of solidarity as political action, theorists often characterize 
groups with interests in solidarity as minority groups, outsiders, who must band together 
against the status quo in order for their voices to be heard.  While this model of solidarity 
has both a theoretical and a practical value, I contend that an alternative solidarity, 
characterized not by shared-outsider status, but instead by a tension of complimentary 
interests, might open new possibilities for productive relationships of solidarity.  In other 
words, if solidarity is most often action-oriented political participation within a minority 
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group with particular shared interests, then the action of solidarity is always working an 
uphill battle in terms of power and representation.  If, however, the defining 
characteristics of solidarity are not couched in terms of the shared interests of minority 
groups, but instead in terms of often tense and complimentary interests that illuminate 
difference as much as identity, then power and representation can be shared within some 
pretty divergent groups.  
This ethical formulation of solidarity borrows from Butler and Habermas‟ 
emphasis on human vulnerability, while at the same time remaining critical of Habermas‟ 
overly rationalist conceptions of human freedom.  For this model to work, and to not 
digress into traditional power dynamics, human freedom must be reconsidered as an anti-
rationalist process of continually re-symbolizing and re-navigating intersubjective 
experiences.  Following Cornell, this is the utopian moment of the moral imaginary.  I 
believe, however, that Cornell‟s model of the moral imaginary also depends on an 
understanding of intersubjective re-negotiation of communicative meaning.  This 
understanding is assisted by modifying the Habermasian position on discourse ethics to 
highlight Habermas‟ lesson “…that actors are embedded in contexts and entangled in 
biographical involvements when they make decisions.”213  The ethical solidarity for 
which I am arguing for, then, is dependent on a view of human nature that synthesizes 
Habermas, Butler, and Cornell.  In order to avoid reductionism or colonialism, our 
understanding of human nature must be open-ended.  However, in order to ground an 
ethical theory, we must have the potential for the recognition and acknowledgement of 
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other humans.  This recognition and acknowledgement is best defined in terms of shared 
vulnerability—on which both Butler and Habermas‟ theories depend. 
According to Amy Allen‟s reading of Hannah Arendt in The Power of Feminist 
Theory: Domination, Resistance, Solidarity (1999), individuals engaged in actions of 
solidarity retain other unique identities and often hold very different positions and 
viewpoints from other members.
214
  Solidarity defines individuals in the “group” 
according to that specific shared interest which motivates the particular political action.  
By highlighting the tension and difference of group members, this notion of solidarity 
offers practical and pragmatic coping mechanisms.  For example, if Stieg Larsson‟s 
Lisbeth Salander would have banded together with other victims of sexual assault in 
order to expose the predator Martin Vanger, then Larsson‟s novel would have 
exemplified a traditional notion of solidarity, the marginalized group of victims coming 
together for shared interests.  However, given Lisbeth‟s outsider status, and difficulties 
with gaining recognition and respect, Henrik Vanger would never have hired her to 
conduct the investigation.  At the beginning of the novel we see this very consideration 
unfold.  The Vanger family lawyer Dirch Frode hires Salander to do a background check 
of Blomkvist, and even when he is presented with the evidence that Lisbeth is a capable 
detective herself—she compiles a thorough and comprehensive analysis of Blomkvist—
neither Frode nor Henrik Vanger consider hiring her to do the research into Harriet 
Vanger‟s disappearance.  Instead, as it unfolds in Larsson‟s novel, Mikael Blomkvist is 
hired by Henrik Vanger.  However, despite Blomkvist‟s obvious status and power, he is 
unable to adequately complete this investigative task on his own, and relies on a strained 
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relationship of solidarity with Salander.  This relationship of solidarity, between 
Blomkvist and Salander, exemplifies a nuanced, intergendered and complimentary 
relationship.  Neither Blomkvist nor Salander are reduced to their interactions; even as a 
sexual relationship occurs between them, their differences only become more pronounced 
and important to their relationship.  However, the resolution of the novel‟s mystery 
depends entirely on their ability to work together towards a specific goal, in a way I 
would describe as using their differences collectively.  This solidarity built on difference 
also has ethical implications.  By uncovering the sexual predator Martin Vanger, Salander 
is able to continue her long-standing opposition to perpetrators of violence against 
women, but by accomplishing this task with Blomkvist, Salander is able to legitimize and 
publicize this struggle within respected media in the public sphere.  Conversely, 
Blomkvist is able to reassert himself as an ethical journalist by publishing an exposé of 
the unscrupulous business deals of Wennerstrom, but by doing this with Salander, he is 
also able to uncover sources and information he was otherwise unskilled to discover. 
This extended analysis of the relationship of solidarity between Blomkvist and 
Salander illustrates an important philosophical point: solidarity and power do not depend 
on a melding together of shared interests, and are not best served by isolating minority 
groups.  Instead, solidarity as political action should be practically and pragmatically 
constructed in complimentary differences, where varying degrees of power and interest 
work together to accomplish shared goals.  This model of solidarity retains the 
recognition for vulnerability and dependence that Butler‟s ethics requires, while also 
highlighting openness to difference and emancipation that Cornell‟s theory advocates.  It 
is a theory of solidarity that could work within and between genders, as well as within 
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and between cultures, without the threat of totalizing reductionism that modernist models 
of solidarity imply.  In chapter 6, I explore the relationship between this modification of 
solidarity and relational ethics, providing my unique contribution to feminist critical 
theoretical ethics. 
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Chapter 6  
Arendtian Solidarity: What Hannah Arendt Offers to a Feminist Critique of the 
Public Sphere 
 
For feminist philosophers interested in the political and ethical ramifications of 
their work, conceptualizations of both normativity and solidarity have been central. 
Finding both concepts integral to understanding contemporary notions of subjectivity, 
intersubjectivity and socialization, these feminist philosophers attempt to uncover the 
meanings of such concepts within a system of feminist ethical discourse.  Despite the 
continued discussion and reinterpretation of these concepts, both “normativity” and 
“solidarity” are admittedly circumscribed by the usage of these terms in the works of 
Habermas and Arendt, respectively.  As I have been arguing throughout the preceding 
five chapters, Habermas‟ definition of normativity has been both a challenge and an 
inspiration for contemporary feminist philosophers.  The same influence of usage can be 
attributed to Hannah Arendt when it comes to the term “solidarity.”  Feminist 
philosophers such as Benhabib, Honig and Allen, however, do more than simply 
acknowledge the historical influence and genealogical relevance of Habermas and Arendt 
to the feminist project.  Instead, Benhabib, Honig, and Allen adopt and adapt 
Habermasian and/or Arendtian philosophy itself as integral to the feminist project.  It is 
through this lens of adoption and adaptation that Habermasian normativity and Arendtian 
solidarity can be seen to have a profound impact on feminist ethics, although neither 
Habermas nor Arendt would identify themselves as feminist theorists.  For my interests, 
the combination and critique of Habermas and Arendt, especially within the circle of 
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feminist critical theorists, provides fertile ground for evaluating feminist notions of 
subjectivity in a political and ethical world.   
In order to explore the themes of solidarity and normativity as they emerge in 
contemporary feminist philosophy, I begin this chapter with a comparative analysis of the 
public sphere in Habermas and Arendt‟s thought.  I contend that their respective 
understandings of the public sphere found their understandings of normativity and 
solidarity.  Exploring the relationship between Arendtian solidarity and the public sphere, 
I will then discuss the feminist reception of Arendt‟s narrativity and universalism in 
Benhabib and Honig.  Following Amy Allen‟s analysis of solidarity as power in feminist 
action, I will conclude with a reinterpretation of solidarity and normativity as 
constructive for contemporary Critical Theory and feminist thought. 
 
Die Öffentlichkeit in Habermas and Arendt 
Although Habermas and Arendt are both concerned with the political, discursive, 
and active possibilities of the public sphere, each takes a unique perspective on the exact 
social role and conceptual impact of the public sphere.  As I addressed in chapters 1 and 
2, in The Theory of Communicative Action and The Structural Transformations of the 
Public Sphere, Habermas defines his conception of the public sphere in terms of 
normativity, communication, and the media.  For Habermas, the public sphere is the 
privileged structure for the network of political communication in a modern discursive 
world.  It is political insofar as it integrates expert and lay culture (along with various 
other perspectives) through communicative action, resulting in a consensus oriented 
communicative process of normativity.  Communication is integral to normative 
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consensus; however, for Habermas, communication is more complex than simply 
speaking and listening to one another.  For Habermas in The Theory of Communicative 
Action, an effective speech act must be social and oriented to reaching understanding and 
rationally motivated assent.  Habermas explains that, “Agreement rests on common 
convictions.  The speech act of one person succeeds only if the other accepts the offer 
contained in it by taking (however implicitly) a „yes‟ or „no‟ position on a validity claim 
that is in principle criticizable.”215 An effective speech act can therefore only exist within 
the normative bounds of a public sphere structured to invite such Ego/Alter 
communication.    
The media, the final concept by which Habermas‟ notion of public sphere is 
differentiated, is most clearly defined in The Structural Transformations of the Public 
Sphere.
216
  In this book, Habermas explains that the media ostensibly provides private 
opinion a venue for the public sphere via publicity.  However, Habermas makes clear that 
the notion of media as an effective means of transport for true opinion and intention is 
merely illusory.  Instead, media, especially commercial media, limits communicative 
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effectiveness by artificially creating consensus where no-one can actually criticize the 
position.  As I laid out in chapters 1 and 3, Habermas claims that the public sphere is the 
location wherein, through speech acts and assembly, the private interests and opinions 
access and guide the affairs of the state.  
 Hannah Arendt, like Habermas, is interested in the notion of a politically minded 
public sphere based in communication and action.  Unlike Habermas, however, Arendt 
does not emphasize the normative value of communication.  Instead, she highlights the 
importance of correspondence between action and word.  In the Vita Activa, Arendt 
claims that the Public sphere is a shared-world [Mitwelt] within which we can assess 
phenomena and we can share communal life.  This shared-world is best understood in her 
conception of activity in the vita activa.  For Arendt, activity is both the ability of a 
person‟s words to correspond with his or her actions, and also the means by which a 
community can act in concert toward a specific shared goal.  Like, Habermas, then, 
Arendt sees communication and the capacity for politically oriented and purposive action 
together.  Unlike Habermas, however, these goals do not have to be normatively agreed 
upon, or systematically achieved.  Instead, in Arendt‟s estimation the public sphere is the 
place for the republican ideals originally posited in Greece and Rome.  That is not to say, 
as many critics have, that Arendt provides a history of decaying society in place of an 
explanation of modern public society.
217
  Instead, following Benhabib, I believe that 
Arendt provides a history of concepts wherein historiography of the role of public space 
illuminates the importance of differentiating the public sphere and „the rise of the 
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social.‟218  Whereas Habermas critiques media for undermining the efficacy of the public 
sphere in civil society, Arendt defines the rise of social interests as the source of the 
dilution of the political impact of the public sphere.  Arendt argues that, “The emergence 
of society—the rise of housekeeping, its activities, problems, and organizational 
devices—from the shadowy interior of the household into the light of the public sphere, 
has not only blurred the old borderline between private and political, it has also changed 
almost beyond recognition the meaning of the two terms and their significance for the life 
of the individual and the citizen.”219  
Habermas and Arendt both clearly emphasize the roles of communication and 
action in their respective notions of the public sphere.  They both recognize the role of 
the public as a means to political interests and action, and they both see a sort of basic 
requirement in communicative rationality as its basis.  Additionally, they recognize the 
threat that blurring the borders between public interest and social interest constitutes—
Habermas through his analysis of the media, and Arendt in her summation of the „rise of 
the social‟.  Despite these basic agreements and corresponding attitudes, Arendt and 
Habermas do have some striking dissimilarities.  Where Habermas emphasizes 
normativity and consensus, Arendt emphasizes republicanism and goal-orientation.  Also, 
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while Habermas views communicative action as packaged concept of communication and 
action in concert, Arendt‟s conceptualizations of communication and action maintain 
separability.     
 
Arendt’s Solidarity 
Whereas Habermas‟ notion of political life in the public sphere focused on 
normativity and consensus, Arendt‟s valuation of republicanism and orientation towards 
change ground her concept of solidarity.  Her biography of Rosa Luxemburg provides an 
interesting reflection on solidarity as a philosophical and political concept through the 
reported actions and ideas of a like-minded revolutionary spirit.  For Arendt, Luxemburg 
is not simply a historical figure, or an interesting personality worthy of record; 
Luxemburg‟s life provides an example, albeit flawed, of living actively and politically 
according to proto-Arendtian values. 
For Arendt, Luxemburg‟s grounding in realism is as much a key to her 
revolutionary spirit and political character as her affinity to Marxian theory or affiliation 
with the famous German political movement, the Sparta Group.  Arendt claims that, 
“What mattered most in her view was reality, in all its wonderful and all its frightful 
aspects, even more than revolution itself.”220  Arendt argues that it is Luxemburg‟s firmly 
materialist and realist tendencies that inspired her unique analysis of capitalism, not as a 
force, but as the historical result of imperialistic actions.
221
  Arendt is sympathetic to 
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Luxemburg‟s realist view of history as causally produced, as opposed to the more 
philosophically popular view of history as a Hegelian flow of spirit.  I believe that 
Arendt‟s affinity for Luxemburg‟s realism further influences Arendtian theory.  Most 
importantly for my analysis here, Arendt‟s conception of solidarity appears firmly rooted 
in a realist conception of the materially and historically experienced world.  Arendtian 
solidarity is not simply a shared kinship of ideas, but a political stance, in which people 
come together for shared goals and actions grounded in the reality of the political, public 
sphere. 
 The biographical reality for Rosa Luxemburg was that she was a part of an 
expatriate, communist wave of immigrants.  Luxemburg‟s identified with her Polish-
Jewish heritage, believing it allowed her to transcend nationality and nation-state 
boundaries.  Arendt highlights the importance Luxemburg finds in a constructed culture 
of immigrant Jews: “This milieu, and never the German Party, was and remained Rosa 
Luxemburg‟s home.  The home was movable up to a point, and since it was 
predominantly Jewish it did not coincide with any „fatherland‟.”222  Arendt‟s emphasis on 
the boundarylessness of Luxemburg‟s affinities proves that solidarity and belonging are 
not dependent on citizenship, or on national identity, but rather on the ability to find and 
construct partnerships within a kinship of interests.  For Arendt‟s quasi-philosophical 
analysis, Luxemburg‟s cosmopolitanism proves that it is not the political character of a 
party that grants solidarity power, but it is rather the coming together of shared interests 
and cooperation for specific goals which characterizes the power of solidarity. 
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 Although Arendt‟s depiction of Luxemburg provides a perfect case study for 
understanding the powers and conscriptions of solidarity, Arendt is clear that shared 
interests and belonging are not always compatible with personal identity and autonomous 
political interests.  Paradoxically, for Arendt, Luxemburg‟s outsider-identity was equally 
integral to her political participation:  
Her distaste for the women‟s emancipation movement, to which all other women of her generation 
and political convictions were irresistibly drawn, was significant; in the face of suffragette 
equality, she might have been tempted to reply, Vive la petite difference.  She was an outsider, not 
only because she was and remained a Polish Jew in a country she disliked and a party she came 
soon to despise, but also because she was a woman.
223
 
 
Arendt‟s subtext here seems to say that shared political interests cannot account for the 
full spectrum of political action and participation.  Individuals are the political actors, and 
as individuals, must necessarily participate politically in order to preserve the republican 
ideals of Arendt‟s active life.  This is not to say that Arendt does not value shared 
political interests; she does, and she even goes so far as to argue that shared political 
interests are what hold individual political actors together during acts of solidarity.  
However, these shared political interests are not sufficient for describing political action, 
even if, for her, they are arguably necessary.  As I argued in the last chapter, there is a 
danger in ascribing too much weight to shared opinions and interests.  Not only does it 
minimize the important differences of a truly diverse democratic society, but it also 
prevents spontaneous solidarity from emerging between actors with otherwise very 
disparate and distinct individual needs and values.
224
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Arendt also uses Luxemburg to illustrate these republican ideals of politics.  
According to Arendt, Luxemburg recognized the necessity for absolute freedom for 
individual political actors, not only in their private lives, but also in their ability to engage 
publicly: 
Which, of course, has never prevented the Russian, Polish, or German comrades from violently 
disagreeing with her on this point.  It is indeed the republican question rather than the national one 
which separated her most decisively from all others.  Here she was completely alone, as she was 
alone, though less obviously so, in her stress on the absolute necessity of not only individual but 
public freedom under all circumstances.
225
 
 
This reinforces Arendt‟s later claims that republicanism must be preserved beyond the 
occasional vote, to a continual individual ability to renew republican membership through 
political action.  For Arendt, renewing republican membership requires a vocal 
engagement in political discourse—protest, presentation, and political writing are all 
forms of political action which go beyond simply occasionally voting. 
 
Universalism and Narrativity 
In her chapter entitled “Judgment and Politics in Arendt‟s Thought,” Benhabib 
rereads Arendt‟s political claims of action through the neo-Kantian lens of moral theory 
as foundational for political action.  Benhabib claims that Arendt is right to highlight both 
the Kantian notion of judgment and the Aristotelian view of narrativity at various points 
in her work.  However, Benhabib contends that Arendt misses the crucial conclusion of 
combining these thinkers in both political and moral matters: the emergence of a 
universalist ethics founded in moral judgment.  Benhabib writes:  
In this sense, Hannah Arendt was right in maintaining that judgement is the most political of all 
human faculties, for it leads to the recovery of the perspectival quality of the world in which action 
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unfolds.  Where I depart from Arendt though is in her attempt to restrict this quality of mind to the 
political realm alone, thereby ignoring judgement as a moral faculty.
226
 
 
By addressing both the moral quality of judgment with the importance of judgment to 
political action, Benhabib believes that a reinterpretation of Arendt‟s work would allow 
for a workable model of a phenomenology of moral judgment.  Reading Arendt against 
Arendt, Benhabib articulates three theses for a phenomenology of moral judgment: 
1.) “The exercise of moral judgment that is concerned with the epistemic 
identification of human situations and circumstances as morally relevant does not 
proceed according to the model of the subsumption of a particular under a 
universal.”227 
2.) “The identity of a moral action is not one that can be construed in light of a 
general rule governing particular instances but entails the exercise of moral 
imagination which activates our capacity for thinking of possible narratives and 
act descriptions in light of which our actions can be understood as others.”228 
3.) “The assessment of the maxim of one‟s intentions, as these embody moral 
principles, requires understanding the narrative history of the self who is the 
actor; this understanding discloses both self-knowledge and knowledge of oneself 
as viewed by others.”229 
Benhabib believes that by understanding judgment‟s relation to personal moral action and 
perspective ensures that political action retains plurality.  In Benhabib‟s view, plurality is 
not a simply external construct of different actors in a political situation, but instead a 
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recognition of internal multitudes of perspectives, which can then be translated onto the 
political sphere.
230
  In other words, the political actor must first recognize his or her own 
self-propensity for embodying an array of different perspectives and opinions in order to 
envision „living in someone else‟s shoes‟.  This interplay between the moral self and the 
political actor—as well as an inferred reciprocal action of empathy affecting the moral 
self—forms the basis for Benhabib‟s Arendtian interpretation of the benefits of 
communicative ethics.  Communicative ethics, following Benhabib, requires that moral 
opinion, as well as political action, of all acting members in a community be respected: 
The discourse model of ethics which enjoins enlarged thought, by making the perspective of all 
involved in a dialogue situation the sine qua non of the moral standpoint, allows us to think of this 
continuity and mediation.  For the articulation of the perspectives of all involved requires, in fact, 
a civic and public life in which the right to opinion and action is guaranteed.
231
 
 
For Benhabib, not only does speech ensure the identity of the political actor, but 
argument is also the means through which political action itself is validated, a construct 
true to the Habermasian system of communicative ethics.  Benhabib‟s claims seem to 
recall Arendt's account of Herodotus at the end of the “Truth and Politics” essay.  There, 
Arendt highlights a plurality by acknowledging the good deeds of Greek and Barbarian 
alike, suggesting an empathetic understanding of the cultural, moral, and political 
other.
232
 
 
Is Cosmopolitanism a Beneficial Goal? 
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 As I introduced in Chapter 3, in Another Cosmopolitanism Benhabib is concerned 
with the philosophical foundations of cosmopolitanism and the philosophical grounding 
for international juridical practices.  In what follows in this chapter, I return to a 
discussion of cosmopolitanism in Benhabib, in order to uncover and evaluate the 
Arendtian foundations for her position.  Explicitly, Benhabib identifies Arendt‟s and 
Jasper‟s appraisal of the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem as forming the basis for any 
dialogue about the legitimacy of cosmopolitan juridical norms and the new groundwork 
for contemporary republican ideals in a globalized world.  Although Benhabib thinks 
Arendt posed the right kind of questions and dealt with the right topics (crimes against 
humanity, genocide, court legitimacy), Benhabib wonders if Arendt‟s final appraisals and 
conclusions are fully correct: 
Why does Arendt deny than an International Criminal Court is conceivable?  Does she mean that it 
is unlikely to come into existence, or rather that, even if it were to come into existence, it would be 
without authority?  Her position is all the more baffling because her very insistence on the 
juridical as opposed to the merely moral dimension of these crimes against humanity suggests the 
need for a standing international body that would possess the jurisdiction to try such crimes 
committed by individuals.
233
 
 
Although it seems here that Benhabib is critical simply of Arendt‟s skepticism, it 
becomes clear that Benhabib shares a level of skepticism of the legitimacy of 
international courts.   Benhabib believes that Arendt‟s wish for an international court 
capable of preserving human rights has been realized to a certain extent in the present-
day European Union and through cosmopolitan organizations of nation-states like 
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NATO.
234
  This development, however, is not free from philosophical, juridical, and 
normative problems: 
Although the evolution of cosmopolitan norms of justice is a tremendous development, the 
relationship between the spread of cosmopolitan norms and democratic self-determination is 
fraught, both theoretically and politically.  How can the will of democratic majorities be 
reconciled with norms of cosmopolitan justice?  How can legal norms and standards, which 
originate outside the will of democratic legislatures, become binding on them?
235
 
 
Because cosmopolitan groups capable of upholding human rights are built from the 
nation-states which represent their citizens, cosmopolitan groups must reconcile the 
supra-national concern of universal human rights (Arendt‟s right to have rights, and call 
to recognize crimes against humanity) with the intra-national concern of remaining 
autonomous nation-states able to democratically express the will of the citizenry which 
grants these governments their legitimacy.  Benhabib identifies this problem as a 
philosophical concern for several groups of thinkers, most notably within Critical Theory, 
the discipline which she claims to belong:  “For a third group of thinkers, whose lineages 
are those of Critical theory, cosmopolitanism is a normative philosophy for carrying the 
universalistic norms of Discourse ethics beyond the confines of the nation-state (Jürgen 
Habermas, David Held, and James Bohman).”236   However, Benhabib thinks that 
traditional Critical theory has not thought through the paradox of democratic legitimacy 
                                                 
234
 Arendt‟s skepticism of international courts is a particularly difficult concept to interpret.  On the one 
hand, Arendt recognizes that crimes against humanity should be recognized, in light of the atrocities of the 
Holocaust.  On the other hand, Arendt does not have much faith in international tribunals, which her 
nuanced criticism of Eichmann‟s trial makes evident.  Benhabib chooses to interpret Arendt as a 
springboard for developing an argument for legitimizing international courts, as long as international court 
systems are critically self-aware.  However, as I explore at the end of this chapter, Honig chooses to 
highlight Arendt‟s overarching skepticism, to question the legitimacy and authenticity of cosmopolitan 
justice and jurisprudence. 
235
 Ibid., 17. 
236
 Ibid., 18. 
139 
 
and the universal protection of human rights; though she acknowledges that Arendt‟s 
skepticism provides a model for concern:   
In extending the norms of Discourse ethics toward a cosmopolitan political philosophy, Held and 
Bohman in particular have not addressed the paradox of bounded communities.  Here I part 
company from my Critical theory colleagues and join in the anxiety expressed by Arendt‟s 
puzzling observations about an International Criminal Court.
237
 
 
Benhabib then goes on to articulate the problem through an analysis partially indebted to 
Arendt and partially indebted to Kantian understandings of cosmopolitanism in general.  
She sees Discourse ethics as a paradigm for desiring cosmopolitan rights: “Because the 
discourse theory of ethics articulates a universalist moral standpoint, it cannot limit the 
scope of the moral conversation only to those who reside within nationally recognized 
boundaries; it views the moral conversation as potentially including all of humanity.”238  
These universal rights include concepts taken from both Kant and Arendt—concepts such 
as „the right to universal hospitality‟, „crimes against humanity‟, and „the right to have 
rights‟ (Arendt) are the legacy of Kantian cosmopolitanism.  In each instance, they 
articulate a shared philosophical perplexity:  
Kant, Arendt, and Jaspers want to give these concepts a binding power over and beyond the moral 
obligation which they impose on individual agents.  These concepts should not be treated as mere 
„oughts‟; they must generate enforceable norms not only for the individuals but for the collective 
actors as well, and in the first place, for states and governments.
239
 
 
Universalist cosmopolitanism, therefore, first and foremost identifies human rights which 
must be preserved over-and-above individual governmental interests:  “These categories 
are intended to provide not only the precepts of individual conduct but also principles of 
public morality and institutional justice.  They transcend the specific positive laws of any 
existing legal order by formulating binding norms which no promulgated legislation 
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ought to violate.”240 This universalist tendency must be meted, however, with a respect 
for autonomy; the autonomy of nation-states, as well as the autonomy of democratically 
participating citizens within those nation-states must be respected.  Benhabib identifies 
Arendt‟s interest in republican self-governance as an example of this concern: 
At times, this is a concession to political realism on their part; more often thought, and particularly 
for Kant and Arendt, the division of humankind into self-governing polities is not a factum brutum 
but has value in itself…neither Kant nor Arendt can reconcile world government with the values 
of private and public autonomy.  Therefore, the tension between the demands of cosmopolitan 
justice and the values of republican self-governance is greatest in their work.
241
 
  
Since the Nuremberg trials, the international community has recognized crimes against 
humanity, genocide, and war crimes as being more than conventional criminal notions of 
murder and rape.  Similarly, these new categories of crime sponsor corresponding novel 
views of jurisdiction and punishment.  This new class of crimes has instigated a 
movement toward humanitarian interventions, “…based on the belief that when a 
sovereign nation-state egregiously violates the basic human rights of a segment of its 
population on account of its religion, race, ethnicity, language or culture there is a 
generalized moral obligation to end actions such as genocide and crimes against 
humanity.  In such cases, human rights trump state sovereignty claims.”242  It is evident in 
Benhabib‟s estimation that the universalizable in human rights must trump in situations 
of potential conflict with local, national, and sovereign appeals to particular laws and 
juridical practices. 
Benhabib recognizes the development of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights as the instantiation of the internal tension of cosmopolitan norms in contemporary 
society: “…although territorially bounded states are increasingly subject to international 
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norms, states themselves are the principal signatories as well as enforcers of the multiple 
human rights treaties and conventions through which international norms spread.”243  So, 
on the one hand, human rights extend beyond the individual nation-states, but on the 
other hand, they are dependent on the enforcement and ratification of individual states to 
protect them: “Modern democracies act in the same of universal principles, which are 
then circumscribed within a particular civic community.  This is the „Janus face of the 
modern nation,‟ in the words of Jürgen Habermas.”244 
 
Honig and Arendt: Materialist Cosmopolitanism 
Bonnie Honig provides a critical and productive answer to Benhabib‟s argument, 
which engages a completely different reading of Arendt.  Honig believes that Arendt 
would be unfulfilled by Benhabib‟s universalism; rather than sympathetic of it, or 
placated by it, Honig‟s Arendt would offer a critical interpretation of cosmopolitanism as 
politically lacking.  Honig begins with a straightforward indictment of what she identifies 
as Benhabib‟s moralistic tendencies.  She writes: “Benhabib‟s Another Cosmopolitanism 
seeks to reclaim universalism or a postmetaphysical politics, but her reclamation is 
marked by traces of earlier universalisms that promise moral guidance from above to a 
wayward human world below.”245  Contrasting her understanding of Arendt with 
Benhabib‟s, Honig claims that Arendt would be disappointed with this moral 
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universalism.  Honig believes that Benhabib‟s weaker version of Arendt comes from an 
incomplete reading of Arendt‟s critique of the Eichmann trial: 
She [Arendt] asked not only „How are they trying Eichmann?‟ but also always: „What are they 
doing by trying Eichmann? What political ends is this trial serving?‟  This, indeed, is what 
offended many of her readers; that she would dare to suggest that the State of Israel might be 
operating politically, that it would use this trial, that the trial was not an end in itself, that it was a 
quest for something other than absolute, unconditional justice.
246
 
 
Honig goes on to claim that this critical ambivalence toward the Eichmann trial underlies 
Arendt‟s own skepticism about global politics and the development of the nation-state 
Israel: 
Indeed, her [Arendt‟s] half-hearted wish for an international criminal court, expressed in the form 
of a lamentation of its impossibility, was not simply a wish to escape from politics as such into a 
really neutral or just realm of law.  Or that‟s not all it was.  It was (whatever else it was) a way to 
highlight and criticize the part played by the Eichmann trial in a larger politics of state-building to 
which she was opposed.
247
 
 
 According to Honig, being faithful to Arendt is not simply recognizing her wish for an 
international court to found juridical legitimacy, but it is also in recognizing the very real 
political problems that any juridical system would have.  Further, being faithful to 
Arendtian theory requires recognizing that political critique is the duty of each and every 
political participant.  According to Honig, Arendt does not wish for fulfillment for her 
philosophy, she wants, instead, a philosophical openness to challenge all new forms of 
political engagement.  Honig writes, “Thus, rather than treat the Arendt who wished for 
appropriate international institutions to judge Eichmann as if she were fulfilled or 
satisfied by the inauguration of today‟s new norms and institutions, we might do better to 
see in Arendt‟s example an invitation to assess emerging new orders in the most 
relentlessly political and critical terms.”248  I read Honig as articulating an alternative 
                                                 
246
 Ibid., 103. 
247
 Ibid., 104. 
248
 Ibid., 104. 
143 
 
notion of cosmopolitanism wherein the new order must be seen in relation to the old, of 
course, but they must also always indicate the possibility for further future development.  
New methods of governance and political participation must be constantly challenged 
and rearticulated.  This openness and affinity for challenging accepted authority 
corresponds with a Derridean notion of Arendtian politics. 
Honig‟s reading of Arendt reinforces her reading of Derrida and the necessity of 
double-gestures in real politics: 
The right to have rights is itself a double gesture: it is a reproach to any particular order of rights 
(albeit certainly to some more than others) and a demand that everyone should belong to one such 
order.  A double gesture is necessary because, paradoxically, we need rights because we cannot 
trust the political communities to which we belong to treat us with dignity and respect; however 
we depend for our rights on those very same political communities.
249
 
  
 Although Honig agrees with Benhabib that the question of cosmopolitan rights and 
norms is indeed a paradoxical question, she takes that paradox one step further.  For 
Honig, the paradox is not simply an accident of political legitimacy, but a theoretically 
necessary double-relation based on a Derridean reading of Arendt‟s call for rights.  It is 
the impossible which comes: “Indeed, Arendt‟s right to have rights—a polemical, 
political call—directs our attention repeatedly to the need for a politics whereby to 
express and address the paradox as it is experienced by minorities, the stateless, the 
powerless, and the hapless.”250 
Honig criticizes Benhabib on the very Arendtian lines of the necessity for 
contextualization and openness to understanding novelty in the political sphere.  She 
recognizes that the future-aspect of human rights, which Arendt calls for, is not a claim 
that we must have unlimited, universalistic protection of the human rights we recognize 
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now, but that the very definition of human rights is open to change and incorporate newly 
emergent rights: 
This view of rights as always pointing (or made to point) beyond themselves is deeply attractive.  
However, what those rights point to in Benhabib‟s account is not an open futurity dotted by new 
or emergent rights but a normative validity that launches us into a subsumptive logic in which new 
claims are assessed not in terms of the new worlds they may bring into being but rather in terms of 
their appositeness to molds and models already in place: incomplete, but definitive in their 
contours.”251 
   
In contrast to Benhabib, Honig proposes a new cosmopolitan form, not based on the 
universalist cosmopolitanism of Benhabib and Kant, but instead on the unconditional 
protection of rights based in Arendt and the notion of the double-gesture in Derrida: 
An agonistic cosmopolitics locates itself squarely in the paradox of founding, that irresolvable and 
productive paradox in which a future is claimed on behalf of a peoples and rights that are not yet 
and may never be.  Arendt‟s unconditional right to have rights is as good a motto as any for that 
project, as long as we understand rights to imply a world-building that is not incompatible with the 
project of building juridical institutions and safeguards, but also reaches beyond that project 
because it is wary of the sedimentations of power and discretion that accrete in such institutional 
contexts.
252
 
  
For Honig, the universal is simultaneously too much and not enough.  Universal rights 
and authority must be based in normative values, and seek completion.  However, 
unconditional rights indicate that our juridical and philosophical foundations are never 
adequate for legitimizing human rights protections.  Additionally, unconditional rights 
leave open the possibility for the expansion of our understanding of human rights and 
human rights violations, an expansion that will undoubtedly occur with future change to 
culture, society, and transnational relations. 
  
Solidarity and Feminist Power 
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In Amy Allen‟s chapter on Hannah Arendt, “The Power of Solidarity: Hannah 
Arendt,” Allen is careful to establish that she is not providing a feminist evaluation of 
Arendt‟s work through the lens of rereading Arendt as a burgeoning feminist.  Instead, 
she is reading Arendt as a sort of harvesting ground, out of which she can pick and 
choose certain concepts and ideas that would prove fertile to Allen‟s own overall 
conception of feminist power.
253
  Primarily, Allen is interested in Arendt‟s account and 
description of „solidarity‟ as a helpful tool for understanding potential resistances to 
power regimes, and for regaining a sort of intrinsic feminist power. 
Allen begins with a sort of necessary critique of Arendt, highlighting the 
difficulties of “feminizing” a philosopher who so staunchly opposed bringing bodily 
reality and needs into the political sphere, thereby delimiting the possibilities for sexuated 
politics.
254
  Allen takes up many of the themes pertinent to my own interests in Arendt‟s 
thought:  Is she or is she not sharply dividing the political and private spheres?  Does she 
allow for culture in politics, or a politics of culture, in her analysis of the pariah Jew?  
Can this analysis be applied to the role of “woman”? 
Allen then goes on to read Arendt alongside her interpretations of Butler and 
Foucault; the rest of the book is devoted to creating a sort of hybrid account of power 
using the Foucault‟s nuanced account of domination surfacing in multiple locations, the 
account of performative resistance in Butler, and the political influence and power of 
solidarity from Arendt.  According to Allen, reading all three theories as complimentary 
to one-another provides a theory of power that exceeds the limitations of all three 
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philosophers.  It gives the feminist the opportunity to be both subject to power and an 
agent of power—a theory with political as well as theoretical consequences.  However, in 
order to develop this theory, Allen needs an Arendtian account of solidarity. 
To further her point that it is not only critically possible to read all three 
philosophers together, but that it is also true that all three philosophers have explicitly 
similar philosophical commitments, Allen describes the “alliance” between the three 
philosophers.  Interestingly, this alliance begins on the grounds that both Arendt and 
Butler make claims about the necessity of linguistic action for creating political subjects.  
Allen believes this affinity reveals a shared philosophical lineage among all three 
philosophers.  Allen points to Benhabib who argued in The Reluctant Modernism of 
Hannah Arendt, that Arendt has both a “modernist commitment to universal morality and 
her „postmodernist‟ critique of foundationalism.”255  Allen believes that this 
postmodernist attitude towards foundationalism, which both Foucault and Butler share, 
comes from her Heidegger/Nietzsche lineage, which Foucault and Butler also share.  She 
carries this genealogical affinity argument even further by pointing out that: 1.) All three 
philosophers criticize the Marx/Hegel dialectic as neglecting the notion of novelty; 2.) 
Foucault and Arendt both criticize normalizaiton in society—Foucault through 
disciplinary power, and Arendt through her critique of the social sphere; 3.) Foucault and 
Arendt use aesthetics to explain judgment—Foucault in his notion of living a beautiful 
life, Arendt through her adoption of Kant‟s judgment in the Third Critique; 4.) All three 
criticize conventional notions of subjectivity—for all three theorists, subjects are never 
autonomous or self-creative as such, they are always a part of the contextualized world; 
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And 5.) “…They all reject the juridical or command-obedience model of power”256—all 
actors for all three theorists are simultaneously political active and political subjugated.
257
 
For my interests, Arendt‟s critique of normativity is most engaging.  Allen 
explains that: 
Arendt‟s critique emerges out of her critique of the rise in the modern era of the domain of the 
social, a hybrid sphere that results from bringing the private concerns of the household into the 
public sphere of politics.  According to Arendt, the rise of the social coincides with the advent of 
mass culture, and mass culture functions through normalzaiton.  Thus, she notes, with the rise of 
mass culture, society comes to expect certain kinds of behavior from individuals, and to impose 
„numerable and various rules, all of which tend to “normalize” its members, to make them behave, 
to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement‟.258 
  
Allen reads Arendt as critical of normativity on the grounds that it prevents them from 
being truly political actors—without the ability to voice their individual concerns, human 
actors are unable to be political actors.  This is especially intriguing for me, because this 
notion of innovative political action is dependent both on Arendt‟s necessary separation 
of the social from the political, and on Arendt‟s claims that we must voice our positions 
in order to be political.  My philosophical priorities are sympathetic to Arendt‟s 
compelling argument for the necessity of innovation in place of normalization (especially 
as a potential critique of Habermas).  However, it is difficult for me to accept that this 
requires the absolute separation of the social and the political, which would exclude 
sexuated politics, as I argued in chapter 1.  I find it additionally problematic that it 
requires linguistic participation, which would exclude non-linguistic or a-linguistic 
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participation in the public sphere.  For example, art and aesthetic participation seem 
equally effective and important means for public participation and critique.
259
  
 Allen also provides a summary of Arendt‟s gestalt notion of power.  Because 
Arendtian power is not of a simple “command-obedience” model, power cannot be 
simply “violence,” “authority,” or “strength.”  Power as a political concept cannot be 
defined as violence, because violence eliminates all other goals—violence becomes a 
state of society that is pursued only for its own sake, as in the French Revolution‟s Reign 
of Terror.  Authority is also more or less an accident of power rather than an actual 
political ability—authority is an office, not an action.  Strength is a quality possessed by 
an individual, also not a political action itself.  Allen identifies the conception of power in 
Arendt‟s The Human Condition as fundamentally and primarily action.  Power is “a 
collective, relational phenomenon that relies on numbers, not implements; it is an end in 
itself that is, thus, by its very nature legitimate; and, most important, its essence is not 
command or rule but collaboration and collective action.”260  This conception of power 
reinforces that weapons and brute force do not constitute the absolute bounds of power, 
an idea Allen and Arendt share.  Instead, by highlighting the power of solidarity, both 
Arendt and Allen reinforce the potential for all political actors to publically employ and 
harness power.  Albeit, in this case, primarily through the sheer numbers of concerted 
political action. 
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 In order to ensure the qualities of collectivity, action, and relationality, power 
must itself be an activity of concert—of working with others.  This concept is what Allen 
identifies as the core of solidarity in Arendt‟s depiction of power.  For Allen, Arendt‟s 
solidarity is a promise-keeping among a group of similarly interested political actors who 
use their concerted efforts to pursue legitimately political goals.  Allen analyzes this 
relationship in terms of feminist interests.  She concludes that solidarity must occur 
between a group of individuals with some sort of base commonality—if all members 
were totally or radically different, they could not communicate their interests to one 
another.  However, this does not mean that the group is reduced to a sort of absolute 
sameness by rejecting that commonality is an essential quality, it is instead a political 
quality.  This eliminates the need for a stagnant or formally final conception of what 
Allen calls “sisterhood”—the idea that all women are essentially and formally the 
same.
261
  Allen points out the common-sense position of Arendt that absolute equality 
would eliminate the need for the political—everyone would prefigure the needs and 
desires of the other, as being the needs and desires that he or she also shares.  We need 
communication and political action because we are all different, and we must be able to 
voice our positions, needs, and desires in the political sphere in order to attain the ends of 
our interests.  Hearkening to Honig and Derrida, Allen seems to articulate the need for a 
double-gesture.  Allen also highlights Arendt‟s position that we must fight back 
politically by identifying with the part of us under attack.  Admittedly, Arendt maintains 
this position in the context of fighting Nazi oppression through Jewish identity, but, as 
Allen agrees, this position could be potentially helpful for feminist interests as well.   
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Normativity and Solidarity: A Place in the Renewed Public Sphere 
 Taking Allen‟s claims to power in solidarity seriously, a new feminist concept of 
the role of solidarity in political society emerges.  Solidarity is not an equivocation of 
differing interests resulting in an essential concept of “woman” or “Other.”  Solidarity is 
also not reducible to social plurality, which would relegate its effectiveness only to the 
private sphere.  Instead, following Benhabib, Honig, and Allen‟s extensions of Arendtian 
thought, solidarity is an explicitly political form of pluralistic and universalistic action.  It 
is a sort of civic empathy—to adapt the concept from Mead—wherein concerted political 
action emerges through actively formed groups of individuals with similar goals and 
interests.  In this way, solidarity is not reducible either to individual interests or to 
ideologies.  As I argued in the preceding section, solidarity is, following Allen‟s reading 
of The Human Condition, an activity of power as such. 
 Keeping in mind the notion of concerted activity as a specific application of 
political power, solidarity fits well into the sort of transfiguration Benhabib calls for in a 
system of utopian Communicative ethics.  If transfiguration is the “new and imaginative 
constellation of the values and meanings of the present,”262 is solidarity not also a 
transfigurative power?  Solidarity, as a political activity, is directly opposed to the notion 
of unchallenged fulfillment of norms.  Additionally, as a pluralistic endeavor for bringing 
together different political actors with shared interests, solidarity seems to be a paradigm 
“constellation of values.”  The notion of an Arendtian politics in general as being 
opposed to aspirations of fulfillment and uncritical complacency, finds even more support 
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in Bonnie Honig‟s reading of Arendt‟s Eichmann in Jerusalem.   Honig‟s analysis that 
Arendt requires an absolute right to have rights, uncovers a deeper power in Arendtian 
political solidarity.  To remain true to Arendtian politcs, constellations of political agents 
working in the interests of solidarity must remain fluid constellations.  Solidarity retains 
its full power by opening itself to as-yet-unseen interests and as-yet-unheard voices in the 
political arena.  Following Honig, if Arendtian politics maintains a Derridean duality, 
than a refreshed concept of Arendtian solidarity would also provide the “double-
gesture”—solidarity works towards the protection of generalizable interests; however, as 
a form of ongoing political action, rather than fulfillment, solidarity is also open to the 
influence of individual political actors. 
 It is in this way that Arendtian solidarity may be able to provide a missing crucial 
element for Habermasian normative ethics in order to meet feminist concerns in Critical 
Theory.  According to Benhabib‟s analysis, and Habermas‟ own descriptions of 
communicative ethics, Habermasian political action overemphasizes the universalist 
qualities of normativity.  By asserting that communicative action is not merely the 
concert of common interests, but explicitly “common convictions,”263 Habermas asserts 
that political action is geared toward normative consensus in all legitimate circumstances.  
However, as Benhabib makes clear in her assessment of Habermas, the interest of 
normativity is to maintain a fulfillment version of historical development—norms 
reinforce the historically held, and therefore propagated, convictions of a consensus 
oriented society.  These norms preclude transfiguration and the utopian critical interests 
of change and development.  
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Following the preceding feminist interpretations of Arendt, perhaps Habermasian 
normativity could be supplanted with the critical perspective of solidarity.  Maintaining 
the notion of legitimacy through shared interests, solidarity achieves a certain level of 
political value in a system of discourse ethics; however, solidarity circumvents the 
problems of normativity by remaining open to transfiguration and the emergence of as-
yet-unheard individual interests.  Because of solidarity‟s unique ability to be 
simultaneously an effective political tool for legitimate power, while maintaining an 
openness to individual interest, perhaps Arendt can provide new hope for the feminist 
project in Critical Theory.  While Benhabib has always remained hopeful for the political 
application of Habermasian communicative ethics, she admits that there are limitations to 
his project of normativity.  However, by reintroducing self-interest to mutual 
understanding, Arendtian solidarity—through the lens of contemporary feminist 
critique—as a notion of political power, may restore the hope for a feminist theory of 
communication and political action. 
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Conclusion 
 
Is this kind of ethics individualistic or not? Yes, if one means by that that it accords to the individual an 
absolute value and that it recognizes in him alone the power of laying the foundations of his own 
existence…But it is not solipsistic, since the individual is defined only by his relationship to the world and 
to other individuals; he exists by transcending himself, and his freedom can be achieved only through the 
freedom of others.  He justifies his existence by a movement which, like freedom, springs from his heart but 
which leads outside of him.—Simone de Beauvoir264 
 
When considering the relationships between power, autonomy, and participation 
in democratically relevant political philosophy, two false alternatives often emerge.  On 
one side, theoreticians identify society as a group of diverse individuals, with divergent 
interests that may be privately met, but whose recourse to an overly insensitive public 
sphere insures only the most basic universal rights.  Fred Evans refers to this conception 
of society as absolute heterogeneity, where a plurality of diversity protects individual 
cultures and differences, but only connects social groups tenuously.
265
  Facile critiques of 
postmodern democratic theory often claim that this is the paradigm for contemporary 
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political philosophy; but even nuanced analyses find tendencies towards the reification of 
absolute difference in the works of Deleuze, Derrida, Irigaray, and Lyotard.  On the other 
side of the dilemmatic horns, is the obviously problematic conception of homogeneity 
within national interests.  This position is now almost exclusively addressed in terms of 
critique, and from a multitude of perspectives.  For example, in Habermas‟ “On the 
Relation Between the Nation, the Rule of Law, and Democracy” in The Inclusion of the 
Other: Studies in Political Theory, Habermas indicts ethnonationalist and constructivist 
approaches to democratic theory, particularly those espoused by Carl Schmitt.
266
  
Habmermas correctly identifies Schmitt‟s position as relying on the notion that peoples 
are existentially and substantively connected—and it is through this connection that 
rights and political determinations naturally emerge.
267
  This notion of absolute 
homogeneity has been explicitly out of favor since the Nazi adoption and implantation of 
homogenous nationalist principles, but Habermas further identifies contemporary 
European tendencies to found even European Union treaties on a conception of 
democratic participation that emerges from “national identity” and “in a relatively 
homogenous manner.”268 As I have argued throughout chapters 1 through 5, although 
Habermas provides such criticism, he continues to have difficulty in proposing an 
alternative capable of fully addressing theories of difference, particularly feminist 
positions.  Throughout the previous five chapters, I have worked to synthesize several 
feminist positions as a corrective to Habermas‟ theory.  Individually, and in relation to 
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one another, these feminist theories function explicitly to provide a critical analysis of 
Habermas‟ limitations.  By staging the various feminist critiques in relation to one 
another, I have worked to synthesize these positions further to create a unique and 
original alternative theory. 
Through a particular reading of the combination of Pateman, Benhabib, Butler, 
Honig, Allen, and Cornell‟s theories, I have suggested the emergence of an alternative 
notion of participation based in relational ethics, embodied action through solidarity, and 
understanding potentiality in terms of utopianism.  What connects us is our shared 
experience of the world, with all of the interdependences and contestations that are 
represented in this shared experience.  What allows us to act in political concert is 
solidarity, which I have proposed as a theory of non-effacing political grouping based in 
social-psychological recognition of mutual oppression and/or dearth of representative 
political power.  What gives us hope for emancipatory change is a utopian orientation 
towards transfiguration, which I have expressed as an openness to imagining future 
possibilities, grounded by our shared past of mourning and forgiveness. 
 
Power and Solidarity: Individual Participation and Intersubjective Alliance 
As I explored in chapter 6, theorizing the space for democratic political and social 
expression is of utmost concern for both the critical theoretical and the feminist project.  I 
believe that this issue, more than most, serves to unify the past and future of 
philosophical explorations of political participation and autonomy.  In chapter 1, I argued 
that the very possibility for political participation and expression is wrought with the 
problematic exclusion of women (and other disenfranchised minorities) to the private 
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sphere.  Synthesizing Pateman‟s careful unpacking of liberal democratic exclusionary 
practices in social contract formation with Habermas‟ emphasis on intersubjective 
society, I attempted to highlight the importance of understanding how intersubjective 
society emerges and creates itself.  For meaningful democratic participation actually to 
endorse emancipation, however, I must critically analyze the basis for this 
intersubjectivity.    
How then can a feminist ethics ground a notion of intersubjectivity, especially in 
light of the difficult power dynamics that pervade social relationships and political 
contexts?   This problem must be dealt with in any exploration of emancipatory theory, 
especially as it relates to the potential confining or freeing of the autonomous individual.  
Here, I would like to articulate the background theory of power I have been working 
under.  I will then relate this theory of power to the theory of solidarity I illuminated in 
chapters 5 and 6, further clarifying the important characteristics of a working theory of 
participation through solidarity.   
To my mind, Amy Allen‟s work in The Politics of Ourselves comes closest to 
articulating a working theory of power that neither disguises the real impact of 
subordination in society, nor elevates such power relationships to an unquestionable 
meta-theory.  In contrast to her own position, Allen admonishes both Butler and 
Habermas, for adopting either extreme theory of power:  
Although Butler goes too far when she suggests that subordination is central to the becoming of 
the subject, Habermas is overly sanguine about the psychic costs of the subjection to the (from the 
child‟s perspective, completely arbitrary) will of the parent that is necessary for socialization.  One 
of the costs of this is vulnerability to subordinating forms of subjection, a tendency to become 
psychically attached to and invested in subordinating modes of identity.
269
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Butler is potentially guilty, therefore, of making subjectivation and iteration into a theory 
of subordination; we can see these tendencies in her hard postmodern theories I addressed 
in Chapter 2.  Habermas, on the other hand, is indicted for his willingness to overlook the 
psychological effects of power relations, even when addressing power relations most 
explicitly, as he does when discussing parent-child relationships in The Future of Human 
Nature, which I addressed in Chapter 4.  Allen would most likely additionally admonish 
Butler for her theory of vulnerability as the basis for reciprocal recognition, the theory I 
explored in Chapter 5.  However, in contradistinction to Butler‟s earlier theories of 
subjectivation, this theory of vulnerability seems to require as much out of recognizing 
the Other‟s vulnerability to oneself, as it does to internalizing a sort of vulnerability as a 
part of subject-formation.  In what follows, I propose that by including Butler‟s theory of 
mutual recognition into Allen‟s theory of power would strengthen a complex feminist 
understanding of power. 
Allen, like both Butler and Habermas, understands the key role recognition plays 
in forming autonomous subjects capable of intersubjective interaction.  In response to 
wanting to have both normative reciprocity and recognition, while also acknowledging 
the ubiquitous nature of power, Allen proposes that power must be understood as a 
background valence of social and cultural life.  She writes: 
A better way to deal with this problem is to interpret the claim that there is no outside to power not 
to mean that power is present in any and all social relationships but instead as the more innocuous 
contention that power is an ineradicable feature of human social life.  In other words, one could 
drop the omnipresence claim but retain the idea that there is no outside to power in the sense of no 
possible form of recognizably human social life from which power has been wholly eliminated.
270
 
  
Allen argues that the integration of normative foundations with a realistic appreciation of 
power dynamics can be accomplished in two ways.  First, she suggests transforming 
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power relationships by using Jane Mansbridge‟s concept of “conceptual and normative 
resources”—in effect suggesting that solidarity for activist groups is founded on 
preexistent normative recognition.
271
  Secondly, Allen argues that it may also be possible 
to subvert subordination through feminist displays of literature, film, and art.  Allen 
agrees with María Pía Lara that narrativity has a real impact on culture, which in turn 
mediates power relationships and dynamics.
272
  In regards to her conception of 
preexistant normative recognition, Allen does not provide a complete argument.  She 
only suggests that the effectiveness of solidarity depends on the existence of such 
underlying recognition.  I, however, believe that the only viable possibility for 
preexisting normative recognition is through a recognition that happens at a psychic 
level, such as the recognition of mutual vulnerability proposed by Butler.  Other forms of 
preexisting normative recognition would require a commitment to a transcendent ideal 
subject, who forms the basis for all individual subjects.  Examples of this form of 
recognition are the Kantian model, or other modernist universalist conceptions of 
recognition.  This is an obviously problematic formulation for feminist ethical theory, as I 
explained in Chapter 3. 
Keeping in mind this qualified definition of power, let me be concrete about how 
solidarity must be characterized, in order to recognize the importance of power relations 
on the capacity for political participation.  First and foremost, a theory of political 
solidarity allows for mutability; as a coming together of shared interests for a time-
specific goal or purpose solidarity is, by definition, open to change corresponding to the 
changes of interest and desire, as well change in historical-political context.  In contrast, 
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communicative action tends to maintain the status quo; there is more permanence 
intended with a theory of normative consensus, resulting in a greater difficulty of radical 
or immediate change.  In relation to power, this means that a feminist theory of solidarity 
upholds a pragmatic approach of recognizing that power relations infuse society.  
However, power-as-such is not seen as absolute or omnipotent, but instead has the 
possibility for change.  If social power dynamics change, then certain political and social 
needs will also change in response.  This fluidity requires the mutability of solidarity.   
Further, solidarity avoids the leveling or hierarchizing of other forms of strategic 
unification, i.e. consensus-oriented communicative action.  Solidarity defines individuals 
as a part of the “group” according to the specific shared interest that brings the group 
together, but does not attempt to restrict individuals, as individuals, to these qualities.  
According to Arendt and Allen, individuals retain other unique identities and often hold 
very different positions and viewpoints from other members on other political, social, and 
personal matters.  In contrast, by virtue of the consensus-orientation of communicative 
action, individual group members are required to defer to one another, to make 
compromises, and to level other individual differences.  Not only is this problematic on a 
theoretical level when it comes to the central Critical Theory issue of emancipation, as I 
addressed in chapter 3, but this is also problematic in light of the issue of power. The 
“group” in a normative ethics operates by means of consensus.  This means that 
according to Habermas, it is desirable for individuals to have autonomous desires that are 
brought to the group, but that eventually the culmination of normative figuration will be a 
totalized agreement.  If normative consensus seeking communicative action requires 
deference and a leveling of difference, then it encourages precisely the unhealthy 
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subordinating power relations Allen warns us to avoid.  Not only is Habermas therefore 
sanguine about hierarchical power and the psychical damage of internalizing such 
subordination, but he is also culpable of directly encouraging such power relations. 
Solidarity is often a characteristic of resistance movements.  A fringe group can 
display the same level of solidarity and the same ethics of solidarity as a “legitimate” 
political group.  Despite Habermas‟ romantic evaluation of certain revolutionary ideals, 
Habermas and Habermasian theory are decidedly conservative.
273
  Normativity, by its 
very nature, promotes standardized political decisions within the scope of a legitimate 
political body.  Fringe groups‟ limited reach precludes their ability to be as effective 
normatively. 
Solidarity also upholds the ideals of the care ethics I outline in Chapter 4.  Parents 
can align themselves as a group with a concerted interest in care of their families and 
children.  Similarly modeled care relationships can also form, where the requisite social 
or political basis is the orientation towards care-fulfillment.  These relationships would be 
otherwise excluded from political consideration except as a sort of democratic 
constituent; this provides a relational/interpersonal characteristic to an ethics of 
solidarity. 
For these reasons, feminist ethics seem naturally to align more closely with 
solidarity.  In relation to the issue of distinguishing between public and private concerns, 
solidarity obviates problems related to neglecting the feminine concerns of the private 
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sphere by respecting psychological and political needs.  Additionally, in order to form a 
relationship of solidarity, participants are not confined to legitimate political bodies in 
order to possess or express power.  For example, transnational feminist movements can 
employ relationships of solidarity, despite their differences in national governing bodies.  
This is not to say that Habermas believes that communicative action is confined to 
nationally organized, official governmental political bodies.  In fact, in 2003 Habermas 
wrote (and co-signed with Derrida) a lengthy appeal to European citizens to unite in their 
dissent of the Iraq War, and further to agree in concert to change national public policies, 
to correspond with the international opposition to the American invasion of Iraq.
274
   
Habermas hearkens to a theory of globalization, writing that such action could, 
“…[S]upport the rejection of Eurocentrism, and inspire the Kantian hope for a global 
domestic policy.”275  However, despite Habermas‟ growing sympathies to transnational 
political action, this form of globalization still retains valences of the Eurocentric and 
imperialistic world order he admonishes.  If Habermas‟ goal is the inclusion of non-
hegemonic world orders into the protections of international human rights, then why 
make the appeal only to the countries of central Europe?  As Iris Marion Young 
convincingly argues:  
I wonder, however, just how cosmopolitan is the stance taken in this statement [the original OpEd 
as a whole].  From the point of view of the rest of the world, and especially from the point of view 
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of the states and people in the global South, the philosophers‟ appeal may look more like a 
recentering of Europe than the invocation of an inclusive global democracy.
276
 
    
For Young, Habermas seems to ground his theory of a new global order only through 
European political action.  In the article, Habermas argues that the possibility for an 
emergent global domestic policy is supported by the simultaneous eruption of anti-war 
protests across Europe:   
But we should also remember February 15, 2003, as mass demonstrations in London and Rome, 
Madrid and Barcelona, Berlin and Paris reacted to this sneak attack [the U.S. invasion of Iraq].  
The simultaneity of these overwhelming demonstrations—the largest since the end of the Second 
World War—may well, in hindsight, go down in history as a sign of the birth of a European public 
sphere.
277
 
 
Habermas‟ use of demonstrations as evidence for the emergence of this international, 
albeit exclusively central European, public sphere is the important point for Young.  As 
Young points out, the important historical moment was not only taking place in Europe, 
but across the world, with demonstrations from Mexico City to Johannesburg.  More 
importantly, for Young, however, is the fact that the evidence for the coordination of 
these demonstrations appears to have taken place, not in Europe, but, 
…[T]he worldwide coordination of these demonstrations was planned at the third meeting of the 
World Social Forum in Porto Alegre in January 2003.  The worldwide coordination of these 
demonstrations thus may signal the emergence of a global public sphere, of which European 
publics are wings, but whose heart may lie in the southern hemisphere.
278
 
 
Habermas‟ lack of recognition for the importance of this council, and also for the general 
importance of the southern hemisphere in establishing cosmopolitan democracy, is 
troubling for Young.  According to Young, is additionally symptomatic of another 
Eurocentric and phallogocentric problem latent in Habermas‟ theory: he attempts to 
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speak on behalf of others, rather than speaking with them.
279
  By arguing that the 
unification of central European policy could be the sign of a new global world, Habermas 
also makes the claim that such an agreement would act in proxy of the inclusion of other 
interested national parties.     
Communicative action seems to require explicit legislative intervention in order to 
be effective.  I suspect that one reason Habermas is forced into such a conservative 
position, is the need for communicative action to rest on a sort of Enlightenment-era 
notion of rationality and rational speech.  By making his appeal through communicative 
action, Habermas is relegated to normative understanding only within countries and 
places with the same standards of rational communication and organization.  This form of 
rational speech lends itself to justification through legislation.  Alternatively, the 
communication of the form of solidarity which I am proposing is based on an 
understanding of the psychological fact of mutual vulnerability.
280
  This commonality is 
enough for the basic recognition required to identify shared interests and needs, which 
then ground the action of solidarity.  Solidarity can therefore be extraneous to all 
governmental bodies and boundaries and grants legitimizing power based on interests, 
not law or nationality. 
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 This understanding of solidarity, however, requires a synthetic understanding of arguments made by 
Allen, Butler and Arendt.  If, as a contemporary feminist philosopher, I merely took up Arendt‟s 
formulation of solidarity, then it would have the same difficulties as Habermasian communicative action.  
For Arendt, any political action is based in rational speech.  But, as I addressed in chapter 5, this seems 
problematic from an inclusionary feminist viewpoint.  Therefore, keeping in mind the potential for 
aesthetic political participation, as well as intercultural political action, I have adapted Arendt‟s theory with 
a new grounding in a Butlerian theory of recognition. 
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On an abstract-theoretical level, solidarity is rooted firmly in the present.  Its goal 
is not consensus formation and transformation in a Hegelian sense.  Instead its goal is to 
provide an outlet for immediate change, with an eye toward future possibilities for further 
change.  It is, centrally, a utopian political practice, oriented towards transfiguration. 
 
The Psychological Foundations for Utopian Change 
Habermas sees in the explorations of utopic ideals, the appeal to reason and 
dialectic.  He admires Marcuse‟s utopist vision, but less because it inspired revolution, 
and more because of what it exposed in Marcuse‟s sensibilities, a romantic element 
grounded firmly in a commitment to idealist notions of reason, i.e., Kant, and an 
appreciation of history grounded firmly in Hegelian dialectics.
281
  Although it may be 
argued that Habermas himself does not have this romantic edge, Habermas‟ account of 
Marcuse is full of reverence and admiration for this quality.  So much so, that Habermas‟ 
own tone begins to wax romantic.  However, if Habermas identifies the core of 
Marcuse‟s romanticism in Kantian reason and Hegelian historicity, it is certainly because 
of his own predilection for these concepts.  Kantian reason and Hegelian historicity 
ground his theory of communication; they are what allow for rational consensus and even 
the speech act situation.  In this way, Habermas introduces a utopic moment to his theory.  
He has hope for a future made better through democratic participation, wherein the norms 
and values most helpful for all are rationally agreed to at the end of reasonable 
communicative action.  This utopist vision parallels the goals and ideals of many 
“rebellious” thinkers, including many feminists whose critical optimism rests entirely in 
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the hope for future change.  Although Habermas and these feminist positions share many 
of the same goals, the philosophical commitments are quite divergent.  Whereas 
Habermas is committed to a hard line notion of reason based argumentation culminating 
in rational consensus in order to promote norms, which are themselves the utopian 
promise, many feminists have a quite different grounding.  Benhabib, for example, is 
closest to Habermas, in that she argues that a commitment to universalist reason is 
necessary for making appeals to betterment—without agreed upon notions of what good 
and better are, how else can we achieve a better future?  However, Benhabib is still 
distinct from Habermas in that she recognizes that this idealist notion of reason is only 
useful on a macro-level.  In order to even come together for utopian change, Benhabib 
contends that we must recognize the individual particularities that can never be subsumed 
into one programmatic norm for society, but are always instead concrete and particular, 
as I argued in Chapter 3.  Utopic change can only arise when a balance is met between 
the generalized and the concrete other.  Here utopianism is grounded less on Hegelian 
historicity and more on historically contingent and contextual psychologies.  Drucilla 
Cornell expands on these notions of historically contingent and contextual notions of 
utopia.  Like Benhabib, Cornell, believes that it is in the reflection of the other that utopia 
is best understood.  However, Cornell hearkens to Kant, Adorno, and Derrida to explore 
how that otherness can be uncovered in the subject‟s own psyche.  For Cornell, Kant 
explains the internal notion of the other best by placing the ego, the act, and the time of 
the act in relation to one another: 
The form of interiority for a subject necessarily “in time” means not only that time is internal to us 
but also that our interiority constantly divides us from ourselves; in this sense, it splits us in two, 
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which is a splitting in two that never runs its course since time has no end for us as finite human 
beings.  We cannot know ourselves as free subjects in the sense of a theoretical knowledge..
282
 
  
For Cornell, then, there is a sort of Kantian optimism for the possibility of a moral image.  
Obviating the problems of cultural relativism and absolute heterogeneity, Cornell adapts 
a Kantian theory of the internal subject/other relation.  By grounding this relationship 
within the human psyche, difference is a concept internal to us as human subjects.  
Similarly, Cornell argues that the image of freedom itself emerges in our mind, as that 
which we understand is already, and “how much it can itself become „other‟ from that 
moment.”283  She synthesizes this political reading of the Kantian subject, with a reading 
of Adorno, highlighting Adorno‟s charge that negativity and pessimism illuminates its 
opposite: “So, even in Adorno the insistence that we must come to terms with the full 
force of the internalization of how we have become subjected and the objects of a society 
of total commodification, we do so not merely by holding on to consummate negativity 
because in a sense that negativity can never be grasped or configured without another 
standpoint.”284  For Cornell, then, first generation Critical Theory and postmodernism 
have something in common with Kant, they require an internal psychological reflection.  
On the other hand, as I explained in chapter 5, Cornell is less convinced than Habermas 
or Benhabib that utopianism must be grounded on conceptual reason at all, where 
conceptual implies a specific concept which is the object of reason.  She contends that the 
limits of reason are in fact the possibilities for change and the future; these possibilities 
are what she identifies as the objects of “redemptive imagination.”285  We must be 
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Kantian to be sure, but the Kant of the Third Critique, rather than the First or Second.  In 
this way, Cornell‟s optimism for the future is grounded on what has not yet come, a 
hearkening to Derrida at his most political.   
For my interests, it is this simultaneously aesthetic and political idea that gives 
credibility toward a feminist relational ethics oriented towards emancipatory 
transfiguration.  By extending Cornell‟s conception of the “redemptive imaginary” to an 
ethical imperative, we are able to reconfigure the terms of the tension between absolute 
heterogeneity and homogeneity.  By recasting the very framework for the discussion into 
Kantian aesthetic and Derridean political terminology, the alternative emerges as a 
“universality that respects the plurality of cultural forms and symbols as integral to the 
moral demand put on us by the ideal of humanity itself.”286  I believe that Cornell‟s 
theory emerges as a viable alternative, combining Benhabib‟s interest in the universal 
utopian with Butler‟s demands for an ethics of respect for individual subjective 
iteration.
287
 Additionally, Cornell‟s emphasis on the aesthetic and the imaginary appeals 
to Allen‟s notion of solidarity, where she claims that feminist hopes for undoing 
                                                 
286
 Ibid., 76. 
287
 Although Cornell is obviously aware of and engaged with Benhabib and Butler‟s theories, I do not 
believe she is arguing explicitly for such a synthesis.  Instead, it is my position that Cornell‟s redemptive 
imaginary can be read as a theory which combines these interests, one which I have been arguing 
throughout  is necessary as a feminist Critical Theoretical corrective to Habermasian theory. See also De 
Beauvoir, Simone.  The Ethics of Ambiguity.  Translated by Bernard Frechtman. Seacaucus, NJ: The 
Citadel Press, 1948.  There she writes: “To put it positively, the precept will be to treat the other (to the 
extent that he is the only one concerned, which is the moment that we are considering at present) as a 
freedom so that his end may be freedom; in using this conducting-wire one will have to incur the risk, in 
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patriarchal and hierarchal power relations are often best addressed through aesthetic, 
narrative, and cultural change. 
 
The Future of Critical Feminist Theory 
Feminist philosophy, explicitly or implicitly, has always had critical predilections.  
By combining the best parts of Habermasian Critical Theory with these impulses, an 
innovative and adaptive Critical Theory of intersubjectivity and participation emerges.  
Although I have outlined a position I feel a viable alternative and corrective to Habermas‟ 
normative and consensus-oriented limitations, I freely admit that this theory is neither 
absolute nor permanent.  In fact, in order to maintain the essential core of my argument 
this theory must be adaptable and oriented to future change.  As de Beauvoir elegantly 
and succinctly explained at the birth of feminist philosophy, “The Other is multiple, and 
on the basis of this new questions arise.”288  It is in her spirit that I open this work to 
further critique and new critical engagements.   
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